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ABSTRACT 
Poverty is a worldwide problem with many challenges in combating. This 
dissertation analyzes poverty in two rural African contexts, Tanzania and Ethiopia, to 
assess aid strategies based on the socio-economic context that causes the poverty to 
persist. Understanding root cause of poverty is critical in order to combat it. We focus 
on whether aid programs have spillovers into the environmental realm, which may 
have impact on effectiveness of aid policies and whether or not a poverty trap, where 
households become structurally trapped in chronic poverty, exists. In this dissertation, 
we attempt to enhance our ability to provide optimal aid to populations stuck in 
poverty based on the underlying characteristics of the poverty. We find a Conditional 
Cash Transfer program in Tanzania results in unintended spillovers into the fishery 
sector via increased demand for seafood products as well as an increase in households 
using fishing as an income source. If unaccounted for, this spillover can lead to 
additional pressures on the fishery causing a reduction in future wellbeing. Next we 
provide theoretic model of a multiple equilibria poverty trap, which we use to 
determine the theoretically optimal level of aid to provide to those facing the poverty 
trap. We find the cost of aid is the primary factor to consider, as opposed to level of 
poverty, and find there are significant costs to underproviding aid, which can result in 
an aid trap, where aid has high cost while poverty is not significantly impacted. 
Lastly, we introduce a new empirical method of identifying poverty traps and apply it 
to herd data on Boran Pastoralists in Ethiopia where poverty traps have previously 
been identified. However, we find no evidence of poverty traps using our methods. 
  
Together this dissertation looks at the underlying structure of poverty to determine 
how aid policy can be better applied.
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1. Introduction and Overview 
Eliminating extreme poverty has been a world priority for some time, highlighted by its 
prominence in the Millennium Development Goals. Significant progress has been made 
on this front, but we still have a long way to go. Combating poverty efficiently requires 
an understanding of the root causes of poverty in the socio-economic context it occurs in 
order to tailor poverty alleviation programs to the needs of poor. In this dissertation, we 
(referring to myself and the significant and essential collaboration with my committee) 
contribute to this substantial task by analyzing poverty reduction programs in empirical 
and theoretic contexts. 
   Poverty reduction programs come in many forms, which can and should be 
tailored to address the context where poverty is being combatted. There is no overarching 
solution, as the context of the socio-economic system directly impact how effective 
various strategies will be. While there are far too many potential aid strategies to detail 
here, we provide a brief overview of some of the methods available in order to discuss 
their applicability to combat poverty for the case studies in Tanzania and Ethiopia, which 
we look at in this dissertation. 
 Microfinance, providing small-scale financial services to low-inomce populations, 
has been a popular method of reducing poverty since the 1970s (Marr, 2012). While 
originally used to provide mostly small scale loans in an attempt to provide the capital 
needed as well as a means of protecting against negative shocks, more recently these 
institutions have been moving towards offering micro-savings programs as well (Rooyen, 
2012). These programs have been popular as they provide access to capital with which to 
start up small businesses or invest in productive capital such as fertilizer and farming 
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equipment. This is especially relevant to the poverty trap discussion, which we go into in 
sections 3 and 4 as one theoretic cause of persistent poverty is the inability to afford 
productive assets, which would enhance long term outcomes. In fact, much of the 
theoretic poverty trap literature requires assuming no access to credit markets for this 
reason. In a review of microfinance in sub-Saharan Africa, Rooyen (2012) finds overall 
positive results, but also there are cases where it provides significant harm to those 
receiving micro-loans. Rooyen finds micro-saving to have a more consistent benefit to 
recipients than the micro-loans, which is a trend that microfinance institutions have been 
moving towards recently. In addition to income impacts, there also appears to be 
significant benefits to other areas such as child education and empowerment of women, 
the latter largely attributed to many microfinance institutions primarily providing services 
to women in the household (Marr, 2012).  
Another popular form of aid has been direct payments to households so long as 
the households follow some requirements, known as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT). 
These programs provide aid while incentivizing behaviors which can lead to a reduction 
in long-term poverty such as increased education and better health practices. These 
programs have been especially prevalent in Latin America and, more recently, have been 
used in Asia and Africa (Evans et al., 2016). In a review of 13 CCTs in Latin America, 
Ranganathan and Mylene  (2102) show overall these programs have been effective at 
increasing health behaviors as well as providing short-term aid in the form of payments. 
By requiring healthy behavior, these programs enhance the productivity of the recipients, 
which provides a long-term benefit. This is especially true when trying to combat 
intergenerational poverty. By incentivizing households to send children to school and 
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attend health facilities at young ages, such as in the CCT we look at in chapter 2, it is 
hoped that the children of aid recipients will be better able to provide for themselves in 
the future, thus reducing the need for poverty reduction programs in the future. While 
CCTs appear effective at reducing poverty and enhancing health and education outcomes, 
there is some concern of unintended spillovers in terms of how individuals interact with 
the local environment. 
In section 2, we analyze the unintended spillovers of poverty reduction program 
on local fisheries in rural Tanzania. If unaccounted for, spillovers may have adverse 
effects on the long term well being of population reducing the effectiveness of aid. This is 
especially true in rural settings where impoverished populations live on fragile land and 
have livelihoods that depend heavily on local environment (Barrett et al., 2011; Barbier, 
2010). Poverty alleviation should take into account the complex feedbacks between the 
environment and socio-economic system to avoid negative unintended consequences. In 
extreme cases, poverty reduction policies with severe negative impacts on local 
environmental amenities may result in short lived gains to wellbeing if they result in the 
exasperation or the beginning of a ‘poverty-environment trap’, where poverty and 
environmental degradation become self-reinforcing (Barbier (2010). 
There is mixed evidence for whether poverty reduction leads to negative impacts 
on local environmental amenities (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003; Zwane, 2007; Alix-
Garcia et al., 2011; Hannah and Olivia, 2015) depending on the context being studied and 
the environmental amenity being studied. While there have been large strides in 
understanding how poverty reduction policies spillover into some resources, most notably 
forests and timber products (Koop and Tole, 1999; Martinez et al., 2002; Culas, 2007; 
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Zhou, et al. 2011), little has focused on how poverty reduction programs impact 
dependence on local fisheries. We fill this gap in the literature by looking at a CCT 
program in Tanzania and analyze the impact of program participation on demand for 
marine and freshwater seafood as well as household income from fishing. Our data come 
from a World Bank pilot study which implemented a conditional cash transfer (CCT) to 
households in eighty villages within three districts from 2009-2012 (Evans et al., 2014).  
In line with much of the world’s fisheries, Tanzania’s fisheries are experiencing 
increased pressure and are at risk of overexploitation both inland (Ogutu-Ohwayo, 1990) 
and in coastal regions (Berachi, 2003; Silva, 2006). Especially in the coastal regions, 
fisheries management programs have been utilized to try to enhance the sustainability of 
local fisheries through a combination of marine protected areas in conjunction with ways 
of promoting alternative livelihoods to reduce pressure on the fisheries (Berachi, 2003). 
Since there is currently activity to push households away from fishing in many areas, it 
may be counter productive if poverty reduction strategies have spillovers which increase 
demand for seafood and/or increase the number of households who earn income from 
fishing. 
The CCT targeted poor and vulnerable households and was designed to provide 
aid to these vulnerable populations as well as promote health and education in three rural 
districts of Tanzania: Bagamoyo (~70 km from Dar es Salaam), Chamwino (~50 km from 
Dodoma), and Kibaha (~35 km from Dar es Salaam). The populations of these districts 
depend largely on farming, both subsistence and cash crops, with over 32% of 
households reporting sale of crops as their primary source of income (Evans et al., 2014). 
Only a small percentage of households report fishing income as either their primary or 
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secondary source of income for this sample, so we are not looking at fishing villages in 
this study, but rather farming communities which may have access to fishing to 
supplement income. Rural poverty in Tanzania is a long-standing problem with an 
estimated 39% of its rural population being poor as of 2000, compared to 24% of its 
urban citizens (Ellis, 2003). Thus, many of the poverty reduction programs in Tanzania 
have a focus on the rural areas. 
The CCT program we look at in chapter 2 targeted the poorest individuals within 
the communities to be eligible for program participation based on income/expenditure 
surveys and a final selection process conducted by community leaders. Of the sample, 
over 90% of households had unimproved floors and under 40% had access to piped water 
or had an improved roof (Evans et al., 2014). The program required young children (0-5) 
to visit health care facilities 6 times a year and elderly to visit at least once a year while 
children between the ages of 7-15 had to maintain an 80% school attendance to be 
eligible for payments. The main livelihood for those in the study was farming with 90% 
of adults performing some agriculture (Evans et al., 2014). The authors report most crops 
were grown for food, a large portion of households (42%) report the main source of 
income was from selling food or cash crops. As the study targeted the most vulnerable in 
the villages, few households own livestock other than chickens or other durable assets 
and less than 2% reported savings of any kind.   
The study conducted a randomized control trial designed to analyze the 
effectiveness of implementing CCTs in Africa, while much of the previous usage of 
CCTs had been conducted in Latin America and Asia. We exploit the randomized control 
trial that was implemented for the first stage of the CCT to assess the impact of the CCT 
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on pressures of local fisheries. We look both at whether increased incomes lead to a 
higher demand for seafood products as well as if additional income causes a shift away 
from farming towards fishing. Typically demand for seafood products tend to rise with 
wealth, which could increase pressures on local fisheries. We find a positive treatment 
effect on both demand for seafood products and number of households earning income 
from fishing activities. Additionally, we find heterogeneous wealth effects as poverty 
reduction policies likely have a systematically different impact on households, which is 
correlated with household wealth. Lastly, we find a significant lag between program 
participation and observable spillovers suggesting the need for assessment over longer 
time frames to ensure spillovers are identified when they exist. 
The next two sections look at poverty traps, in essence how households appear 
stuck in poverty over time. We use data from the Borana Plateau of southern Ethipoia to 
study this phenomenon. In section 3 we present a general poverty trap model loosely 
based on this system and section 4 atempts to empirically identify poverty traps using 
data of herd sizes from Boran pastoralists. We have 17 years of data across four villages 
in the Borana Plateau of southern Ethiopia, an important rangeland for Ethiopia with 
livestock from this region supplying various domestic and export markets (Coppock et 
al., 2014). The arid climate of the region makes crop production relatively unproductive, 
which is why the dominant livelihood has been pastoralism, especially cattle, which has 
been prominent in the region for many generations. However, increased pressures due to 
rising populations in the region and a drier climate have led to increased degradation of 
rangelands and decreased livestock productivity (Lybbert et al., 2004; Soloman, 2006; 
Coppock et al., 2014). More recently, there has been growing adoption of non-pastoral 
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livelihoods increasing the diversification of income streams, especially amongst younger 
households (Berhanu et al., 2007). As the lands are becoming less productive, it is also 
having to support larger populations, which increases the pressure on the fragile 
rangelands (Coppock, 2016). The rangeland has been typically unmanaged and has 
recently experienced bush encroachment and gullying due to the additional pressures and 
changing environmental conditions, which has led some to propose a more active 
management of these rangelands to promote sustainable pastoralism (Coppock, 2016). 
Along with the changes associated with decreased rainfall and reduced herd sizes 
amongst pastoralists that has been observed over time for this region, between 1983-85 
there was a severe famine largely brought about by civil turmoil in Ethiopia combined 
with severe drought resulting in substantial livestock loss (Desta and Coppock, 2004). 
This famine had widespread effects across the country, but the Boran pastoralists were hit 
particularly hard with nearly 10% of the population moving to relief shelters during this 
period (Lindtjørn, 1990). This period certainly represents a major shock to the productive 
capacity of the Boran pastoralists, which we can clearly see in terms of a reduction in 
household herd sizes after this period. This process of shocks and rebuilding is not 
uncommon for pastoralists, there is a tendency for drought and other die offs to reduce 
herd sizes followed by a rebuilding of herds during good years (Lybbert, 2004). 
 The pastoralism of the Borana Plateau has been a focal point of the poverty trap 
literature (e.g. McPeak and Barrett, 2001; Lybbert et al., 2004; Barrett 2006; Toth, 2014), 
along with similar setting in other arid and semi-arid dry lands of east and southern 
Africa where semi-mobile pastoralism is the primary livelihood. This system is an ideal 
study location due to its reliance on one productive asset (the herd) and lack of access to 
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alternative livlihoods, which we disucss in more detail in section 3. Most importantly 
there is a more productive livelihood (mobile pastoralism), which is only accessable with 
a large enough herd size. Thus, there is a clear and visable mechanism, which could 
explain a poverty trap in this system. 
Semi-mobile or transhumant pastoralism occurs when households’ move herds 
between pastures, especially during the dry seasons, while maintaining a permanent 
home. Typically the herd is broken down into two sub-herds: the warra herd consisting 
of milk cows and calves under two years old, which remains near the home, and fora 
herd, which migrates between pastures and water sources consisting of older immature 
cattle, dry cows and bulls (Lybbert et al., 2004; Soloman, 2006). Accessing pastures 
away from the immediate village requires a large enough fora herd to support the herders 
who rely heavily on meat and blood from their animals during the long migrations 
(Lybbert et al., 2004). Thus, mobile pastoralism requires a minimum herd size. When 
herds drop below this level, the household must resort to sedentary pastoralism, which is 
far less productive and associated with significantly higher rates of poverty (Little et al., 
2008; Toth 2014).  
This represents multiple production technologies (mobile and sedentary 
pastoralism), where the more productive technology requires a minimum wealth level to 
access. This is one of the theoretic mechanisms that can cause a multiple equilibrium 
poverty trap, which we discuss in section 3. Another desirable feature of this system, in 
the context of identifying poverty traps, is wealth is almost exclusively maintained in the 
form of the herd with little to no access to financial markets.  
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 In chapter 3, we expand upon our theoretic understanding of how to provide 
optimal aid to populations experiencing a poverty trap. A poverty trap is characterized by 
self-reinforcing mechanisms causing poverty to persist (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005). 
In this chapter we focus on a specific case of poverty trap where wealth dynamics result 
in multiple dynamic equilibria each with its own basin of attraction (in essence pulling 
wealth towards it over time) separated by a critical wealth threshold known as the 
Micawber Threshold. In this context, once people fall into poverty they are highly likely 
to remain impoverished in the future due to a lack of productive assets and means to 
accumulate them. In such cases, individuals are very unlikely to surmount the Micawber 
Threshold on their own and require external aid in order to escape poverty. 
We expand upon this literature by analyzing how the level of aid affects the cost 
and effectiveness of poverty reduction. Specifically we seek to answer the question of 
whether aid should target the Micawber Threshold. Barrett (2005) suggests for aid to be 
effective it must ensure wealth surmounts the Micawber Threshold, however, Barrett 
only shows this for the deterministic case. On the other side, Plucinski, Ngaonghala, and 
Bonds (2011) have shown aid set below critical thresholds can lead to escaping poverty 
trap, but do not attempt to determine if this is optimal.   
We present a poverty trap model and use numeric simulation to show optimal aid 
typically must be set above the Micawber Threshold when combating the multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap. When aid is set below the Micawber Threshold, typically 
results in a higher cost of poverty reduction coupled with higher rates of poverty, clearly 
an undesirable outcome. This arises due to an aid trap forming when aid is set at a level, 
which households can not maintain over time, as they are still in the basin of attraction of 
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a low wealth equilibria, while not being set high enough to significantly escape poverty 
in the future. Additionally we show the optimal aid level is largely determined by the cost 
of providing aid and the level of poverty as well as the weight a society places on 
poverty, which together can be thought of as the social cost of poverty, plays only a 
secondary role. This arises due to the coupled relationship between cost and level of 
poverty, which arises due to the aid trap. This chapter highlights the importance of 
understanding the dynamic process leading to chronic poverty based on numeric 
simulation and provides a theoretic starting point with which to make policy decisions 
when a multiple equilibrium poverty trap exists. 
However, the identification of multiple equilibrium poverty traps has numerous 
challenges (Barrett and Carter, 2013; Nashold, 2013), which limits the applicability of the 
theoretic results. Identifying the root cause of poverty is a necessary step to provide 
optimal policy. In section 4, we introduce two novel tests to surmount some of the issues 
associated with empirically identifying multiple equilibrium poverty traps by testing for 
implications of poverty traps rather than directly identifying the poverty trap itself. The 
first issues we circumvent are a lack of observations around the Micawber Threshold, 
which is a necessary feature of the multiple equilibrium poverty trap as it is an unstable 
dynamic equilibria with stable equilibria on either side pulling wealth away from the 
Micawber Threshold over time. The second issue is many empirical test for multiple 
equilibrium poverty traps do not allow for heterogeneity amongst a population and 
assume a single underlying asset dynamic (Jalan and Ravallion, 2004; Nashold, 2013), 
which is unrealistic as individual ability (Ikegami et al., 2016). 
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 We first test for mean reversion at the individual level using a variance ratio test, 
which has been widely used in the finance literature to test whether financial assets 
follow a random walk (e.g. Lo and MacKinlay, 1988). By testing at the individual level 
opposed to the aggregate level, we can allow for heterogeinity across individuals. 
Additionally we perform a mixture model designed to pick up clustering of data 
consistent with a multiple equilibrium poverty trap. However, this test does require 
assuming equilibria are homogeneous across the population. The clustering of data is a 
necessary feature of equilibria at the aggregate and village levels. The downside to our 
tests, is we cannot distinguish between whether a multiple equilibrium poverty trap exists 
or an alternative hypothesis of club convergence where both mean reversion and the 
equilibria are caused by each individual having access to one of the equilibria. Thus our 
test is designed as a falsification test to determine when a poverty trap cannot be present. 
When we apply our empirical tests to our data on the Boran pastoralists, we find 
no evidence of a poverty trap. This contradicts previous findings of Lybbert et al., (2004). 
In their paper, the authors use a direct test designed to fit a curve to the data to locate the 
Micawber Threshold and non-convex
1
 wealth dynamics associate with a multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap. We find this results is spurious likely caused by overfitting due 
to some clustering in the data around the Micawber Threshold they identify. Their 
analysis does not take into account the likelihood of data being present. If a Micawber 
Threshold exists, there should be few observations nearby that level of wealth, which 
                                                 
1
 Typically economic theory suggests the slope of the wealth generation function is to be 
decreasing at all points (negative second derivative) known as decreasing returns to scale, 
which results in dynamic wealth equilibrium. For multiple equilibria to exist, the wealth 
generation must exhibit increasing returns to scale (positive second derivative) over some 
portion of the data below the Micawber Threshold. 
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they fail to account for. This chapter highlights the importance of multiple and rigorous 
tests in order to identify the underlying poverty dynamics of a socioeconomic system, as 
applying poverty alleviation strategies assuming a poverty trap exists when it does not 
may lead to inefficient policy decisions. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter two evaluates 
the spillovers of a cash transfer program on the dependence of local fisheries. Chapter 
three introduces a poverty trap model and shows a “guaranteed wealth” aid policy should 
be set at the Micawber Threshold. Chapter four and five expand on this model by 
breaking down the cost of providing a guaranteed wealth at the Micawber Threshold into 
the cost of providing a “cargo net” and the cost of providing a “safety net” and introduce 
a method for estimating these costs with chapter four focusing on cargo nets and chapter 
five focused on the safety net. Chapter six concludes this dissertation. 
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2. Impact of Poverty Reduction Programs on Dependence of Local Fisheries 
2.1 Introduction 
The relationship between poverty and environmental quality has been a long-standing 
question. Especially in rural settings, impoverished populations tend to live on fragile 
land and have livelihoods that depend heavily on local environment (Barrett et al., 2011; 
Barbier, 2010). There is a complex relationship between the environment and the 
livelihoods of the people living in these areas. A central question at this environment-
poverty nexus is whether poverty reduction programs impact environmental quality in the 
surrounding area. It is unclear whether reducing poverty will put additional strain on local 
environmental amenities due to increased demand for resource intense products or 
potentially lead to households investing in environmental quality and reducing 
environmental damages (Alix-Garcia et al., 2011). The current literature is ambiguous 
about whether poverty reduction programs have spillovers into the realm of 
environmental quality as well as the direction of the impact if one exists (e.g. Hannah and 
Olivia, 2015; Zwane, 2007; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003). 
Understanding how poverty reduction programs impact local environmental 
quality can have major implications especially when livelihoods depend on the local 
environment. Reductions in poverty from these programs may be short lived if they 
degrade the ecosystems which the impoverished populations depend upon and may result 
in the exasperation or the beginning of an ‘poverty-environment trap’ as described by 
Barbier (2010), where poverty and environmental degradation become self-reinforcing. 
The environmental and economic conditions are likely to greatly impact how poverty 
reduction programs may impact local ecosystems. The livelihoods of the impoverished 
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population and how they change in response to poverty reduction programs will greatly 
influence whether poverty reduction leads to environmental degradation or improvement. 
The livelihoods of the target population will also impact which environmental amenities 
are likely to be affected. 
While there have been large strides in understanding the relationship of how 
poverty reduction policies spillover into some resources, most notably forests and timber 
products, little has focused on how poverty reduction programs impact dependence on 
local fisheries. We fill this gap in the literature by looking at a Conditional Cash Transfer 
(CCT) program in Tanzania and analyze the impact of program participation on demand 
for seafood
2
 and earning income from fishing. We exploit a randomized control trial that 
was implemented for the first stage of the CCT and find a positive treatment effect on 
both demand for seafood products and number of households earning income from 
fishing activities. Additionally, we highlight the importance of looking at heterogeneous 
wealth effects as poverty reduction policies likely have a systematically different impact 
on households depending on their wealth. Lastly, we find a significant lag between 
program participation and observable spillovers indicating the importance of longer 
period data sets to be sure any effects are picked up on. 
 
2.2 Background 
Understanding the complex relationship between income and environmental degradation 
has been a long-standing question with important implications for both poverty reduction 
and environmental management. The topic largely began with Grossman and Kruger’s 
                                                 
2
 The definition of seafood we use includes all marine and freshwater species. 
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(1991) adaptation of Kuznets (1955) theory, now known as the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (EKC), which predicts an inverted u-shaped relationship between wealth and 
environmental quality, implying as a poor country gains wealth it will degrade its local 
resources in the process of development up to a point where it is wealthy enough to 
afford to invest in environmental quality.  
There is mixed evidence of the existence of the EKC and depends largely on the 
type of pollution being considered. Grossman and Krueger (1995) use data from a panel 
of many cities in different countries and find evidence in favor of the EKC for air 
pollution and river water quality. Local air pollution has been one of the more widely 
studied indicators used to identify the EKC with a large body of supporting evidence (e.g. 
Seldon and Song, 1992; Cole et al., 1997), however, pollutants with a longer term or 
dispersed damages appear to monotonically increase with per capita income (Arrow et 
al., 1995; Cole et al., 1997). There has even been some contention over previous findings; 
Stern (2004) suggest much of the evidence in favor of the EKC hypothesis may have 
issues with serial dependence in time series data and/or omitted variable bias and find, 
once these are correctly accounted for, most pollutants and waste flows are increasing 
with per capita income. Deforestation is another localized environmental quality indicator 
with mixed evidence in favor of the EKC hypothesis (e.g. Koop and Tole, 1999; Martinez 
et al., 2002; Culas, 2007; Zhou, et al. 2011). 
While highly debated, both in theory and with contradicting empirical evidence 
(e.g. Stern, 2004; Li et al.; 2007; Choumert et al., 2013), this idea is still prominent in the 
poverty-environmental quality discussion where there is a concern that increasing wealth 
amongst poor populations will lead to increased pressure on local natural resources. Thus, 
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there may be unintended negative consequences to providing aid to impoverished 
populations, which are largely not considered when governments are implementing 
poverty-reduction policies (Alix-Garcia et al., 2013). Understanding the complex 
relationship between poverty and natural resource usage may shed light on whether 
reducing poverty will necessarily reduce environmental quality or if win-win solutions 
exist in terms of poverty reduction and environmental quality.  
A large portion of this literature has focused on deforestation and forest 
degradation as it is an issue in much of the developing world and, especially in the case 
of deforestation, highly visible issue. There is mixed evidence concerning the actual 
effect of poverty reduction on deforestation rates, which may be largely due to differing 
socio-environmental conditions of the study area. Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) find no 
evidence increasing income leads to afforestation in open economies where there is a 
weak link between demand for forest products and forest cover, but in a closed economy, 
they find a positive relationship between income and forest cover. In contrast, Zwane 
(2007) find evidence of a positive, but decreasing, relationship between income and 
deforestation rates in Peru, consistent with the EKC. Similarly, Alix-Garcia et al. (2013) 
find poverty reduction has negative spillover effects in terms of increasing deforestation 
in Mexico. Poor households tend to switch to more land-intensive farming activities in 
response to the increased income. 
The economic and environmental contexts are important to consider as they 
pertain to potential livelihoods. Zwane (2007) and Alix-Garcia et al (2013) focus on 
deforestation driven largely by households clearing land for agriculture in Peru and 
Mexico respectively. This is a prominent concern in places where populations live near 
  17 
established forests, which are suitable for farming or pasture lands with access to markets 
to sell farm products. In other contexts, the demand for forest products come in the form 
of extractive behaviors such as fuel wood harvesting, which has been a principle concern 
in places such as India (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003), China (e.g. Demurger and 
Fournier, 2011) and Africa (e.g. Adeoti et al., 2001).  
The choice of fuel has numerous health and environmental consequences. Low 
quality cooking fuels such as dung, wood, and charcoal can have serious negative health 
effects resulting in lower productivity workers, especially when burned indoors as is 
typical in many developing countries (Bruce et al., 2000). In addition to health effects, 
fuel choice impacts demand for local ecosystem services in the form of harvesting wood 
and charcoal from local forests (Demurger and Fournier, 2011). Thus there may be both 
an environmental and health benefit associated with households switching away from 
these fuel sources. The “Energy-Ladder” hypothesis is as a household’s wealth increases 
it shifts towards consuming higher quality fuels (Hanna and Olivia, 2015; Demurger and 
Fournier, 2011). If fuel wood is an inferior good, that is to say the use decreases as 
income rises, as the Energy-Hypothesis states, we would expect to see poverty reduction 
programs result in a lower usage of fuel wood as other, more desirable, fuels become 
affordable. 
 There is mixed empirical evidence about how poverty reduction affects demand 
for fuel wood. Hanna and Olivia (2015) show a wealth effect increases aggregate fuel 
usage with little substitution towards cleaner fuels in India suggesting an increase in 
income will likely put increased pressure on local forests. The authors found a relative 
increase in the use of dirty-burning cow dung, which was likely due to the income 
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increase for households (as part of an aid program) was in the form of cattle. In contrast, 
Demurger and Fournier (2011) show firewood is an inferior good in rural China. As 
wealth increases, they find significant switching behavior towards cleaner fuels 
indicating a reduction in poverty would result in lower harvesting pressure on local 
forests. The discrepancy may depend on other factors such as relative price and 
availability of substitutes, which is highly influenced by access to markets. 
These studies highlight the importance of understanding the economic and 
environmental conditions when trying to determine how poverty reduction policies will 
impact environmental quality. The linkages between poverty and demand for local 
ecosystem services can come from both livelihoods (e.g. clearing forests for additional 
farmland) and consumption needs (e.g. increased pressure on forests due to increased 
demand for forest products). While much of the literature has focused on forest 
degradation, this is just one potential spillover of poverty reduction programs into the 
realm of environmental quality. There is still a significant lack of understanding how the 
spillovers will impact demand for other local ecosystem services, which in turn impacts 
the overall environmental degradation.  
Much of the insights from assessing poverty reduction programs on forest 
degradation are directly applicable to the impact of poverty reduction on local fisheries as 
both are, typically, common pool resources poor populations depend upon for livelihoods 
(e.g. Beck and Nesmith, 2001). These resources can be used to supplement alternative 
forms of income or as a household’s primary source of income and both can be used for 
direct consumption (e.g. food or fuelwood). One notable difference, a large degree of 
deforestation is to clear land for other usage, such as farm or pasture land, and there is no 
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analogous process related to fisheries. Thus, studies which found deforestation being 
caused by transforming forests into agriculture and/or pastureland may not provide much 
insight into how a fishery may be affected by poverty reduction strategies. Another 
difference is there usually are different fish species which households can target in a 
fishery, potentially switching target species depending on socio-economic and 
environmental conditions, which does not have a good analogy in the forestry sector. 
However, most of the linkages between income and natural resource usage appear to have 
strong similarities between the fishery and forestry sectors allowing us to use literature of 
poverty reduction programs on forest degradation as motivation and a good starting point 
to discuss the impact of poverty alleviation on the pressures on local fisheries. 
In this paper, we address both the livelihoods and consumption pathways as we 
investigate the impact of poverty reduction programs on pressures on local fisheries, 
which, to our knowledge, has yet to be explored. We investigate the change in fishing 
behavior caused by program participation, which is the direct pressure on the local 
fisheries, as well as the indirect pressure arising from how household demand for seafood 
products change due to participation in poverty reduction programs.  
 
2.2.1 Poverty and consumption behavior 
At the macro level, total seafood consumption increases with income (Jenson, 
2006; Kent, 1997). Developing countries typically get a lager percent of their animal 
protein from seafood (Kent 1997). Jenson (2006) show as incomes rise consumption 
shifts from cereals, roots and other staples to consuming more animal products, however, 
this shift towards animal products is less strong for seafood. As incomes rise the percent 
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of income spent on animal consumption rises, but the share of protein expenditure spent 
on seafood declines.  
 
Looking at household consumption, Humphries et al (2014) look at food expenditure 
based on income level in Peru. They show the poorest households spend proportionately 
more of their income on food, but less of that spending goes towards animal products. 
They also show that as food expenditure increases, the proportion devoted to animal 
products increases for poor households (elasticity > 1). Similarly, Abdulai and Aubert 
(2004) show budget share of meat fish and eggs increases with wealth in Tanzania and 
does so to a greater extent than all other foods except cereals.  The trend of relatively 
larger expenditure on seafood, as compared to other animal protein, by the poor is 
apparent at the household level as well. In a survey of multiple Asian countries, Dey et al. 
(2005) show poorer households spend a larger percentage of their income on seafood 
making it an important source of animal protein. The authors point poorer households 
consume lower value fish, which make it a relatively cheap source of animal protein.  
The literature is consistent in suggesting as income rises we would expect 
increased seafood consumption, but at a slower rate than other sources of animal protein. 
However, some forms of less desirable seafood may be inferior goods, which households 
will switch away from and replace with more expensive seafood. Thus there may be 
ambiguous effects on the pressure on local fisheries depending on the quality of locally 
caught seafood. Our study attempts to address this question by looking at different types 
of seafood which households have access to. Specifically, we separate out dagaa, a small 
freshwater fish species that is popular amongst East Africa (Bille and Shmkai, 2006). 
  21 
While dagaa is consumed in large quantities, it is unclear whether its popularity stems 
from the fact that it is cheap (i.e. an inferior good) or if it is a choice fish, which people 
will consume in higher quantities as income rises. By separating out dagaa from other 
fish species, we can better determine the relationship between poverty and demand for 
dagaa as well as the demand for all other seafood. 
 
2.2.2 Poverty and fishing behavior 
In his meta-analysis, Béné (2003) highlights the lack of empirical investigation into the 
linkages between poverty and fisheries even though the prevailing view of policymakers 
and international agencies that fishermen tend to be, as Baily (1988) puts it, “ the poorest 
of the poor.” The two schools of thought have been: ‘fishermen are poor’ the open access 
nature of fisheries induces too many people to enter the fishery resulting in rent 
dissipation and eventual impoverishment of those involved (Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968) 
usually coupled with low incomes outside the fishery sector (Cunningham, 1994) or the 
‘poor are fishermen’ because fishing is a last-resort activity, which is only employed 
when all other options have been exhausted (Panayotou 1980; Bailey and Jentoft, 1990). 
Fishing can provide additional income as well as subsistence for impoverished 
populations. In Bangladesh, over 70% of rural households report at least some level of 
fishing (Tofique and Benton, 2014). This relationship is especially important during lean 
seasons where wild caught food, especially seafood, becomes an important for 
subsistence consumption between harvests for many parts of Africa (Bille and Shemkai, 
2006; de Merode et al., 2004; de Garine and Koppert, 1987).  
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Dependence on wild caught foods, including seafood, is a typical of impoverished 
rural populations, however, there is mixed evidence concerning the relationship between 
poverty and dependence on wild caught foods. It is widely believed the most 
impoverished in a community will be most dependent on local common pool resources, 
including wild caught food using data from India and countries in Western Africa (Beck 
and Nesmith, 2001). This is expressed in the fisheries literature as the belief that fishers 
are the ‘poorest of the poor’ where fishing is typically an activity undertook when 
households are unable to engage in more profitable activities (e.g. Cunningham, 1994). 
However, Merode et al. (2004) find it is the middle-income group, which engage catching 
wild foods using data from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Béné  (2009) 
show income tends to be higher for those engaging in fishing activities in the DRC as 
well. This is consistent with the idea that the poorest in a community may be unable to 
access some natural resources due to high fixed cost inputs necessary for extraction (e.g. 
fishing gear). Thus, the relationship between poverty and dependence on local fisheries is 
still is still an open question with important implications to how poverty reduction 
programs will impact pressures on local fisheries. We attempt to answer whether 
providing aid through participation in the CCT will increase fishing pressures by 
allowing additional households to overcome the fixed cost associated with fishing or 
whether fishing pressure decreases as incomes rise from the cash transfers. While the 
results may generalize to other poverty alleviation mechanisms, we leave this question 
for future research. To do so it would be useful to distinguish between the wealth effect 
of program participation (the cash) versus the other effects of program participation (the 
conditions), which we are unable to separate out here. 
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2.2.3 Use of CCTs in the literature 
A major concern with empirically estimating the relationship between poverty and 
natural resource use is the endogeneity between income and activities effecting natural 
resource usage. It is well noted poor populations disproportionately depend on local 
ecosystem services for their livelihoods (Barret et al., 2011). Even at the village level 
where access to local ecosystem services is similar, there may be endogeneity between 
income and dependence on local ecosystem services. For instance, individuals who are 
better able to perform non-extractive activities (e.g. start a small business) are likely to 
have higher income and lower dependence on local natural resources independent of any 
income effect.  
One way to overcome the endogeneity issue is to use an instrumental variable that 
correlates well with income, but does not impact natural resource usage. Zwane (2007) 
utilize instrumental variables for income (non-farm income and non-labor income) to 
overcome the endogeneity between income and land clearings as both capture the time-
invariant income that is not impacted by agricultural land usage. The author finds at low 
incomes, relaxing credit constraint increases deforestation, but at higher incomes this is 
reversed, which is consistent with the EKC hypothesis. Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) 
use a crop index and proportions of crops instrumental variable to overcome the 
endogeneity issue and find increased incomes decrease deforestation through an 
increased demand for forest products, which increases the marginal value of forest lands 
and reducing clearing for farmlands. While using instrumental variables is a powerful 
method, it relies heavily on the assumption the instrumental variables have no causal 
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relationship with natural resource usage. Finding variables that meet this strict 
requirement are not always possible. 
Another way to overcome the endogeneity issue is to exploit an exogenous shift 
in income for a subset of a population. This exogenous income shift usually comes in the 
form of a cash transfer from a government aid program. Cash transfer programs are 
popular poverty reduction policies, however, they are usually implemented without much 
thought about potential secondary effects (Alix-Garcia et al., 2013). Due to the successful 
nature of cash transfer programs in reducing poverty, conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programs have been adopted in almost every country in Latin America (Fiszbein and 
Schady, 2009) and combination of CCTs and unconditional cash transfers (UCT) have 
been implemented in Africa (Evans et al. 2016). With the widespread popularity of cash 
transfer programs, much of the recent literature has focused on identifying spillover 
effects of aid policy, largely driven by an increase in income (e.g. Cioda et al., 2015; 
Handa et al., 2015; Hannah and Olivia, 2015; Asfaw et al., 2014; and Alix-Garcia et al., 
2013).  
One potential issue with using aid programs is if there relates to potential 
selection bias due to households having the option to opt out of such programs. Treated 
households (those enrolled in the program) are potentially systematically different from 
those not participating even when observable characteristics are accounted for. 
Conveniently, many cash transfer programs include a phased rollout where initially only 
a portion of the households receive cash transfers such as Mexico’s Oportunidades (Alix-
Garcia et al., 2013), Philippine’s Pantawid Pamilya (Crost et al., 2014), Kenya’s Cash 
Transfer Program for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (Asfaw et al., 2014) and the data 
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we use in this paper from Tanzania’s pilot community-based CCT (Evans et al., 2016). 
Following Evans et al. (2016), we make use of the random assignment to treatment as a 
randomized control trial removing any potential for selection bias.  
 
2.3 CCT program design and data 
We analyze the impact of poverty reduction on households’ dependence on local fisheries 
by making use of a randomized control trial implemented during the pilot phase of a CCT 
implemented in Tanzania. We use this case study to capture the change in demand for 
seafood by looking at reported consumption as well as whether households engage in 
fishing activity as a major source of income.  
 
2.3.1 CCT pilot program 
Our data come from a pilot community-based CCT program implemented by the 
government of Tanzania through the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) with support 
from the World Bank and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The 
program targeted health outcomes for young children and Elderly and education 
outcomes for children in three impoverished districts; Bagamoyo, Chamwino, and 
Kibaha. Evans et al. (2016) analyze the effect of the CCT on health and education 
outcomes targeted by the program. Three surveys were conducted. A baseline survey was 
conducted from late December 2008 through May 2009 and included 1,764 households, a 
subset of households enrolled in the program. Payments began in January 2010, followed 
by a midline survey from July through September 2011 (18-21 months after transfers 
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began) and an endline survey conducted from August through October 2012 (31-34 
months after transfers began).  
Payments occurred every two months and ranged from US $12 to US $36 
depending on household size and composition with a household average reported 
payment of $14.50. The CCT provided US $3 per month for orphans and vulnerable 
children up to 15 years old and US $6 per month for elderly, 60 years and older. These 
payments were 50 percent of the food poverty line for vulnerable children and 100 
percent of the food poverty line for Elderly. These payments were conditional on young 
children attending a healthcare facility at least six times a year, elderly attending health 
care facilities at least once a year, and children age 7-15 maintaining an 80 percent 
attendance rate at school. Eligibility criteria and payments were made through a 
Community Management Committee (CMC) located in each village comprised of elected 
representatives from that village. The community based structure of the CCT is designed 
to reduce implementation costs for the program, compared to more centralized CCTs, and 
allow for CCTs to be implemented effectively in more remote areas. 
Each CMC had previous experience managing TASAF projects prior to taking 
part in the CCT. Additionally, TASAF conducted communication and training programs 
on the CCT at the regional, district and village levels. The CMCs were then tasked with 
identifying and prioritizing the poorest and most vulnerable households and survey the 
poorest half of households. TASAF used these data to rank households within each 
village, which was finalized by the governing bodies of each village, determining who 
received benefits. During the pilot CCT, the CMCs in treatment villages were responsible 
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for screening potential beneficiaries, transferring funds, communicating program 
conditions, and enforcing program conditions.  
Data were collected from 80 villages, half of which were randomly assigned to a 
control group after eligible households were identified from all villages. Stratified 
sampling based on known characteristics (e.g. district and community size) was used to 
ensure comparability between control and treatment groups. Control villages began 
receiving transfers in November 2012, following the completion of the endline survey. 
 
2.3.2 Data and summary statistics 
We analyze the effect of participation in the CCT on household protein consumption, 
with a focus on seafood consumption. We use reported household consumption for fish 
and other protein sources in conjunction with whether households report any income 
from fishing to assess the impact a cash transfer on household dependence on local 
fisheries. A large portion of seafood consumption comes in the form of dagaa, a small 
freshwater fish which makes up over half the seafood consumption in our sample. To 
capture any difference between dagaa and other seafood and due to potential seasonal 
differences in availability between fresh and dried seafood, we break down total seafood 
consumption into four categories: fresh seafood excluding dagaa, dried seafood 
excluding dagaa, fresh dagaa, and dried dagaa. Our non-seafood protein sources are 
beef, goat, poultry, and eggs. Consumption variables are measured in grams consumed by 
household in the previous week. We look at per capita weekly consumption, for the 
previous week, as well as binary variables for whether the household has any 
consumption of the variable of interest in the previous week to analyze the intensive and 
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extensive margins respectively. Our data does not include magnitude of fishing income; 
thus, we only look at households reporting any household income from fishing in the 
previous year.  
In Table 2.1, we compare baseline levels of outcome variables between control 
and treated groups. To determine if there is a significant difference between treatment 
and control households, we use ordinary least squares and cluster errors at the village 
level. As we explain in detail in the next section, our analysis looks at per capita 
consumption of seafood and other sources of animal protein as well as whether 
households consume any seafood or other sources of protein. All consumption variables 
are reported consumption in the previous week. While Evans et al. (2016) find most 
covariates to be balanced at baseline, many of our variables of interest differ significantly 
between treatment and control households.  
We find a small difference in how many households report fishing income with 
households in villages assigned to the treatment group being less likely to engage in 
fishing (10% significance level). Additionally, we find consumption of goat and poultry 
to be higher amongst villages assigned to treatment (5% significance level). Additionally, 
we see fresh dagaa consumption per capita, households consuming any fresh seafood 
(excluding dagaa), and households consuming fresh dagaa are all significantly lower in 
villages assigned to the treatment villages (1% significance level) during the baseline 
period. These are all explanatory variables we use to capture the effect of the cash 
transfer on the local fishery, making the differences at baseline worrisome. 
Table 2.2 breaks down these seafood consumption variables by district to provide 
a more detailed view of what may be driving these differences at baseline. We see 
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households assigned to treated villages consume less fresh seafood across all 
measurements (all at 1% significance level). Bagamoyo is the only district to show 
differences in fresh dagaa consumption, both per capita and for households consuming 
any fresh dagaa, and the difference is large enough that we still observe the difference 
when awe look at all villages together. In Kibaha, we see households assigned to 
treatment villages consuming less fresh seafood per capita (5% significance level) as well 
as fewer households assigned to treatment villages consuming any fresh seafood (1% 
significance level), similar to households in Bagamoyo. In contrast, Chamwino 
households assigned to treatment villages consume larger amounts of fresh seafood per 
capita and the number of households consuming any seafood is also larger (both at the 
1% significance level). When aggregated, these differences do not show up in fresh 
seafood per capita, however, we do see it in number of households consuming any fresh 
seafood. The fact each district shows significant differences between households assigned 
to control and treated villages is troublesome. It indicates there may be some systematic 
differences between treatment and control villages. As we discuss in the next section, 
random assignment to treatment and control groups should be enough to ensure there is 
little systematic difference between treatment and control households, even though they 
appear different at baseline. However, randomization is not perfect and if differences 
these differences in baseline could indicate differences between treatment and control 
groups, known in the epidemiologic fields as chance bias (Roberts and Torgerson 1999), 
which would result in biased estimates. While imperfect, the random assignment in 
conjunction with well balanced covariates on other observable characteristics, as reported 
in Evans et al. (2016), is evidence there is no systematic difference between groups at 
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baseline. If this holds, we can still determine the causal relationship of the cash transfer 
on our outcome variables by comparing the trends over time for each group. A good 
example of this is depicted in figure 2.1 showing the extensive margin of consuming any 
seafood in the previous week. Even though consumption differs substantially at baseline, 
period 1, the trends clearly move in opposite directions indicating a treatment effect. 
 
2.4 Methods 
2.4.1 Empirical specification 
We exploit the pilot CCTs randomized control trial to identify the effect of poverty 
reduction programs on dependence on local fisheries. Random assignment removes the 
worry of selection bias between the treated and control groups and, in expectation, 
ensures treatment and control groups are similar at baseline. Thus, the difference between 
groups we see after treatment can be attributed to the causal effect of treatment. 
Additionally, we compare observable household characteristics at the baseline (Table 2.1) 
to ensure treated and control groups are similar characteristics prior to introducing 
treatment as discussed in the previous section.  
We identify the treatment effect utilizing both the midline (1.5 years of receiving 
cash transfers) and endline (2.5 years) surveys along with the pretreatment baseline to 
capture how treatment effects very over time, shedding light on the time it takes for 
changes in income to impact behaviors related to local resources. For the remainder of 
the paper, we denote baseline, midline, and endline as period 1, period 2 and period 3 
respectively.  We determine the causal effect of wealth on demand for ecosystem services 
using the following model specification: 
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where yist  is the variable of interest for household i , from village s  in period t . pt  is a 
categorical variable corresponding to each of the three periods respectively.    is the 
binary treatment variable, which equals one if village s  was assigned to the treatment 
group and zero otherwise. Household fixed effects are denoteda i  and  is the error 
term.  
We cluster standard errors at the village level to control for the within village 
correlation of household errors. Households in a village face similar conditions, which 
likely impact access/dependence on local fisheries through availability of seafood and 
access to fishing areas. The correlation of error terms within villages, if uncontrolled for, 
would result in inflated standard errors and inhibit identification of the effects of 
participating in the CCT.  
Similar papers attempting to identify effects of cash transfers have utilized 
difference-in-difference (DD) approach (e.g. Alix-Garcia et al., 2013; Asfaw et al., 2014; 
Handa et al., 2015). While DD correctly identifies treatment effect and controls for time 
invariant characteristics between groups, it does not control for individual differences 
within each group. Households within our data vary drastically between one another (i.e. 
occupation, household size, wealth, etc.) some of which we can observe and some we do 
not have information on. We chose a fixed effects model as it handles the within group 
variation better than DD. While we present the results from our household fixed effects 
with standard errors clustered at the village level, there was not large differences in the 
results when we performed DD as a robustness check.  
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Similar to DD, the fixed effects model specification requires the parallel trend 
assumption to hold in order to identify a causal effect of treatment on the variable of 
interest. That is, without treatment both the control and treated groups would have 
continued to behave similarly if no intervention took place. We can only capture the 
treatment effect if, absent treatment, variables of interest for control and treatment groups 
would have exhibited the same trends. We exploit random assignment to treatment from 
the CCT program to this end. Since treatment is randomized, we are reasonably confident 
the parallel trends assumption holds. 
Eligibility for cash transfers is assigned at the village level. However, during 
implementation some households assigned to treatment villages did not receive treatment 
likely due to last minuet changes in household prioritization or household refusal (Evans 
et al. 2016). Additionally, a small number of households in non-treatment villages 
received cash transfers, due to proximity to treatment villages. We estimate our treatment 
effect using assignment to treatment village and, hence, are estimating intention to treat 
(ITT). Since the number of households incorrectly receiving treatment or lacking 
treatment are small compared to the sample size (4.30% of the sample failed to receive 
treatment when eligible and 0.37% received treatment when they should not have), the 
ITT we estimate should closely approximate the true treatment effect on the treated.  
A caveat of our study is we only observe consumption variables for the week 
prior to the survey and have no information about consumption in other weeks. If 
consumption changes from week to week, which is almost certain, our consumption 
variables can be interpreted as random draws from the distribution of consumption. In 
essence, this increases the [sampling variability] within our data, which will increase 
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standard errors making it more difficult to identify a treatment effect without biasing 
results. This holds true even if consumption depends on unobservable variables, for 
instance if certain foods are associated with special events like weddings. These events 
would simply act as increasing the sampling variability further. If we had data on such 
factors we could attempt to control for them, however, it is not possible in this data set.  
 
2.4.2 Heterogeneous wealth impacts 
We test whether treatment effects have heterogeneous effects on households with 
different wealth levels. Following Evans et al. (2016) we divide our sample into two 
subgroups based on a summation of total assets, moderately poor (above median asset 
level) and extremely poor (below median asset level). Aggregating assets into a single 
wealth measure has its challenges in order to provide a comparable estimate of wealth for 
households with a robust set of assets and livelihoods (e.g. Carter and Barrett 2006). 
These issues would be more problematic if we were analyzing wealth as a continuous 
variable and assessing the marginal impact on treatment effect due to a small change in 
wealth. However, since we use assets solely to break households into two discrete groups, 
the calculation of the wealth measure has a smaller effect on our results. Regardless of 
how wealth is calculated, the groups will be largely unchanged with only the households 
near the median (which is where the cutoff between the groups is defined) are at risk of 
switching groups, thus impacting results. We test whether participation in the CCT has 
different effects on moderately poor and severely poor households. Since payments from 
the CCT depend on household size and composition (e.g. number of children and elderly) 
and do not take assets or other wealth variables into account, apart from having low 
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enough wealth to be eligible for the program, there is a larger relative wealth effect for 
poorer households. That is to say, payments represent a larger proportion of 
income/expenditure for poorer households than wealthier ones. Additionally, households 
with different wealth levels may have different demands for ecosystem services; hence, 
may respond differently to an exogenous increase in income. While we cannot separate 
the magnitude of the wealth effect from whether households of varying wealth have 
different demand from local ecosystem services, we can assess whether program 
participation impacted wealthier households differently than poorer ones in aggregate. 
Additionally, we test for differing effects for each district using district fixed effects to 
account for varying local conditions affecting demand for ecosystem services (e.g. 
fishing income may depend on distance to fishing areas, which varies widely between 
districts). 
 
2.4.2 Intensive and extensive margins 
The majority of our variables of interest (excluding those which are already dummy 
variables), are truncated at zero and many households report zero in at least one period, 
which is problematic when running our single difference fixed effect model across the 
whole sample. We analyze the effects at the intensive and extensive margins respectively 
to estimate the effect of the cash transfer. The intensive margin estimates the effect of 
assignment to a treated village for households who report a positive amount of the 
variable of interest (i.e. consume some amount of seafood in at least one period). All 
households, which report zero in all three samples are excluded. We then run our fixed 
effects model described above. We determine the extensive margin by converting the 
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continuous variable into a dummy variable equaling 1 for if the household reports 
using/consuming any of the variable of interest and zero otherwise. We then run a linear 
probability model to estimate the change in households who consume/utilize the variable 
of interest over the sample to determine the treatment effect. Together, the intensive and 
extensive margins tell us how assignment to treatment village effects both the proportion 
of houses using/consuming a variable of interest and the relative magnitude for 
households which do. 
 
2.4.3 Seasonality 
In Tanzania, there are four main seasons: January to February is a short dry season 
followed by a long rain season from March through May. June through October is the 
long dry season followed by a short rain season from November through December. 
There is likely to be seasonal differences in fishing activity resulting in different 
availability in seafood, especially fresh seafood (Merode et al., 2003). 
One concern about the implementation of the CCT is the baseline survey was 
conducted during either the dry or long rain season while the endline surveys were both 
conducted during the long dry season. Thus, we may be picking up a change in seasonal 
behavior rather than the desired treatment effect. Seasonal differences may exist between 
the short dry season and long dry season (when the endline was conducted), but is a 
larger concern when comparing the long rainy season to the long dry season where 
household behavior may be drastically different.  
Due to randomization, it is unlikely that treated and control groups are likely to 
respond in systematically different ways to the change in seasons so long as 
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randomization was successful in (1) geographical location of villages (e.g. treated 
villages were not systematically located further inland associated with different seasonal 
conditions) and (2) households surveyed in baseline were balanced across the short dry 
and long rainy seasons. Random assignment combined with stratification based on 
district sufficiently ensures (1) holds. However, we find assumption (2) does not hold. 
Table 2.3 shows a significantly larger number of treated households were surveyed 
during the long rainy season, as compared to control households, which must be 
controlled for in order to identify effect of the CCT on household dependence on local 
ecosystem services. We do so by including fixed effects for the month each survey was 
conducted. These fixed effects should capture any systematic differences, which arise due 
to seasonality allowing us to identify an unbiased ITT when comparing treated and 
untreated households. However, it does not allow us to reliably determine if an 
explanatory variable changes across the sample. For instance, we would be able to 
determine if treated households consume relatively more seafood than untreated, but 
cannot determine if a change in total fish consumption indicates households eating less 
fish or if there is just less available in the dry season. 
An alternative specification could be to include a dummy variable for baseline 
survey season. However, we would be unable to use this in conjunction with our 
household fixed effects model as it does not vary for households and, thus, is collinear 
with household fixed effects.  
 
2.5 Results 
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In this section, we report our main findings. We break up our results into three 
subsections: seafood consumption, other protein consumption, and fishing income. We 
first discuss how treatment affects demand for seafood by looking at both the extensive 
and intensive margins. We then use the same approach to see how consumption of other 
animal protein sources change due to treatment to identify if there is any switching 
behavior away from seafood. Lastly we look at how treatment effects the likelihood of 
households engaging in fishing as a source of income. 
 
2.5.1 Seafood consumption 
To determine the effect of program participation on seafood consumption we look at five 
consumption variables: total seafood, fresh seafood excluding dagaa, dried seafood 
excluding dagaa, fresh dagaa, and dried dagaa. We look at how many households have 
consumed any of the dependent variable (extensive margin) as well as per capita 
consumption for households consuming the dependent variable in any period (intensive 
margin). We see from Table 2.4, at the extensive margin, the number of extremely poor 
households located in treatment villages consuming any seafood, fresh seafood excluding 
dagaa, and dried dagaa all increase (all at the 5% significance level). We see some of the 
same effect extremely poor households assigned to treatment villages in period two 
where the number of households consuming seafood increases, which is driven by an 
increase in dried dagaa consumption (both at the 10% significance level). This is 
consistent with poverty reduction policies taking some time to result in observable 
changes in behavior. We see a slight increase in period two, which continues to larger 
increase in period three. Additionally, we see a small increase in moderately poor 
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households increasing consumption of fresh dagaa in period two (10% significance 
level). 
Table 2.5 shows the intensive margin for seafood consumption. While the results 
are less statistically significant, we can see some similar trends from the extensive 
margin. Extremely poor households located in treatment villages increase total seafood 
consumption per capita, which is largely driven by an increase in fresh seafood excluding 
dagaa (both at the 10% significance level). We also see moderately poor households in 
treatment villages increasing per capita consumption of fresh dagaa in period three. 
Together the intensive and extensive margins indicate participation in the CCT 
leads to extremely poor households increasing their seafood consumption. This increase 
is driven largely by increasing fresh seafood consumption, but the number of extremely 
poor households consuming any dried dagaa also increases. We see both that any 
treatment effect from poverty reduction programs are likely to have significant lag before 
any spillover effects can be observed. Thus, poverty reduction programs appear to 
increase the demand for seafood, which likely results in increased pressure on local fish 
resources. 
We also see some indication that moderately poor households increase 
consumption of fresh dagaa. Since we do not see this increase in the extremely poor 
group, it provides evidence suggesting dagaa is not an inferior good for the people of 
Tanzania as moderately poor households still seek to increase consumption as income 
increases through participation in the CCT. 
As a robustness check, we use a Tobit model to look at the effect of program 
participation on seafood consumption. Tobit models are designed to handle truncated 
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data, such as our consumption variables with large numbers of zeros, and do not require 
us to break the analysis apart into intensive and extensive margins. The downside to this 
approach, is it is not compatible with fixed effects. For this reason, we prefer the previous 
models and focus on them in the discussion. Table 6 presents the results from the Tobit 
model on seafood consumption. We find inconsistent results with our previous estimation 
strategy, we find the moderately poor households show a significant increase in seafood 
consumption in period 3 driven largely by an increase in consumption of dried seafood 
excluding dagaa (both significant at the 1% level). Additionally we see moderately poor 
households consume more dried dagaa in both periods 2 and 3 (significant at the 5% 
level).  Extreely poor households show a negative treatment effect for fresh dagaa in 
periods 2 and 3 as well as a decrease in fresh seafood excluding dagaa in period 2 (all at 
the 1% significance level). We attribute these differences largely to the lack of ability to 
control for household fixed effects. Failing to account for the heterogeneity between 
households may result in biased estimation of treatment effects, leading us to prefer 
analyzing the intensive and extensive margins for our analysis. 
 
2.5.2 Other protein consumption 
In addition to seafood consumption, we look at consumption of other animal protein to 
see if we observe any switching behavior to or away from seafood. Specifically, we look 
at consumption of beef, goat, poultry, and eggs at both the extensive and intensive 
margins. Table 2.7 shows the effect of treatment on whether a household consumes any 
of each type of animal protein over the last week. We include total in order to compare 
seafood consumption to the other animal protein sources. We find very little evidence of 
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a treatment effecting the likelihood of households consuming other sources of animal 
protein. The only significant treatment effect is in the amount of extremely poor 
households in treatment villages consume more goat in period two (10% significance 
level), but does not carry through into period three. 
Table 2.8 depicts the intensive margin of household consumption per capita of 
animal protein in the previous week, only including households who have consumed 
some of the dependent variable in at least one period. We find largely the same results as 
at the extensive margin. Once again, we only have one significant treatment variable, 
which was extremely poor households in treatment villages consumed more eggs in 
period three (10% significance level).  
Together, the intensive and extensive margins indicate participation in the CCT 
does not lead to a change in consumption of animal protein other than seafood. The 
increased consumption of goat at the extensive margin and eggs at the intensive margin 
are likely to be spurious rather than indicating a slight change in consumption. The 
literature is consistent in saying increases in income will lead to increased consumption 
of animal protein, so a lack of evidence of a positive treatment effect is surprising. We 
find participation does not lead to households switching away from seafood to other 
sources of protein and, if anything, treated households appear to consume seafood as a 
higher portion of their diet. Thus, we find no evidence program participation reducing 
pressures on local fisheries by shifting demand away from seafood to other animal 
proteins.  
 
2.5.3 Fishing Income 
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We estimate the direct effect of treatment on the dependence of local fisheries by looking 
at the number of households reporting income from fishing. Fishing income is a dummy 
variable equaling one if the household reports fishing income as the household’s primary 
or secondary source of income. We exclude households from Chamwino as there was 
only one household reporting income from fishing. Chamwino is furthest from a major 
water source so the majority of its impact on demand from fisheries will be on the 
consumption side rather than from directly harvesting seafood. Our data do not include 
the magnitude of fishing income so we can only analyze how the number of households 
reporting fishing income changes in response to treatment.  
Table 2.9 shows three linear probability models all including household and 
monthly fixed effects with errors clustered at the village level. The first model includes 
period variables and assignment to treat in periods. We find a slight increase in 
households reporting fishing income in period three (10% significance level). Model 2 
allows for heterogeneous effects for extremely poor and moderately poor households. 
Here we see only moderately poor households in treatment villages increase their 
likelihood of earning income from fishing (10% significance level). We see consistent 
results when we include village by time fixed effects (Model 3) and see moderately poor 
households in treatment villages become more likely to earn income from fishing (10% 
level). 
These results suggest program participation leads to more moderately poor 
households generating fishing income, but it takes time for the effect to come about. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis there are significant barriers to enter that must be 
overcome before a household can enter the fishery. The moderately poor households are 
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closet to surmounting the barrier to entry and are the only ones who end up being able to 
incorporate fishing income into their livelihoods. Additionally, the fishing equipment, 
such as nets, may be expensive enough households need to save up over time. Thus, we 
only see an effect in period three across all model specifications.   
The increase in number of households relying on fishing as either their primary or 
secondary source of income due to treatment indicates poverty reduction policies increase 
pressure on local fisheries. Participation in the CCT increased the number of households 
depending on a local fishery as an income generator. This increase in fishing pressure 
may not become problematic until seafood harvest exceeds the ability of the stock to 
replenish itself. However, it does increase the likelihood of over exploiting the fishery 
which may lead to a decline of stock and harvests. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
We estimate the effect of participating in the CCT on dependence on local fisheries by 
looking at both the demand for seafood by looking at household consumption as well as 
direct pressure on local fisheries by looking at households earning income from fishing. 
We find there is an increase in both direct fishing pressure from additional households 
earning money from fishing due to program participation as well as an increase in 
demand for seafood. Both put increased pressures on local fisheries. Hence, we find 
evidence supporting the claim poverty reduction policies can potentially have negative 
spillovers in environmental quality. This arises both from consumption demand as well as 
altering livelihoods towards those more dependent on the local fishery resources. 
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 In this chapter we show participation in the CCT leads to increased pressure on 
local fisheries, but do not attempt to determine if this increased pressure leads to 
overexploitation of the local fisheries. We do not have data concerning the fish stocks 
and harvest rates to make an assessment of the fisheries being utilized by our study 
population to shed light on this question. Rather, we identify pathways, which may lead 
to overexploitation and potential degradation of the fishery. It is plausible the increased 
demand on local fisheries can be performed sustainably and that increased pressure due 
to program participation only arises because there are sufficient fish stocks, which we 
cannot determine in this study. However, when sustainable management of local fisheries 
is either not present or not functioning properly, these results suggest it is important to 
consider the spillover into the fisheries sector as increased demand may lead to increased 
degradation of the local fisheries. 
It is also possible the demand from seafood can be satisfied both from distant 
fisheries as well as investment in aquaculture, both of which would not result in increased 
pressure on the local fishery. While we do not attempt to identify where the seafood 
comes from, it is unlikely either of these contribute to a large portion of the seafood 
consumed. These villages are located in poor rural areas. Thus, the likelihood of having 
access to aquaculture raised seafood or seafood from distant fisheries is low. Most of the 
increased demand from seafood due to program participation is likely to be filled by 
putting additional pressure on local fish populations. 
We find significant differences in the treatment effect based on initial wealth 
level. The response to treatment appears to depend, at least in part, on the relative wealth 
of the households. While extremely poor households increase pressures on local fisheries 
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through an increase in demand, the increased pressure on fisheries from the moderately 
poor comes from an increasing number of households earning income from fishing. We 
find allowing for heterogeneous wealth effects is useful for understanding the full impact 
of poverty reduction programs. Not only does understanding how responses may differ, 
failing to include heterogeneous wealth effects can disguise true effects of program 
participation. 
We also find program participation may take significant time before spillover 
effects become observable. Both for fish consumption and fishing income, we see 
stronger treatment effects in period three than period two. This is consistent with 
households requiring a certain period to adjust to the changes brought about by 
participating in the poverty reduction program. This is especially important when looking 
at livelihoods, such as fishing in this study, which may take a longer period of time to 
adjust to changes than consumption or expenditure variables. 
We have a number of potential weaknesses, which we were not able to surmount 
in this paper. First, we do not have a balance on some explanatory variables in the 
baseline survey. This could be evidence that treatment and control groups were 
systematically different making an identification of a treatment effect problematic. 
However, Evens et al. 2014 show baseline characteristics on other key variables such as 
education, health, assets, house characteristics, and water sources are highly balanced. 
This in conjunction with the randomized assignment to control and treatment villages is 
evidence the differences observed are due to chance rather than signifying a systematic 
difference between treatment and control. So long as the differences at baseline are not 
due to systematic difference, our estimation strategy should pick up the intention to treat 
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effect even without a balanced baseline. However, we cannot rule out the possibility 
treated and control households behave systematically differently towards seafood in this 
study. 
A second issue concerns the sampling variability of consumption variables, which 
are reported as the amount consumed in the previous week. Since we only observe three 
data points for each household (baseline, midline and endline surveys), we only see 
snapshots of weekly consumption at three points. It is possible protein consumption is 
correlated with special events such as weddings. Observing only one week of 
consumption may be heavily influenced by unobservable factors and may not represent 
typical consumption patterns. However, this would only result in increased variation 
within the sample causing increased standard errors, but would not bias our estimates. 
Thus it makes identifying treatment statistically significant effect more difficult, but does 
not hinder the interpretation of results. Additionally, consumption and other explanatory 
variables may depend on seasonal differences. 
The baseline of our study was conducted at a different time of year than the 
midline and endline. The baseline was conducted in either the short dry or long rain 
season, depending on the village, while midline and endline were conducted during the 
long dry season. There may be different access to protein sources and fish species during 
the different seasons making a direct comparison of consumption problematic (e.g. 
consuming less seafood in the endline does not imply less seafood is consumed yearly by 
the household). Additionally, we find significantly more treatment villages were sampled 
in the long rainy season than control villages during baseline exasperating the seasonality 
issue. We include monthly fixed effects for baseline to account for this. While we are still 
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unable to identify whether a reduction in consumption between baseline and endline 
indicates a reduction in consumption for the household, monthly fixed effects do allow us 
to pick up any differences between treatment and control groups, even with the 
unbalanced assignment. Thus we can identify a treatment effect to shed light on whether 
program participation impacts the demand for seafood, but fall short of being able to 
determine if the aggregate demand changes. 
Another potential weakness of the paper is our estimates do not separate out the 
income effect from other effects of CCT participation, namely schooling and required 
healthcare visits for children and elderly. Knowing the income effect is potentially more 
useful, as it can be applied to other situations than understanding the spillovers of poverty 
reduction programs on local ecosystem services. We discuss whether it is possible to use 
our estimate of CCT participation a close approximation for an income effect. For this 
discussion, we break up the effect of the CCT into two categories: income effect and the 
additional effects of program participation. We see three primary mechanisms in which 
the additional effects of program participation come about: (1) a reduction in child and 
elderly labor (from additional time at school and healthcare visits), (2) a reduction in 
adult labor from time spent taking children and elderly to school and healthcare visits, 
and (3) an increase in household health resulting in increased productivity. 
The main effect of (1) and (2) will be to decrease total household earnings 
through a reduction in earnings from child activities and decreased labor hours from 
adults. This effect would partially offset the cash transfer. However, Evans et al. (2016) 
show CCT participating households are significantly more likely to invest in health 
insurance, allowing them to seek treatment when they need it, for example seeking 
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treatment at the onset of a disease rather than letting financial liquidity determine when 
the household will visit a clinic. Thus, CCT participating households are likely to be 
healthier, which leads to higher productivity and household income. These effects move 
in different directions and the magnitude of the effects cannot be determined with the 
information obtained from the survey. While it is likely the case our estimates closely 
resemble the income effect, if one of these three effects is significantly greater than the 
others, our estimates would be a biased estimate of income effect without knowing which 
direction the bias is in. Thus, our paper has focused on estimating the impact of CCT 
participation rather than attempting to estimate the income effect. 
As a robustness check, we test whether there is an effect on time spent by children 
collecting firewood and fetching water and find no significant treatment effect using a 
similar fixed effect framework described in the methodology section. This is an 
indication that program participation does not significantly reduce income generated from 
children, which we would expect to be a large component of (1).  
Our findings shed light on a previously unexplored potential spillover of poverty 
reduction programs. While many papers have sought to identify how poverty reduction 
impacts forest cover and demand for forest products, the impact on local fisheries has 
been left unexplored. We find participation in the CCT leads to increased pressures on 
local fisheries. Our paper also highlights the importance of having a long enough time 
frame in order to observe the effects of program participation as there may be a large lag 
between treatment and the ability to observe environmental spillovers. We also find 
including heterogeneous wealth effects in our estimation allows us to better identify the 
true effects of the program.  
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2.7 Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1: Comparison of variables of interest between control and treatment 
villages at baseline 
Characteristic 
Mean for HHs in 
treated villages 
Mean for HHs 
in control 
villages 
Difference 
(Treated-Control) 
Seafood consumption per 
capita (grams) in last week 
N=883  
 
N=881  
 
 
Total seafood  109.63 110.02 -0.39 
Fresh seafood excluding dagaa 45.88 42.78 3.10 
Dried seafood excluding dagaa 11.25 11.10 .15 
Fresh dagaa 2.44 8.95 -6.51*** 
Dried dagaa 50.06 47.19 2.87 
Household consumed any  
seafood in last week 
   
Total seafood  48.70% 52.78% 4.08%* 
Fresh seafood excluding dagaa 8.72% 12.94% -4.22%*** 
Dried seafood excluding dagaa 12.68% 12.60% .08% 
Fresh Dagaa 2.27% 7.72% -5.45%*** 
Dried Dagaa 40.32% 40.75% -0.43% 
Other protein consumption 
per capita (grams) in last week 
   
Goat 9.84 12.39 -2.55 
Beef 20.73 14.66 6.07 
Poultry 41.75 34.93 6.82 
Eggs 1.81 1.70 0.11 
Household consumed any  
other protein in last week 
   
Goat 3.06% 1.36% 1.70%** 
Beef 7.59% 6.24% 1.34% 
Poultry 8.72% 6.02% 2.70%** 
Eggs 1.70% 2.27% 0.57% 
Household engages reports 
any fishing income 
 
0.79% 
 
1.70% 
 
-0.91%* 
Notes: Percentages correspond to binary variables and indicate the percentage of households 
using the dependent variable. There are 883 households located in villages assigned to treatment 
and 881 households in control villages. Significance is determined using OLS with clustered 
errors at the village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2.2: Difference in fresh seafood (excluding dagaa) and dagaa consumption by 
region at baseline 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All Districts Bagamoyo Kibaha Chamwino 
Fresh seafood (excluding  3.10 -31.90*** -31.64** 94.88*** 
dagaa) per capita (grams) (9.866) (11.38) (12.95) (27.40) 
Household consumes any fresh  -4.22%*** -8.89%*** -9.85%*** 9.01%*** 
seafood (excluding dagaa) (0.0148) (0.0241) (0.0297) (0.0192) 
Fresh Dagaa per  -6.51*** -15.12*** 0.79 0.18 
capita (grams) (1.796) (3.828) (2.068) (0.144) 
Household consumes any   -5.45%*** -11.50%*** -1.93% 0.820% 
Fresh Dagaa  (0.0103) (0.0198) (0.0174) (0.00580) 
     
Observations 1,764 771 506 487 
R-squared 0.007 0.020 0.000 0.003 
  
  
5
0
 
Table 2.3: Baseline survey date for treated and control villages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Season December 2008 January February March April May 
        
Treated Village 0.152*** -5.66e-05 0.00624 -0.158*** 0.151*** 0.0245 -0.0251** 
 (0.0236) (0.00743) (0.0206) (0.0202) (0.0189) (0.0195) (0.0115) 
        
Observations 1,759 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 
R-squared 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.035 0.001 0.003 
Notes: Results are for when households were surveyed at the baseline. All variables are dummy variables corresponding to the 
month and Season is a dummy variable equal to zero if the dry season (December, January, and February) and 1 for the short 
rainy season (March, April, and May). All months apart from December are in 2009. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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 Table 2.4: Effect of treatment on seafood consumption at the extensive margin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Total 
Seafood 
Fresh Seafood  
Excluding 
Dagaa 
Dried Seafood 
Excluding 
Dagaa 
Fresh 
Dagaa 
Dried 
Dagaa 
      
Period 2 -0.0627* -0.0454 -0.000831 -0.0203* -0.104** 
 (0.0366) (0.0283) (0.0395) (0.0112) (0.0490) 
Period 3 -0.0225 -0.0633* 0.0815* -0.0227 -0.0687 
 (0.0481) (0.0335) (0.0471) (0.0158) (0.0564) 
Extremely Poor* 0.0653* 0.00977 0.0142 0.0184 0.0680* 
Treat in Period 2 (0.0348) (0.0206) (0.0240) (0.0165) (0.0387) 
Extremely Poor* 0.0826** 0.0391** 0.0206 0.0122 0.0920** 
Treat in Period 3 (0.0395) (0.0195) (0.0273) (0.0178) (0.0390) 
Moderately Poor* -0.0242 -0.0173 -0.0286 0.0351* -0.0322 
Treat in Period 2 (0.0469) (0.0315) (0.0394) (0.0200) (0.0486) 
Moderately Poor* -0.0260 -0.0207 0.0330 0.0269 -0.0508 
Treat in Period 3 (0.0408) (0.0281) (0.0433) (0.0236) (0.0456) 
      
Observations 5,053 5,053 5,053 5,053 5,053 
R-squared 0.040 0.010 0.021 0.014 0.035 
Number of HH  1,759 1,759 1,759 1,759 1,759 
Household FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster 
 
Notes: Results are from a linear probability model for households reporting any 
consumption of seafood in the prior week in at least one period. Dependent variables are 
dummy variables equal to 1 if the household reports any consumption in the previous 
week and zero otherwise. All models include household and month fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the village level and presented in parentheses *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.5: Effect of treatment on per capita seafood consumption (grams) in previous week at the intensive margin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Total Seafood Fresh Seafood  
Excluding Dagaa 
Dried Seafood  
Excluding Dagaa 
Fresh Dagaa Dried Dagaa 
      
Period 2 -111.4* 37.20 -4.774 -5.749 -108.9 
 (63.62) (145.6) (8.722) (52.20) (68.29) 
Period 3 -129.0* 13.19 14.02 -26.76 -125.0* 
 (67.77) (143.0) (11.30) (35.88) (73.24) 
Extremely Poor* 9.238 52.34 9.348 -31.34 17.59 
Treat in Period 2 (27.83) (59.50) (8.978) (52.32) (22.27) 
Extremely Poor* 45.83* 143.6* 8.082 -30.70 33.00 
Treat in Period 3 (25.97) (72.75) (11.20) (44.27) (21.22) 
Moderately Poor* -70.51 -70.12 1.819 34.54 -46.33 
Treat in Period 2 (55.33) (44.32) (8.651) (20.55) (57.86) 
Moderately Poor* -43.29 -18.68 3.607 38.23* -39.29 
Treat in Period 3 (58.12) (67.00) (8.592) (19.11) (58.32) 
      
Observations 4,043 943 1,799 461 3,697 
R-squared 0.014 0.073 0.019 0.123 0.012 
Number of Households 1,371 313 589 149 1,240 
Notes: Results are for households reporting consumption in at least one period. Consumption variables are in grams consumed 
by household in the previous week. All models include household and month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
village level and reported in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.6: Effect of treatment on per capita seafood consumption (grams) using a Tobit model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Total Seafood Fresh Seafood 
Excluding Dagaa 
Dried Seafood 
Excluding Dagaa 
Fresh Dagaa Dried Dagaa 
      
Period 2 -46.07** -31.05 -19.68* -38.30* -26.81 
 (21.87) (61.38) (10.65) (21.29) (20.26) 
Period 3 -55.79** -145.2** 18.26* -44.33** -30.68 
 (22.06) (65.15) (9.995) (21.74) (20.44) 
Extremely Poor*  -50.18* -424.4*** -22.73 -112.7*** 4.782 
Treat in Period 2 (29.67) (102.5) (15.37) (40.46) (27.06) 
Extremely Poor*  1.997 -162.2* -12.07 -165.8*** 30.72 
Treat in Period 3 (29.61) (96.74) (13.38) (51.49) (27.06) 
Moderately Poor* 51.85 -113.9 28.97* -39.57 69.65** 
Treat in Period 2 (32.01) (97.21) (15.25) (36.30) (29.27) 
Moderately Poor* 84.71*** -87.73 47.27*** -66.74 73.06** 
Treat in Period 3 (32.17) (105.3) (13.53) (40.62) (29.56) 
      
Observations 5,369 5,369 5,369 5,369 5,369 
Notes: Results are from a Tobit model and does not include household fixed effects. Consumption variables are for grams 
consumed in the previous week. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 are clustered at the village 
level. 
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Table 2.7: Effect of treatment on protein consumption extensive margin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Total Seafood Goat Beef Poultry Eggs 
      
Period 2 -6.27%* -1.38% 4.73% -4.59%* -0.63% 
 (0.0366) (0.00947) (0.0454) (0.0272) (0.0202) 
Period 3 -2.25% 2.14% 9.97% 0.56% 1.20% 
 (0.0481) (0.0193) (0.0627) (0.0375) (0.0244) 
Extremely Poor* 6.53%* 2.43%* 0.533% 0.33% 0.82% 
Treat in Period 2 (0.0348) (0.0145) (0.0330) (0.0261) (0.0108) 
Extremely Poor* 8.26%** 3.73% -3.14% -0.06% 1.21% 
Treat in Period 3 (0.0395) (0.0232) (0.0311) (0.0238) (0.0105) 
Moderately Poor* -2.42% 2.33% 0.87% -2.34% -0.64% 
Treat in Period 2 (0.0469) (0.0143) (0.0402) (0.0285) (0.0149) 
Moderately Poor* -2.60% 1.68% 0.05% 1.35% 1.00% 
Treat in Period 3 (0.0408) (0.0179) (0.0429) (0.0337) (0.0186) 
      
Observations 5,053 5,053 5,053 5,053 5,053 
R-squared 0.040 0.033 0.077 0.017 0.011 
Number of Households 1,759 1,759 1,759 1,759 1,759 
Notes: Results are from a linear probability model for households reporting any 
consumption of animal protein in the prior week in at least one period. Dependent 
variables are dummy variables equal to 1 if the household reports any consumption in the 
previous week and zero otherwise.  All models include household and month fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and presented in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.8: Effect of treatment on protein (grams) consumed in previous week at the 
intensive margin  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Total Seafood Goat Beef Poultry Eggs 
      
Period 2 -111.4* 47.23 16.24 -35.13 -46.11* 
 (63.62) (82.30) (20.09) (88.09) (25.08) 
Period 3 -129.0* 190.5 37.57 24.42 -27.64 
 (67.77) (138.9) (32.55) (85.93) (21.04) 
Extremely Poor* 9.238 33.39 13.18 -61.35 18.89 
Treat in Period 2 (27.83) (84.04) (24.70) (67.72) (12.65) 
Extremely Poor* 45.83* -42.40 -22.51 -83.92 24.83* 
Treat in Period 3 (25.97) (104.5) (24.47) (69.38) (12.91) 
Moderately Poor* -70.51 73.89 -30.65 5.161 -2.859 
Treat in Period 2 (55.33) (142.2) (20.18) (49.77) (10.16) 
Moderately Poor* -43.29 -51.07 -28.86 -16.19 -9.249 
Treat in Period 3 (58.12) (146.9) (24.82) (60.33) (12.98) 
      
Observations 4,043 568 1,934 1,215 479 
R-squared 0.014 0.050 0.077 0.031 0.065 
Number of Households 1,371 188 627 395 152 
Notes: Results are for households reporting consumption in at least one period. 
Consumption variables are in grams consumed by household in the previous week. All 
models include household and month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
village level and presented in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.9: Effect of treatment on binary fishing income linear probability model for 
households’ reporting fishing income from Bagamoyo and Kibaha 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fishing Income Fishing Income Fishing Income 
    
Period 2 -0.35% -0.35% -0.12% 
 (0.00784) (0.00783) (0.00896) 
Period 3 -0.62% -0.61% -0.38% 
 (0.00763) (0.00763) (0.00886) 
Extremely Poor*  0.96% 1.35% 
Treat in Period 2  (0.00653) (0.00859) 
Extremely Poor*   1.01% 1.23% 
Treat in Period 3  (0.00707) (0.00952) 
Moderately Poor*  0.80% 1.10% 
Treat in Period 2  (0.00786) (0.0103) 
Moderately Poor*  1.36%* 1.55%* 
Treat in Period 3  (0.00719) (0.00852) 
Assigned to  0.88%   
Treat in Period 2 (0.00668)   
Assigned to 1.19%*   
Treat in Period 3 (0.00646)   
Treated village in   -0.77% 
Kibaha in period 2   (0.0108) 
Treated village in   -0.44% 
Kibaha in period 3   (0.00982) 
    
Observations 3,915 3,913 3,913 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Number of Households 1,277 1,276 1,276 
Notes: Results are from a linear probability model for households reporting fishing 
income as either their primary or secondary source of income. All models include 
household and monthly fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and 
presented in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Effect of treatment on percent of households consuming any seafood by 
period 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the percentage of households that consumed seafood in the 
previous week for control villages, in blue, and treated villages, in red, by period.  
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3. Location of Optimal Aid 
 
3.1 Introduction and Motivation 
‘Why do the poor stay poor?’ has been a long-standing question in the development 
literature with important implications about how to best combat poverty. Poverty traps 
occur when populations experience long-term chronic poverty with limited or nonexistent 
opportunities to accumulate wealth. These systems are characterized by self-reinforcing 
mechanisms causing poverty to persist (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005). The most useful 
application of poverty trap models occurs when there exist multiple long term equilibria 
separated by a critical asset threshold, called a “Micawber Threshold” (MT), which is an 
unstable dynamic equilibrium separating the basins of attraction of the high and low 
wealth equilibria (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; Carter and Barrett, 2006). This specific 
type of poverty trap is known as a multiple equilibrium poverty trap where households 
with initial wealth above the MT tend to experience a growth in wealth and approach the 
high-wealth equilibrium, while households just below the MT get mired in poverty. 
Poverty trap models are useful in explaining why some groups appear to be stuck in 
chronic poverty while apparently similar groups prosper by highlighting how small initial 
differences in wealth can dramatically affect long term wellbeing, which has important 
policy implications.  
It is possible short-term aid can change long term wealth trajectories by setting 
households on a path of wealth accumulation towards a high wealth equilibrium rather 
than the household falling further into poverty. In the theoretically deterministic setting 
where random shocks to wealth are assumed away, providing aid just above the MT 
ensures a household will progress towards the high-wealth equilibrium and would be the 
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ideal location to target aid policies (Barrett 2005). However, if aid falls short of the MT, 
the impact of aid will be short-lived with household wealth diminishing overtime, 
approaching a low wealth equilibrium. In this paper, we addresses whether targeting aid 
at the MT is optimal when wealth generation has a stochastic component. 
While poverty traps have recently received a large amount of attention, too little 
work has been done to analyze how to optimally provide aid to those stuck in poverty 
traps. There has been some work analyzing how well subsidized insurance programs 
perform at reducing poverty for populations experiencing or vulnerable to multiple 
equilibrium poverty traps. Janzen et al. (2012) look at a pastoralist system in Northern 
Kenya
3
 and find those closest to the MT would benefit most from insurance, as even a 
small downward shock to their productive assets (in this case the loss of an animal) may 
put the household on a trajectory of further herd loss and potentially resulting in exiting 
from pastoralism altogether. However, it is also this group who are least likely to 
purchase insurance due to the high opportunity cost for households around this critical 
wealth level. For these vulnerable households, selling an animal to pay for insurance may 
put them below the MT and would place them on the unfavorable negative trajectory. 
The authors suggest subsidized insurance, especially targeted at the vulnerable 
households, may prove a promising means of social protection. Similarly, Kovacevic and 
Pflug (2011) show fair insurance is only effective at reducing the risk of experiencing a 
poverty trap for wealthier households in theoretic setting. The authors use a ruin theory 
model where once a low-level wealth threshold is crossed, escape from poverty becomes 
impossible, and model wealth as a having deterministic growth with low-probability, but 
                                                 
3
 This is a highly studied socioeconomic system for poverty traps, which we discuss in 
more detail later. 
  60 
severe downward shocks. The authors show only wealthy households can benefit from 
insurance, while the most vulnerable households cannot afford the cost of insuring 
against downside risk even though they have the highest benefit of insurance. These 
studies suggest while insurance may be included in an overarching poverty reduction 
strategy, alternative forms of aid are necessary to help the most vulnerable segments of 
the population when a potential poverty trap is present. The insurance literature 
concerning poverty traps has mostly addressed fair insurance, where the burden of 
purchasing insurance falls on the recipients. This can be thought of as a tool for 
eliminating poverty rather than aid, where the cost of assistance is borne by external 
agents such as charitable donations or taxation on other members of the society.  
    Barrett (2005) makes a distinction between two general policies: ‘cargo nets’ 
are policies to lift people up to a certain wealth level and ‘safety nets’ to prevent people 
from falling below it in the future. Some examples of safety nets are emergency feeding 
programs and disaster relief; additionally heavily subsidized or free insurance would be a 
form of a safety net. Cargo nets are designed to create pathways out of poverty and can 
be in the form of direct transfers (in the form of cash or productive input) or alterations to 
the socio-economic system such as land reform, school feeding programs, subsidized 
farming inputs, and targeted microfinance (Barrett, 2005). In practice, the form of the 
cargo and safety net may impact the effectiveness and care must be placed to determine 
the appropriate form of aid depending on the context. For our purposes, we assume cargo 
nets and safety nets having the same effect regardless of the specific form they take and 
for the remainder of the paper, we will be treating a cargo net as a direct transfer and a 
safety net as free insurance at a specified wealth level.  
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While it is useful to think in these terms, little has been done to understand what 
types of policies work best to combat poverty traps as well as what wealth level these aid 
policies should target. Ikegami et al. (2016) provide a good start to compare the 
theoretical effectiveness of safety nets versus cargo nets by comparing the long run 
effectiveness of two aid strategies; a needs based aid policy, composed of a cargo net 
each period to lift the wealth of the poorest households as high as funds allow, and aid 
targeted to individuals located nearest the MT to bring them up to the MT, essentially 
providing a safety net at this level for those starting above the MT in the previous period 
and a cargo net for some households starting below the MT. Under both policies, the aid 
budget is funded by taxes imposed on the non-poor households in the population
4
. The 
authors show large gains in long term poverty reduction by providing a safety net located 
at the MT by effectively increasing the number of people who can sustain themselves at a 
high wealth equilibrium and, hence, no longer require aid. While this work provides 
substantial insight into optimal aid, the authors only test two policies and do not attempt 
to identify where the targeted aid policy would be most effective, specifically would a 
safety net placed slightly above or below the MT provide perform better than a safety net 
at the MT. Additionally, as the authors point out, it is difficult to imagine an aid program 
that provides aid to those at risk of falling into poverty while excluding those currently 
suffering.  
We focus on a policy of providing a minimum level of wealth, similar to the 
needs based aid strategy in Ikegami et al. (2016). However, we focus on identifying the 
                                                 
4
 An important implication of this is the total aid budget increases as poverty is reduced 
due to increased proportion of the population being taxed, which partially drives their 
results. While this assumption is not unreasonable, the authors’ results may not apply to 
cases where a large portion of the aid budget comes from foreign aid. 
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optimal level of aid to provide in the face of poverty traps. Currently there is no 
consensus of where an optimal safety net would lie in relation to a Micawber Threshold. 
Barrett (2005) suggests for safety nets to be effective, they must be set above the 
Micawber Threshold, which is certainly true for the deterministic case. However, 
Plucinski, Ngonghala, and Bonds (2011) show safety nets set below critical thresholds 
can lead to long term escape from disease-driven poverty traps, a specific cause of the 
poverty trap we discuss in the next section, using numerical simulation. It is important to 
note, Plucinski, Ngonghala, and Bonds (2011) define ‘safety net’ as a policy bringing 
individuals up to a minimum level and ensuring they do not fall below it in the future, 
similar to the policy we consider. This is analogous to a combination of a ‘cargo net’ and 
a ‘safety net’ in Barrett’s (2005) terminology and is analogous to the needs based strategy 
used by Ikegami et al. (2016). Plucinski, Ngonghala, and Bonds (2011) show high level 
of wellbeing is possible even when aid is provided below the MT, but do not attempt to 
prove this is optimal, leaving the question of the optimal level of aid unanswered. We 
seek to fill this gap using numeric simulation to test the effectiveness of aid across a wide 
range of aid levels to determine where the optimal aid level is located in relation to the 
MT. We find the MT for a basic wealth policy with the optimal aid level usually falling 
about 2-3% above the MT. We find the optimal aid is predominately determined by the 
cost of poverty reduction and the level of poverty reduction is a secondary concern. This 
arises due to the formation of an ‘aid trap’, where there is a region below the Mcawber 
Threshold where both the cost of reducing poverty and the amount of poverty can both be 
reduced. We show this occurs because the cost of providing aid actually decreases as the 
level of aid increases for some range of aid levels below the Micawber Threshold. This is 
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the point where aid begins to lift people out of poverty allowing them to no longer be 
dependent on the safety net. 
An aid trap is used to describe the situation where some populations appear to 
become dependent on external aid to maintain wealth levels. Typically, aid dependency is 
used to describe when an individual, household, or community cannot meet its basic 
needs without external aid (Lentz et al., 2005). This dependence may come about by 
households relying on safety nets rather than taking the necessary steps to self-protect 
themselves from downside risk, known as the moral hazard problem, potentially even 
resulting in reducing work hours or exiting the labor force entirely. For instance, Seleka 
and Lekobane (2016) show government food rations reduce the likelihood of subsistence 
farming for poor households in Botswana. Even without the moral hazard issue, 
dependence makes providing aid less desirable, as there are no long-lasting benefits to 
justify the cost of providing aid. However, if dependence is caused by aid failing to 
surmount a MT, then there can be significant gains to aid so long as it is placed at the 
correct level. This is similar to Rosenstein-Rodan (1943)’s big-push theory to deal with 
poverty traps at the macro level, which is there is a minimum level of resources that must 
be devoted to an aid program if it is to have any chance of being successful.  
Barrett and Carter (2013) motivate the importance of understanding the 
underlying structure of the poverty to determine the appropriate aid to combat it. If a 
multiple equilibrium poverty trap exists, identifying the existence and location of MT is 
critical to achieve long-term lasting gains in welfare from aid policy. We show how an 
aid trap can occur when providing aid to those stuck in a multiple equilibrium poverty 
trap and show costs can be reduced by increasing the level of aid above the MT to put 
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households on a path of wealth growth and eventual exit from poverty. This reduces the 
dependency on external aid, resulting in a lower cost of providing aid. We use this 
observation to introduce a new twist on the aid trap and define the inefficient aid trap, 
which occurs when both the cost of aid and the levels of poverty can both be reduced. 
Thus, the aid policy is inefficient as there is a clearly superior aid policy available. The 
inefficient aid trap is particularly useful when discussing the location of optimal aid and 
we show the upper bound of the inefficient aid trap is the lower bound of where optimal 
aid can occur.  
This paper seeks to enhance our understanding of how to combat poverty traps by 
identifying the aid trap caused by providing too little aid and determining the relationship 
between the optimal aid level and the MT. We show the cost of providing aid largely 
determines the location of optimal aid. We use this to find the local minimum for the cost 
of providing aid and find it occurs slightly above the MT. Thus, optimal aid must either 
be close to non-existent or set above the MT, consistent with Barrett (2005). We use this 
minimum aid level to identify the inefficient poverty trap caused, in part, by the 
increasing costs as level of aid decreases from this point, due to increased number of 
impoverished people being supported by the safety net. Additionally, we use the shape of 
the cost curve to show when there is uncertainty concerning the location of the Micawber 
Threshold and the location of optimal aid, it is better to err on setting aid too high. This 
occurs because the slope of the cost of providing aid is extremely steep just below the 
MT, which results in a large penalty for providing aid too low, even if its only by a 
relatively small amount. Together the results from this chapter provide a theoretic 
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foundation, which can be built upon to inform aid policy decisions when a multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap is identified. 
 
3.2 Poverty Trap Background 
To begin the discussion of poverty traps, it is useful to distinguish between different 
types of poverty as well as measures of poverty. Not all poverty is created equal, as the 
duration of poverty may be just as important, if not more so, than the severity of it. Some 
people who are currently poor may not be expected to be poor in future periods, or vice-
versa. While it is usually more convenient to take a snapshot of wealth levels in a given 
period to define who is poor and who is not, such as the commonly used Foster-Greer-
Thorbeke (FGT) measures, the poverty trap literature focuses on the importance of 
identifying the structural nature of poverty to provide a forward-looking measure to 
distinguish if a household is likely to be poor in the future. Carter and Barrett (2006) 
provide a detailed look at how poverty measures have evolved over time and advocate for 
using asset-based poverty measures, opposed to those based on consumption or income, 
as these measures capture the dependence of future wellbeing on current levels of 
productive assets. Assets causal relationship with future wellbeing is a critical component 
of the poverty trap literature with strong theoretic and empirical foundations and useful 
for distinguishing between stochastic and structural poverty.  
Carter and May (2001) introduce the asset poverty line to distinguish between 
structural/chronic and transitory/stochastic poverty. Stochastic poverty is when a 
household has a low level of consumption/income in a period, and is hence poor as 
defined by traditional poverty measures, but is unlikely to remain so in the future due to a 
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large asset base. Structural poverty is when a household has a low-level of productive 
assets, which would predict a low level of wellbeing in future periods. The asset poverty 
line is the level of assets at which expected income in the future is equal to the income 
poverty line. This largely began the transition into focusing on productive assets opposed 
to income/expenditure measures, which are far more stochastic and less predictive of 
future wellbeing. The asset poverty line still has the disadvantage of being rather 
arbitrary. Individuals’ with wealth on either sign of this assigned threshold have nearly 
identical levels of wellbeing, however one is defined as poor while the other is not. 
Another downside to using assets, as a wealth measure is it can be difficult to 
aggregate assets into a usable measure (Carter and May, 2001; Carter and Barrett, 2006), 
especially since each livelihood will depend on different assets to produce wealth. Even 
when just considering one livelihood, it may be difficult to determine the relative value of 
a given productive asset, which may be complicated if certain assets become more 
productive when owned together, for instance while a plow and an ox each provide some 
level of productivity to a farmer individually, a plow becomes more productive when 
paired with an ox to pull it. The more complicated the socio-economic system, the more 
difficult asset aggregation becomes, which adds to the empirical complications of using 
asset-based measures (Barrett and Carter, 2013). However, the advantages of productive 
assets deterministic relationship with future wellbeing still make asset-based poverty 
measures desirable even with the additional empirical challenge of creating an asset 
measure. 
Carter and May (2001)’s asset measure is still a static way of measuring 
wellbeing and suffers from not being able to consider potentially predictable changes in 
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assets over time and focuses on some arbitrary asset poverty line. This is improved upon 
by Carter and Barrett (2006) who introduce the idea of the asset-based MT, which is a 
forward-looking measure focused on how assets are likely to change over time and 
whether this will result in poverty, in terms of income/expenditure, in the future. The MT 
separates where productive assets are expected to grow over time or diminish to a lower 
level making it a dynamic measure of poverty. Those with assets above the MT are said 
to be structurally non-poor, regardless of income/expenditure in any current period.  
Understanding the structure of poverty is essential to determine the amount and 
type of aid that can effectively allow households to escape poverty. There are a number 
ways in which a household can experience poverty and, depending on the form, may 
require different forms of aid to overcome it (Barrett, 2005). Transitory/stochastic, or 
short-term, poverty occurs due to the randomness inherent in wealth dynamics. A 
household, which is typically not impoverished, may fall below a poverty line, however 
defined, in a period due to a negative shock, but if the household’s underlying 
circumstances have not changed, e.g. there is no change in their productive assets, the 
household will likely exit poverty in later periods (Carter and Barrett 2006). While not 
desirable, transitory poverty does not require external aid to fix, as households will 
recover from shocks over time and progress out of poverty. Providing short-term aid (e.g. 
food aid in response to drought) will be effective in reducing short-term reduction in 
wellbeing following negative shocks and should be focused on speeding the recovery 
process (Nashold, 2013). 
Structural, or chronic, poverty is characterized by long spells of low wellbeing 
where once a household becomes poor it is likely to persist, perhaps even generations. 
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Structural poverty occurs when a household has a low level of productive assets that are 
not growing, or expected to grow, over time and this level of assets cannot produce the 
income/expenditure required to surmount an income/expenditure poverty line. The 
poverty trap literature breaks chronic poverty down into two categories: single 
equilibrium and multiple equilibrium poverty traps. Single equilibrium poverty traps 
describe a situation where the socio-economic circumstances will always push 
households towards some low-level of well being below a poverty line. Regardless of 
initial asset endowments, overtime households will be pulled into poverty absent external 
aid. Providing aid can yield short-term improvements, but will have no long-term impact 
on wellbeing unless the socio-economic conditions underpinning the poverty trap are 
changed. In this system, meaningful aid must be long-term without any expectation of 
eliminating the poverty (Hubbard and Duggan, 2009; Ikegami et al., 2016). The single 
equilibrium poverty trap is extremely rare if not non-existent, as it is hard to imagine a 
form of poverty where there is no amount of aid could change the long-term wellbeing of 
those in the system. However, if the amount needed to escape poverty is large enough, it 
may be appropriate to model the poverty as a single equilibrium poverty trap. 
We follow the majority of the poverty trap literature and focus on the multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap where small differences in wealth can result in dramatically 
different long-term outcomes depending on which side of the MT one falls. This point 
becomes especially important when considering the implications of downward shocks 
such as natural disasters. If for instance a flood, drought or hurricane destroy productive 
assets, the primary means of storing wealth in many developing contexts where 
functioning credit markets are not present, this could dramatically alter the future 
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wellbeing of the household. Where the household was once able to sustain or grow 
wealth, if a shock drops wealth below the MT, the household will be on a wealth 
trajectory where long-term poverty may be inevitable without external assistance. This 
provides strong motivation for aid policies to prevent households from falling below the 
MT, in Barrett (2005) terminology, providing a safety net around the MT to keep 
households on high-wealth trajectory.  
In general, multiple equilibrium poverty traps are caused by non-convexities in 
wealth accumulation or an ‘S’ shaped relationship of income/asset dynamics. These can 
occur at any scale from countries down to individuals with the potential for poverty traps 
at different scales to occur simultaneously and reinforce each other (Barrett and Swallow, 
2006). Barrett and Carter (2013) provide a detailed description of what can cause the 
non-convexities in asset accumulation, which underpin the multiple equilibrium poverty 
trap at the different scales. We focus on the micro-scale and summarize some of the 
mechanisms, which, in theory, cause multiple equilibrium poverty traps at the individual 
or household level. 
One largely studied cause of the multiple equilibrium poverty trap centers on 
physical work capacity, which declines more rapidly when wealth drops below a critical 
level (e.g. Dasgupta and Ray, 1986). In this example, malnutrition leads to lower 
productivity resulting in lower incomes, which in turn exacerbate the malnutrition. This 
self-reinforcing mechanism ensures once the Micawber Threshold is crossed the 
individual will fall deeper into poverty. A closely related set of literature focuses on how 
disease reduces work capacity. Plucinski et al. (2011), among others, consider the case 
where disease prevalence is inversely related to wealth levels, that is, poorer individuals 
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have less access to healthcare and get sick more often and/or recover from sickness more 
slowly. Once an individual becomes sick, their earnings decrease, which is intensified the 
longer they are sick. This is an example of a poverty trap with multiple and non-separable 
assets, health and wealth. The interaction of the two can result in a tipping point, where 
once poor individuals becomes sick, they become stuck in a disease driven poverty trap. 
The non-tradability of health, i.e. you cannot lend someone your good health or borrow 
against it in the future, is a central feature to other causes of poverty traps as well. 
Another largely studied case concerns natural resource degradation. The 
productive capital in natural resources behaves similarly to health in the nutrition or 
disease driven poverty trap models, where it is largely not tradable. The typical case here 
occurs where farmers below a certain wealth level cannot afford fertilizer, which lowers 
the productive capacity of farmland overtime (Antle et al., 2006; Stephens et al., 2012). 
With slightly larger initial asset endowments, farmers could invest in fertilizer. This 
maintains or increases farm productivity eventually resulting in further investment in 
assets and a higher standard of living. 
Multiple equilibrium poverty traps can also be caused by increasing returns to 
scale over some wealth range caused by multiple production technologies with varying 
levels of fixed costs. If a more productive livelihood requires an expensive input, a 
household must have an initial endowment of wealth to purchase it before it has access to 
the increased level of production (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Ikegami et al., 2016). One 
largely studied case of multiple production technologies is the pastoralist system of 
Eastern and Southern Africa, where a minimum herd size is required to engage in the 
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more productive mobile pastoralism (e.g. McPeak and Barrett, 2001; Lybbert et al., 2004; 
Toth, 2014), which we describe in more detail later in this section.  
A necessary feature in all of these is some inability to borrow against the future in 
order to surmount thresholds. This could be due to the nature of the asset, such as health 
or, more typically, due to a lack of functioning credit markets. When credit is freely 
available, individuals could surmount the MT and pay off the debt with the increased 
returns from the high production technology. However, many impoverished populations 
especially in remote rural areas do not have access to formal credit markets (Besley, 
1995; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997). Barrett and Carter (2013) suggest the most likely 
cause of multiple equilibrium poverty traps would be some increasing returns to scale in 
production over some level, such as different production technologies with varying levels 
of fixed costs, combined with lack of financial markets preventing households from 
borrowing to switch to a more profitable production technology. Most of the underlying 
causes of the multiple equilibrium poverty traps share the same fundamental behaviors. 
Thus, while the theory we present in the next section is presented as a poverty trap caused 
by multiple production technologies, the results can be applied to other causes as well. 
The main exception occurs poverty traps are caused by the interaction of wealth and other 
asset stocks, such health or local natural resources, where the poverty trap must be 
defined in multiple asset space. This complexity is left for future work where a more 
complex model allowing for the interaction of multiple assets is allowed for. This model 
can then be compared to our basic model to determine how this complexity impacts 
results. 
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The theory of poverty traps has been applied to a diverse set of applications and 
used to motivate development policy at scales from the micro to macro level. However, 
there has been long standing difficulty in empirically identifying multiple equilibrium 
poverty traps, even in contexts where theory would predict them to occur. Specifically, it 
is difficult to identify the existence and location of Micawber Thresholds. While many 
empirical studies have failed to identify poverty traps, this does not prove poverty traps 
do not exist, but merely testing for non-convexities in asset accumulation has many issues 
including significant measurement error, lack of observations occurring near non-
convexity, and non-random attrition to name a few, which makes identifying poverty 
traps extremely difficult (Barrett and Carter, 2013; McKay and Perge, 2013; Kraay and 
McKenzie, 2014). Additionally, thresholds may be heterogeneous based on ability level 
(e. g. Ikegami et al., 2016) or changing over time as socio-economic factors shift. We 
provide a more detailed description of these issues and the empirical techniques used to 
surmount them in section 4. 
The existence of a multiple equilibrium poverty trap for any specific case is 
inherently an empirical question, which we do not seek to answer here, but rather extend 
our knowledge of how to provide aid in situations where they are found to arise. We 
abstract away from many of the empirical challenges and consider the case where a 
poverty trap exists and, importantly, know the location of the MT to determine whether 
aid should be targeted at this dynamic wealth threshold to provide the foundation for 
future aid policy decisions. While the model we present in section 3.3 is intended to be as 
general enough to be applied to many contexts where multiple equilibrium poverty traps 
exist, it is helpful to couch some of the discussion in terms of a specific context. We 
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briefly discuss one notable economic system where multiple equilibrium poverty traps 
have been identified and much of the poverty trap literature has been focused; the 
pastoralist system eastern and southern Africa. 
We follow a large portion of the poverty trap literature and focus on the mobile 
pastoral system of the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of east and southern Africa. The 
ASAL is characterized by bi-annual dry seasons with frequent occurrences of severe 
drought making traditional farming largely unproductive making pastoralism the main 
livelihood for this region. This system provides an ideal context for studying poverty 
traps, in part, due to access very limited economic outside of pastoralism and a single 
productive asset, the herd, is the main form of wealth. With only one main productive 
asset, we can circumvent the many issues associated with asset aggregation (Carter and 
Barrett, 2006). Additionally, this economic system is comprised largely of two groups of 
households, those with large herds engage in mobile pastoralism, moving to different 
water sources and grazing lands, and households with small or non-existent herds who 
are forced into sedentarism. 
Several studies have empirically identified poverty traps in this system, which 
arises due to requiring a large enough herd size to engage in mobile pastoralism (McPeak 
and Barrett, 2001; Lybbert et al., 2004; Toth, 2014). These papers identify a Micawber 
Threshold in herd size, below which herd size tends to decrease, in other words 
productive assets decrease, eventually resulting in the far less productive sedentary 
pastoralism and, sometimes, exiting from pastoralism altogether (Little et al., 2008). 
Mobile pastoralism represents a more productive production technology by providing 
access to additional grazing and watering areas. In this context, mobile pastoralism is 
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only possible when the herd is large enough to support the pastoralists, consuming meat, 
milk and blood from the herd itself while moving between watering holes and grazing 
areas. When a herd becomes too small, households are forced to stay near the village 
which limits access to water (McPeak and Barrett 2001) and grazing lands resulting in 
further loss of animals largely due to overexploited grazing lands near these villages due 
to overstocking (Santos and Barrett 2011). This is an ideal example of the multiple 
production technologies causing a non-convexity in asset accumulation. 
There is strong evidence people perceive and respond to the existence of 
Micawber Thresholds. Hoddinott (2006) surveyed farmers in rural Zimbabwe, who report 
requiring at least two cows/heifers to maintain a stable herd size, which is consistent with 
Hoddinott and Kinsey’s (2003) finding farm incomes in the area rise when farmers own 
at least two cows. In the ASAL context, Santos and Barrett (2006) surveyed of the 
Ethiopian pastoralists who report a critical herd size consistent with empirical findings of 
Lybbert et al. (2004) of minimum herd size of about 4 TLU per person to engage in 
mobile pastoralism. There is also mounting evidence of behavioral responses of 
households, which would only be optimal if the household had assets around a perceived 
MT. One behavior is ‘asset smoothing’ where household’s around a MT tend to forgo 
consumption rather than reduce productive assets (either through selling or direct 
consumption of livestock) when faced with negative shocks (Zimmerman and Carter, 
2003; Carter and Lybbert, 2012). This behavior is in opposition to the typical economic 
prediction of ‘consumption smoothing’ proposed by Deaton (1991), which predicts 
households maximize their inter-temporal utility by maintaining relatively consistent 
consumption, even when faced with negative income shocks. Observing asset smoothing 
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for some range of the population with consumption smoothing for the remainder of the 
population is a strong indicator of non-convex asset accumulation with a MT in the 
vicinity of where households’ are asset smoothing. Relatedly, we can also observed risk 
taking behavior just below a MT. While typically households are risk-averse, that is they 
prefer lower levels of risk, households just below the MT may gamble on riskier 
production technologies/behaviors in the hopes of a positive stochastic outcome allowing 
them to surmount the critical asset threshold (Lybbert and Barrett, 2011). Together these 
studies make a strong case households are aware of the existence and location of MT 
when a multiple equilibrium poverty trap exists. 
This begs the question, if households know the location of MT, why can’t they 
engage in alternative behaviors to surmount this threshold? A clear example in the mobile 
pastoralism context is if mobile pastoralism is more productive, but requires a minimum 
herd size; why don’t household’s with small herds pool their herds, or lend their herd to a 
household with a large herd, in order to surmount this threshold? The practice of herd 
aggregation, or professional herders, is more common in western Africa (Swift, 1986), 
but in the ASAL of eastern and southern Africa the shorter more frequent migrations 
decrease supervision cost, which increases the cost of reciprocal herd sharing (Santos and 
Barrett, 2011; Toth, 2014). However, we do see some communal coping mechanisms. 
Informal insurance exists in many locations of rural Africa where neighbors and relatives 
give productive assets or food items to households who experience large negative shocks, 
such as livestock death. In eastern Ethiopia, a system of informal insurance based 
partially on the charitable obligation inherent in the Islamic religion as well as a form of 
self-insurance due to expectations of reciprocity in the future (Devereux, 2006; Beyene, 
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2013). However, this is not always the case. For instance in rural Tanzania, informal 
insurance networks are uncommon present even though these socio-economic 
environments appear very similar (Amani et al., 1987; Dercon, 1998). Even where 
informal insurance is present, systematic shocks that are frequent and/or severe reduce 
the likelihood of the success of this type of informal insurance (Beyene, 2013).  There 
does appear to be a lack of mechanisms to deal with the multiple equilibrium poverty 
traps within the community, motivating the need for external aid. In the following section 
we present our poverty trap model, which we use to analyze how to best provide this aid. 
 
3.3 Poverty Trap Model 
Poverty traps are an inherently dynamic method of looking at poverty, which focuses on 
how wealth, measured in some aggregation of productive assets, changes over time. 
While identifying an appropriate wealth measure has its own empirical challenges, which 
depends heavily on the socio-economic context of the system being studied, our model 
assumes household wealth is knowable and incorporates all meaningful productive assets 
making it the sole predictor of future wealth, apart from a stochastic component. We 
model wealth growth using a transition function with two production technologies, which 
implicitly incorporates consumption/saving decisions and optimal behavioral responses. 
This simplification allows us to circumvent specifying and including an intertemporal 
utility function to govern wealth dynamics through consumption and savings decisions, 
which would obscure results due to added complexity. A more complete model should 
include a utility function to explicitly allow for optimal behavioral responses when facing 
a poverty trap, most notably asset and consumption smoothing (see Zimmerman and 
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Carter, 2003; Hoddinott, 2006; Carter and Lybbert, 2012), but we save this for future 
research. Additionally, we assume there is no access to financial markets so households 
are not able to borrow to overcome the Micawber Threshold, which is consistent with 
many of the locations where poverty traps have been identified, most notably the 
pastoralist system of the ASAL of East Africa (e.g. McPeak and Barrett, 2001; Lybbert et 
al., 2004; Toth, 2014). 
Multiple equilibrium poverty traps have two or more dynamic wealth equilibria, 
with at least one of those falling below a poverty line, however defined. For simplicity, 
we consider a dual equilibrium poverty trap where there exist two stable dynamic 
equilibria for assets separated by an unstable dynamic equilibrium, the Micawber 
Threshold, which we label M. Households choose the production technology, which 
maximizes wealth in the next period based on the households’ current wealth level. For a 
given wealth, , at time, , we model the transition function for a household as:  
 
q Î{L,H} , 
where  is the production technology, which takes values L and H, representing low and 
high level production technology respectively.  and  are scaling and curvature 
parameters for their respective and  represents the fixed cost of production technology 
where the high production technology has some positive fixed cost and the low 
production technology as has no fixed cost, ensuring wealth growth is strictly possitive, 
 and . Additional constraints on the parameters:  and  
with no restriction on the relationship between  and . Alternatively, this can be 
written as: 
w t
wt+1 = T (wt ) = max
q
(aqwt -bq )
cq
q
aq cq
bq
bL = 0 bH > 0 0 < aL < aH 0 < cq <1
cL cH
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, 
where  is the switching point between technologies, which occurs when 
.
5
 When assets are above , the high production technology will 
generate more assets than the low production technology and vice versa. For a multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap to exist, assets must have a negative expected growth rate at the 
technology switching point, . This yields one unstable dynamic equilibrium at 
 and two stable dynamic equilibria,  and , corresponding to where the low and 
high dynamic equilibria for the low and high technology respectively. Over time, 
households with assets starting above will approach  and those with initial assets 
below  will approach . If , the transition function would exhibit positive 
growth until  is reached, with  being a unique dynamic equilibrium.  
Figure 3.1 depicts an example where individual production technologies result in 
a multiple equilibrium poverty trap. The low production technology is depicted in black 
and the high production technology in blue. The 45-degree line, shown in red, can be 
interpreted as where wealth in the next period equals weatlh in the current period. 
Anywhere the transition function intersectst the 45-degree line represents a dynamic 
equilibrium with stable equilibria being those that cross from above. Figure 3.1 depicts 
the two stable equilibria for the high and low production technologies respectively. 
Anywhere where the transistion function lies above the 45-degree line will result in asset 
growth and when the transition function lies below the 45-degree line, assets will decline 
                                                 
5
 Note the time subscript is removed here, as the technology switching point is time 
invariant. 
(aLw)
cL = (aHw-bH )
cH
M wL
* wH
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*
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over time. We see  lies below the 45-degree line, a requirement for the multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap to exist. 
Figure 3.2 shows the transition function composed from the individual production 
technologies depicted in Figure 3.1. It shows the transition function is comprised of the 
maximum of the two separate production functions. Additionally Figure 3.2 includes the 
Micawber Threshold. As we can see it occurs where the transition function intersects the 
45-degree line from below, indicating an unstable equilibrium. Wealth above M  will be 
in the basin of attraction of the high wealth equilibrium, wH
*
, and will approach wH
*
 over 
time while those below M  will trend towards wL
*
. 
We also introduce an asset poverty line, z, which represents the level of 
productive assets that produce the amount of income/consumption equal to the more 
typeical income/consumption poverty line, on average. Any individual with wealth below 
z in a period can be said to be impoverished acording to this static measure. To 
distibguish between structural and transitory poverty we also need to look at the 
Micawber Threshold. As we described in the previous section, the Micawber Threshold 
represents a dynamic asset poverty line. Everyone with wealth below M are said to be 
structurally poor regardless of whether current assets are below an asset poverty line. 
When houshold wealth is below z and M, the household is structurally and chronically 
poor and when household wealth is above both z and M the household is non-poor. 
However, when wealth falls between the two poveryt measures, we see households which 
may be strucutrally poor, but currently non-poor or just in transitory poverty and will 
eventually emerge from it. Figure 3.3 depicts a scenario where z >M , which depicts the 
case where there exists some transitory poverty. When M <w < z , the household is 
  80 
currently poor as assets are below the asset poverty line, but structurally non-poor as 
assets will increase over time resulting in an exit from poverty. Figure 3.4 shows the case 
where M > z . When  z <w <M , the household is structurally poor, even though current 
assets are temporarilly above the asset poverty line, in other words the household is 
transitorilly non-poor. This highlights the importance of using the benefit of using the 
Micawber Threshold opposed to static poverty lines, however, in our analysis we utilize 
more typical poverty measures, some of which depend on the asset poverty line. 
We introduce randomness into the model as lognormal error, independent of 
production technology. A more realistic model would allow each production technology 
to have systematically different error components; for instance, McPeak and Barrett 
(2001) show pastoralists in the ASAL of eastern Kenya experience greater risk of animal 
loss due to raiding
6
 the further away from towns they graze, which would be 
systematically higher variance for the high production technology. We do not allow for 
technology dependent stochasticity, as it would complicate the decision of when to 
switch between technologies without substantially altering the fundamentals of the 
system. Thus, our stochastic model can be written: 
 
, 
where  is the process variance. The lognormal error ensures the stochastic component 
is tied to wealth level ensuring shocks have a proportional impact on households, for 
example a drought would be better modeled as killing off a percentage of a herd rather 
                                                 
6
 Raiding amongst pastoralists and herders of the ASAL is not an uncommon practice to 
restock herd size after drought or other herd loss and is potentially becoming more 
prominent and destructive as automatic weapons become more prevalent in the ASAL 
(McPeak and Barrett 2001; Schilling et al. 2012). 
wt+1 = max
q
(aqwt - bq )
cq ×ut
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than a given number of animals, which is also consistent with much of the financial 
literature models how financial assets (stocks, derivatives etc.) evolve over time. Other 
poverty trap models have modeled randomness as some negative shock, rather than 
random error that can be positive or negative (e.g. Ikegami et al. 2016), which is intuitive 
to describe situations where drought kills off a large proportion of a herd with no real 
reciprocal for a positive benefit. While our model does not lend as easily to this thought 
process; functionally, it works the same. The main difference is our transition function is 
centered at the median
7
 of the distribution, rather than the maximum of the distribution. 
We feel this provides a more meaningful interpretation of the high and low equilibria and 
the MT while still capturing the dynamics of the poverty trap. With these underlying 
wealth dynamics, we introduce a social planner with the objective of reducing poverty 
while still considering the cost of reducing poverty. 
 
3.4 The Social Planner’s Problem 
Rather than discuss optimal aid in terms of a as part of a government or aid organization, 
which may have multiple, potentially conflicting objectives; it is useful to introduce the 
abstract social planner with the sole purpose of determining the optimal level of aid to 
provide to those stuck in poverty. We use the social planner to compare the costs and 
benefits of providing aid. We can simplify this into two components: the cost of 
providing aid and the social cost of poverty. Absent aid, there is no cost of providing aid, 
however, the level of poverty is largest. Thus there exists a tradeoff between providing 
                                                 
7
 It is the median, rather than the mean, of the distribution as we are dealing with 
lognormal errors. The transition function in any given time period can be interpreted as 
the m  in the  
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aid, with a monetary cost, versus the cost to society of having poverty. In this section, we 
discuss how we model the social cost of poverty in terms of a dollar value, which we can 
directly compare to the cost of providing aid, and use this to determine the total cost of 
providing aid at varying levels. We show the optimal aid level is largely determined by 
the cost of providing aid, which is decreasing just below the Micawber Threshold 
resulting in a local minimum of the total cost of aid. Due to the shape of the cost of 
providing aid, the cost of poverty becomes only a secondary consideration, suggesting aid 
policy decisions can focus on costs of providing aid when combating the multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap. 
We model the social planner’s problem as minimizing the sum of two costs: the 
cost of providing aid and the social cost of poverty. The social planner chooses aid level, 
, that guarantees a minimum wealth level for all households, which we call the basic 
wealth policy. This policy is similar to the more familiar basic income policy, except the 
guarantee is based on household assets rather than income. The present, or discounted, 
cost of providing aid, , is the sum of payouts to each household, , in population, 
, with assets below the aid level to bring assets up to  at the end of each time period, , 
summed over the length of the time horizon, , with discount rate, . It is useful to 
break cost of aid into two components: the initial cost of providing aid to bring 
households’ assets up to , which Barrett (2005) refers to as a ‘cargo net’, and the cost of 
preventing households’ assets from falling below  in all future periods, called the 
‘safety net’. Breaking it down in this way, we can write the cost of providing aid as: 
 
S
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 , 
where the + superscript is the shorthand notation, x( )
+
= max x,0( ). Due to the aid policy, 
wealth is bounded at , which is captured in the second equation. The first term is the 
cost of the cargo net, paid in the initial period, , and the second term is the 
discounted cost of the safety net for the duration of the policy. Breaking it down this way 
allows us to estimate the cost of providing aid, which we describe in detail in chapters 
four and five. 
The social cost of poverty, , is a function of some poverty measure, , 
which is partially determined by the level of aid, .  
C(P | S) = g P(wt | S)( )
t=1
T
å
,
 
where  is some weighting function capturing the negative impact of poverty, however 
measured, and wt  is the vector of wealth levels at time t. We do not explicitly include 
any discounting function for poverty. Any discounting can be included in the function, , 
or we can interpret the social planner as being indifferent between poverty today or in the 
future.   
In practice, the weighting function, g , will depend on a number of social factors 
and captures how much a society dislikes poverty. We do not attempt to prescribe a 
functional form of g , but we can make some standard assumptions about its form, which 
intuitively hold across societies. The main feature we will rely on in our analysis is g  is a 
strictly positive function, as poverty is non-negative and has some social cost, which is 
increasing with respect to poverty, . Simply stated, more poverty is worse for 
wi,t | S = max[T (wi,t-1),S]
S
t = 0
C(P | S) P
S
g
g
¶g(×)
¶P
> 0
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society. For our analysis, we do not need to make any assumptions on the second 
derivative of , although, intuitively, the social cost of poverty is likely to be increasing 
weakly faster as poverty becomes more extreme, 
¶2g(×)
¶P2
³ 0 .  While our results hold for 
this extremely general form, for the remainder of the paper we will assume a functional 
form of g  to aid in the discussion and make the interpretations more accessible.  
Specifically, we assume the social cost of poverty is a multiplicative transform of the 
poverty measure: 
g(P) = b ×P , 
where b  is some positive scalar capturing the cost of poverty. With this functional form, 
the curvature of the social cost of poverty is largely determined by the poverty measure 
itself and b  acts as some scaling factor to transform the poverty measure into some 
dollar value, which we can use to directly compare the cost of poverty with the cost of 
providing aid. In other words, we assume the poverty measures themselves indicate social 
preference over the cost of poverty; just not expressed as a dollar value, with lower levels 
of a poverty measure correspond directly to a lower social cost of poverty. 
The choice of poverty measure has important implications in many contexts as 
each measure places weights on different aspects of poverty, such as amount of inequality 
in society or the percent of the population below a defined poverty line. Some widely 
used measures are the Gini coefficient and the Foster-Greer-Thorbeke (FGT) measures, 
which we briefly discuss as well as show how each is calculated for a population in a 
single time period. While typically these measures are based in expenditure or income, 
g
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Carter and Barrett (2006) show these measures can just as easily be applied to asset-based 
wealth measures, consistent with our modeling framework.  
The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality rather than poverty, per se. It is a 
measure of how wealth is dispersed across a population. It is calculated: 
G =
|wi -w j |
j=1
N
å
i=1
N
å
2N wi
i=1
N
å
 
 . 
The coefficient can take on values between zero and one, assuming there is no negative 
wealth. The larger the Gini coefficient, the higher the inequality of the system is. A Gini 
coefficient of one means perfect inequality, where one individual has all the wealth, and 
zero indicates perfect equality. A benefit of this measure is it does not rely upon an 
arbitrary definition of poverty, such as the poverty line, like the members of the FGT 
family. The major downside with this measure is it says nothing about the wellbeing of 
households. A population where all households are mired in extreme poverty will score 
well (a low value) using the Gini coefficient, while a population with high levels of 
wealth with significant variability between households will score worse (a high value). 
While the latter case is clearly preferable, it also has a more inequality, which highlights 
why using the Gini coefficient by itself can be misleading. However, looking at the Gini 
coefficient in conjunction with other measures that include some level of wealth or 
wellbeing is useful.  
The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indices are a family of poverty measures sharing a 
common functional form: 
FGTa =
1
N
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where  indicates the poverty measure,  is the asset poverty line, and  is the number 
of households below the poverty line. The poverty headcount, , is the first measure 
in the FGT family. It doesn’t put a weight on anything other than the number of 
households falling below the poverty line and can be written: 
. 
According to this metric, a starving household is just as undesirable as a household just 
below the poverty line, which is not realistic. However, it can be used to look at the cost 
of removing households from poverty, especially if one wants to consider the case of 
eliminating poverty entirely or to bring percentage of households’ in poverty to some 
level, which may be the objective of some government or aid program. A less severe 
problem with all of the FGT measures is it does not give any weight to how households 
above the poverty line. An extremely wealthy household with little to no risk of falling 
into poverty is viewed as the same as a household just above the poverty line.  
The second FGT measure is the poverty gap, , which is the difference 
between a household’s wealth and the poverty line, summed across all households in the 
population. This gives a measure of how impoverished the poor households are. This 
measure partially weights inequality as poorer households have a larger weight. As with 
all the FGT measures, it relies on an arbitrary poverty line and does not consider the 
wellbeing of non-poor households. 
How one measures poverty is important in many empirical contexts and can result 
in different measurements of the severity of poverty as well as potential effects on 
optimal aid strategies. For our analysis, we can circumvent the issue of selecting a 
poverty measure by noting any poverty measure that depends solely on level of poverty 
a z H
a = 0
FGT0 =
H
N
a =1
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and inequality will have its own social cost function, , which all behave similarly with 
respect to .  Increasing  will have a positive effect on wealth levels and a negative 
effect on inequality. For poverty measures that weight inequality, it is always as a 
negative. Thus, increasing  has a positive benefit in terms of wealth and inequality 
resulting in a lower level of poverty, however measured. Figure 3.5 depicts the 
relationship between poverty measures as a function of aid level for one parameter 
combination with an asset poverty line at w = 70. We see the FGT measures equal zero 
when aid level is set at or above the poverty line, as these measures only consider the 
impoverished within the population. We see poverty is weakly decreasing for all 
measures and we see significant drops in all measures slightly below the Micawber 
Threshold.
8
 This drop corresponds to the aid level being high enough for individuals to 
begin escaping poverty and holding themselves at the high wealth equilibrium, thus no 
longer being dependent on the external aid. The measures which place a higher weight on 
inequality exhibit a smoother decline, while the poverty headcount has little to no change 
until a sharp drop. This is intuitive as lower levels of aid do not significantly impact the 
likelihood of escaping poverty, but it does raise wealth levels for the most impoverished, 
thus reducing inequality. All measures of poverty are weakly decreasing as aid increases. 
This combined with our modest assumptions of  for our poverty measures, ensures the 
social cost of poverty is decreasing as level of aid increases, ¶g ¶S £ 0 everywhere. 
Because the poverty measures (and therefore the social cost) are weakly decreasing in 
aid, the solution to minimum total cost ends up depending primarily on the cost function 
for providing aid. We will demonstrate this feature of the problem more extensively 
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 We do not include the Micawber Threshold in the figure as it clutters up the image and 
is not the focus of the discussion here.  
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below, as it provides a compelling result: future applied researchers and policy makers 
can focus almost exclusively on the cost of providing aid. 
To show this, we start by modeling the social planner’s problem inclusive of the 
social cost of poverty, as choosing the aid level that minimizes the sum of the cost of 
providing aid and the social cost of poverty: 
min
S
c(S)+C(P | S) . 
We model this as an unconstrained optimization with the solution being the level of aid, 
which is best for society, independent of available funds. In other words, we assume the 
social planner has access to enough money. Adding a constraint does not fundamentally 
change the nature of the problem, as cost of aid is explicitly included in the optimization. 
Due to the poverty trap and the cost of aid being explicitly included, we do not find the 
solution of the social planner’s problem to be an arbitrarily large S  and we show later 
optimal aid must either be close to non-existent (for the case of a society caring very little 
about poverty) or located near the MT. We omit the non-negativity constraint on aid for 
notational convenience; obviously, the choice set includes no aid. 
Taking the first order condition of the social planner’s problem with respect to the 
level of aid, we get: 
¶c(S)
¶S
+
¶C(P | S)
¶S
= 0  
¶c(S)
¶S
= -
¶C(P | S)
¶S
, 
intuitively, the optimal level of aid should balance the cost of providing aid with the 
social cost of poverty. Aid should be provided up to the point where the marginal cost of 
providing aid equals the marginal benefit of reducing poverty.  
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Intuitively, it may appear the location of optimal aid will depend largely on the 
social cost of poverty. However, due to the underlying mechanics of the multiple 
equilibrium poverty traps, we show the cost of providing aid is the primary concern for 
our basic wealth policy and the social cost of poverty is a secondary concern, in terms of 
where the optimal solution lies. Clearly, policy makers can choose no aid, which will 
come at zero cost. Initially, for very low levels of aid, the cost of providing aid is strictly 
increasing. Barring some edge cases (to be discussed below), if society values poverty 
reduction sufficiently to take action, the optimal solution will be characterized by a local 
minimum in the cost function for providing aid. We will show that this local minimum 
will be at an aid level very close to the Micawber Threshold in nearly all cases where a 
dual equilibrium poverty trap is the appropriate model. We will also show that this 
phenomenon is driven by the structure of the poverty trap model. When the asset poverty 
line, z, is below M, aid only up to z will result in (definitional
9
) poverty eradication but at 
very high cost, so policy makers can keep poverty at zero but lower costs (and raise 
wellbeing of those affected) by raising the aid level. On the other hand, when z is above 
M, aid is only needed up to (a small interval above) the Micawber Threshold to propel 
households to the high equilibrium. The supporting details for these claims are covered in 
the next section. 
The social planner’s problem is difficult to solve analytically so we turn to 
numeric analysis to determine the optimal level of aid to combat the multiple-equilibrium 
poverty trap. We input our model into MATLAB and simulate wealth paths for 
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 When aid is set above the asset poverty line any measure such as the FGT poverty 
measures, which measure poverty below the poverty line will equal zero. According to 
these measures poverty will be completely eliminated, by definition. 
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households under varying levels of S  to calculate the cost of providing aid as well as the 
level of poverty. We start by generating wealth levels for 10,000 households using a 
uniform distribution across relevant wealth ranges, 1 to 100, and simulated wealth 
trajectories without aid for twenty periods. The 20
th
 period we use as the starting wealth 
levels, which approximates the steady state distribution resulting from the underlying 
transition function. We then introduce varying aid levels of S  and simulate wealth 
trajectories for these households, which comprises our data. We vary high technology 
parameters as well as discount rates and the maximum time period to generate data used 
to determine what factors impact the cost of providing aid and the likelihood of poverty. 
We do not vary the low-technology parameters for simplicity and ease of interpretation. 
In previous iterations of this simulation we found the low-technology parameters did not 
significantly impact our results as the high technology determines M  and the 
surrounding region, which largely determines the optimal aid level. For these data we 
focus on the effect of the high technology parameters and include only a few levels of T  
and d  to show they do not play a significant role in determining the level of optimal aid 
and aid levels and the inefficient aid trap. 
 
3.5 Poverty Trap and Aid Mechanics 
The total cost in the social planners problem is the sum of the cost of providing aid and 
the social cost of poverty, which is the objective function we seek to minimize. The 
lowest value of total cost represents what is preferred by society and depends on the cost 
of reducing poverty as well as the social cost of poverty within the society. The social 
cost of poverty depends on the level of poverty as well as the weighting function, b , 
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which translates a poverty measure into a dollar cost of poverty. The cost of providing aid 
in the form of our basic wealth policy is the sum of the cargo net, to bring people up to 
the desired aid level, and the present value of the safety net to keep people at this level in 
all future periods, which depends on the number of people relying on aid and the 
magnitude of the payouts each period. It is important to note the cost of providing aid is 
independent of a specified poverty line – only the poverty measure itself is potentially 
sensitive to the official poverty line. The basic wealth policy simply pays out to ensure 
household wealth equals at least the aid level in each period and can be set anywhere in 
relation to this poverty line. We can simulate the cost of providing aid and the level of 
poverty and, hence, determine the social cost of poverty by assuming some value for the 
weighting function b , for each aid level. The sum of these components will be the total 
cost, which the social planner is trying to minimize. In this section, we describe the 
general form of these cost functions and detail some specific cases to motivate why we 
can focus almost exclusively on the cost of providing aid for much of our analysis. 
 While the cargo net is strictly increasing with respect to aid level, the cost of the 
safety net is decreasing over some range of aid level. This decrease is large enough to 
cause the cost of aid to be decreasing over much of this range as well. Figure 3.6 depicts 
these dynamics. The cost of providing aid, in black, is equal to the sum of the two blue 
lines, the cost of safety net (solid blue) and the cost of the cargo net (dashed blue). This 
comes about directly from how aid interacts with the poverty trap mechanics. Once 
people escape the trap by crossing the Micawber Threshold, they are propelled to the 
high wealth equilibrium and no longer need to be supported by the safety net. Reducing 
the number of people supported by the safety net reduces the cost of providing a safety 
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net in each period, which in turn reduces the cost of providing aid. We show later this 
drop in cost happens slightly before the Micawber Threshold. At this level of aid, we see 
individuals being able to surmount the Micawber Threshold and propel themselves 
towards the high wealth equilibrium. In addition, this level occurs around the technology 
switching point, which represents where expected wealth change is most negative as 
shown in Figure 3.6. Aid at this level typically represents the peak of the aid trap, where 
payouts are large and the number of people supported is large. As aid increases from this 
point, the expected payout per individual kept at the safety net decreases because the 
expected wealth change is increasing (less negative) at this level.  
Figure 3.7 depicts the typical relationship between cost of providing aid, in black, 
and the likelihood of poverty, in blue. The x-axis is the level of aid, the left y-axis is the 
present value of providing aid in terms of cost per person, and the right y-axis is the 
percentage of the population below the poverty line, or the poverty headcount, over the 
length of the simulation. We see at low aid levels, there is a minimal impact on poverty 
level with costs rapidly increasing. Costs switch from increasing rapidly to sharply 
decreasing around the technology switching point. This drop in cost is concurrent with a 
sharp drop in the poverty level. This is intuitive, when the number of people being held 
up by the safety net decrease, there will be lower costs each period. The shape of the cost 
function is important. We see it is not strictly increasing with aid level creating a local 
minimum of cost, which we call the minimum aid level, Sˆ . We later show Sˆ  is the upper 
bound of the inefficient aid trap.  
The likelihood of poverty in figure 3.7 is expressed in its own scale, loosely 
interpreted as the average amount impoverished household wealth levels are below the 
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poverty line, rather than in terms of a dollar value. We can transform this into its dollar 
value by assuming a value for the weighting function, b , so we are comparing the dollar 
cost of providing basic wealth with the dollar cost of the level of poverty at all levels of 
the safety net. The level of b  determines how much society cares about poverty and can 
significantly impact the optimal level of aid. Another important component, which can 
impact optimal aid level, is the location of the poverty line. We consider three general 
cases of how b  and the poverty line effect the location of optimal aid: low value of b  
and/or a low poverty line, a poverty line within the inefficient aid trap, and what we call 
the typical case where b  and the poverty line are sufficiently large. This last case is what 
we focus much of our analysis on, as it is the most relevant to providing aid to those 
stuck in poverty traps. 
 There are two cases where optimal aid will be close to nonexistent: when the 
social cost of poverty is very low (a relatively small b ) or when the poverty line is close 
to the low equilibrium. The latter naturally requires a society using a poverty measure, 
which depends on the defined poverty line such as any in the FGT family. It is easiest to 
interpret our model in relative terms, rather than specific values. While we talk about 
results in like terms, aka dollars, these are arbitrary units, which is meaningless without 
the rest of the contest. For instance, saying the social cost of poverty is 75$ can mean two 
very different things depending on whether to cost of providing aid is $1000 or $10. With 
this in mind, the two cases both represent situations where poverty is relatively 
unimportant to society. A low social cost of poverty indicates the cost of poverty 
reduction is large compared to the benefits of removing poverty and a poverty line close 
to the low equilibrium indicates the poverty trap results in only mild levels of poverty.  
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3.5.1. The Case of a Low Poverty Line 
Figure 3.8 shows the case of a very low poverty line, which would affect the FGT 
poverty measures, but not the Gini coefficient. The total cost function is expressed as a 
solid black line, and is made up of its components, the cost of aid, the dash/dotted line, 
and the social cost of poverty, the dashed line. We use the poverty gap to measure 
poverty for this analysis. At low levels of aid, we see the total cost depends entirely on 
the social cost of poverty, as the cost of providing aid is nonexistent at the low levels. We 
see the cost of poverty is relatively low, as much of the population does not experience 
poverty due to the relatively low poverty line. We see the total cost function has a local 
maximum at the minimum aid level, which is simply the local minimum of the cost of 
providing aid, but this does not correspond to the global minimum of the function. The 
global minimum indicates the optimal aid policy, which occurs around the aid level 25. 
 
3.5.2. The Case of a Low Social Cost of Poverty 
Figure 3.9 shows a similar case of where the social cost of poverty is low, in other words 
a low b . We still see the local minimum of the cost of providing aid is not the global 
minimum as the cost of poverty is always extremely small. Thus the optimal aid level in 
this case is close to nonexistent, as the benefit of eradicating poverty is very small, since 
society does not care much about it. Both cases have a global minimum of aid level very 
low, as poverty is not a large concern in either case, resulting in a low level or non-
existent aid. These cases will have aid provided at a level below the start of the inefficient 
aid trap. While these represent potential situations in the real world, they correspond to 
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situations where poverty is relatively unimportant making much of the discussion of aid 
policy moot. Thus, we do not focus on this scenario for our analysis and focus on cases 
where the poverty trap leads to substantial poverty, which society cares about enough to 
eliminate. 
 
3.5.3. A Poverty Line in the Region of the Aid Trap 
A second notable case occurs when the poverty line lies within the inefficient aid trap. 
When this occurs, the poverty measures which depend on the poverty line will all go to 
zero sharply within the inefficient aid trap, making at least some of the range having a 
zero cost of poverty. This results in optimal aid being exactly the minimum aid level, so 
long as b  is large enough. After the poverty line is reached, the total cost depends solely 
on the cost of providing aid making the minimum of total cost be equal to the minimum 
of the cost of providing aid.  
 First, some notation. In the context of our model, we define the inefficient aid trap 
as including all levels of aid below Sˆ , for which the cost of aid is at least as high as c Sˆ( )
. We denote as S0  the lower bound of this interval, for which c S0( ) = c Sˆ( ) , which is 
depicted in Figure 3.10. It is immediately clear from the Figure that the case of the low 
poverty line (Section 3.5.1 above) is one in which z < S0 . The beginning of the inefficient 
aid trap occurs when cost first reach this level, which we label S0 . We do not devote 
much time to the S0  as it is not easy to empirically determine, it does not have a useful 
economic interpretation nor is it particularly relevant for policy decisions.  
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 Now, consider the case where zÎ S0, Sˆ( ). Figure 3.11 shows this case where, 
once again, the total cost is shown as the solid black line, the dot/dashed line is the cost of 
providing aid and the dashed line is the social cost of poverty. We see after the cost of 
poverty goes to zero, which occurs when aid level is higher than the poverty line, which 
is set at 40 for this example, we see the total cost overlays the cost of providing aid, as 
these are equal beyond this point. We see the local minimum, which is the minimum aid 
level also is the global minimum. Thus, when the poverty measure used to value poverty 
is in the FGT family and the poverty line lies within the inefficient aid level, the optimal 
aid level lies exactly at the minimum aid level.  
 
3.5.4. A Poverty Line above the Aid Trap 
The last case occurs when the b  is sufficiently large and either the poverty line lies 
above the minimum aid level or we are using a poverty measure, which does not depend 
on a poverty line, such as the Gini coefficient. For this case, the minimum aid level 
becomes a lower bound for the optimal aid level. The exact location of optimal aid will 
depend on b , the slope of the poverty measure, and the slope of the cost of providing aid. 
This is the case where the solution to the social planners problem holds, that is to say the 
marginal benefit of reducing poverty equals the marginal cost of providing aid: 
¶c(S)
¶S
= -
¶C(P | S)
¶S
.
 
The other cases represent different corner solutions to the problem. Figure 3.8 depicts this 
with the total cost being shown as the solid line, the cost of providing aid is the 
dot/dashed line and the social cost of poverty is the dashed line. We see a global 
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minimum of the cost function occurs above the minimum aid level, which is why we treat 
this as a lower bound. The solution to the social planners problem, that is to say the 
location of the global minimum, occurs when the slope of the cost of providing aid equals 
the absolute value of  the slope of the social cost of poverty. This is the point where the 
marginal benefit of eliminating poverty equals the marginal cost of providing aid. For aid 
levels above this point, the cost of providing aid is increasing far more rapidly than the 
cost of poverty is decreasing. This is consistent across poverty measures and under 
different model parameters, and ensures the optimal aid level lies reasonably close to the 
minimum aid level.  
It is the structure of the dual-equilibrium poverty trap model that causes costs to 
increase relatively faster than the poverty level drops at points above the Micawber 
Threshold. It is for this reason that the minimum cost aid level is always so close to M, 
and that the social planner can focus primarily on cost. Once aid is this high, the cost of 
providing a safety net each period is relatively low. Increasing the level of aid does not 
have much of an effect on the safety net cost each period, but has a large effect on the 
initial cost of the cargo net. Thus increasing aid at points significantly above the 
Micawber Threshold have larger costs due to the increased cost of the cargo net, without 
a significant change in the likelihood of people falling below the aid level and having to 
be supported by the safety net. Thus, poverty levels, however defined, do not change to a 
large degree as safety nets rise beyond this point, but costs do increase significantly.  
 
3.6 Does the Minimum Aid Level Approximate the Micawber Threshold? 
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We identify the upper bound of the inefficient aid trap by finding the minimum aid level, 
Sˆ , by identifying the local minima of the cost function with respect to the aid level. For 
the vast majority of aid levels below this point, there will be a higher cost of providing 
aid with a lower reduction in poverty, which comprises the rest of the inefficient aid trap. 
Any aid set below Sˆ  with a lower cost will have a non-noticeable impact on poverty 
levels, which occurs at extremely low aid levels. While we cannot rule out the potential 
the optimal aid level lies in this region, this would only be optimal if society has a very 
low social cost of poverty, g , making the discussion of poverty reduction moot as 
discussed in section 3.5. We focus on the relationship between M and Sˆ  to determine 
whether the Micawber Threshold should be the target level for aid policy. 
Table 3.1 reports linear regression for the location of minimum aid, Sˆ . We find 
M almost entirely predicts Sˆ . A regression coefficient around .99 for all model 
specifications indicates Sˆ  has almost a one to one relationship with M , which is 
significant at the 1% level. We include the high equilibrium and sigma in alternative 
models, which moderately improves the regression fit; both variables are equal at the 1% 
level. We see our process variance parameter is has a positive effect on the location of 
minimum aid, suggesting the more variance in the system, the larger the minimum aid 
level should be.   
Figure 3.13 shows the scatter plot with Sˆ  on the y-axis and M  on the x-axis as a 
visual of this relationship. We include a 45-degree line to better visualize which side of 
the MT the minimum aid level lies with observations to the left/above indicating the 
Sˆ >M . We see minimum aid level almost entirely lies above M . The only exceptions 
occur when the Micawber Threshold is very close to the high wealth equilibrium, which 
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can be seen in figure 3.14. This occurs because the basin of attraction for the high wealth 
equilibrium shrinks the closer the Micawber Threshold and the high wealth equilibrium, 
in other words the equilibrium is less stable. Even if households reach this equilibrium, 
the stochastic process is likely to drop them below it in the near future. This situation 
would be better described as a single equilibrium poverty trap with some minor periods 
of relatively high well being for the initially well endowed, or those who experience 
repeated good luck, but this high wellbeing is short lived. We look closer at the 
distribution of minimum aid levels for select parameters later in this section to get a 
better estimate of how much larger Sˆ  is than M .  
We find the minimum aid level for our basic wealth policy lies slightly above the 
MT. Rather than looking at the magnitudes of the MT and minimum cost when making 
this comparison, it is helpful to consider the difference in percentage terms. Figure 3.11 
shows the distribution of the percent difference between minimum cost and the MT as a 
percentage of MT, 
Sˆ -M
M
×100 , under different sets of parameters simulated 1000 times. 
Positive values are interpreted as how much larger the minimum cost of basic wealth is 
larger than the MT, in percentage terms, with zero indicating the minimum cost is located 
at the MT. We find the minimum aid level is, on average, 2-3% larger than the MT. The 
spread of the distribution is largely determined by the process variance, s 2 , with a larger 
s 2  increasing the distance between the minimum cost level and the Micawber Threshold. 
We also see larger shape parameters, aH  and cH  reduce the variability and lower the 
distance. The distribution of minimum aid level lies fully above the MT, for these 
parameter combinations as these parameters had a sufficiently large gap between the high 
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equilibrium and MT. Table 3.2 shows regression results of the effect of our parameters on 
the percent difference. We see bH  and s
2  have a positive effect on the percent 
difference, while other parameters aH , cH  and M  all have negative effects. When the 
multiple equilibrium poverty trap exists with a large enough basin of attraction around 
the high equilibrium, we can interpret the Micawber Threshold as a lower bound for the 
minimum aid level. As Sˆ  is the upper bound of the inefficient aid trap, the Micawber 
Threshold can be reasonably interpreted as this upper bound. We use this in conjunction 
with comparing the slope of the cost curves on either side of Sˆ  to suggest M  should be 
used as a lower bound for the optimal location of aid, without needing to specify a 
functional form for the social cost of poverty, g . 
Looking at the cost function around Sˆ , we see costs increase faster below the 
minimum aid level than above it, 
¶c(Sˆ- )
¶S
>
¶c(Sˆ+ )
¶S
, where the positive and negative 
sign represent above and below respectively. This is an asymmetric penalty for 
misspecifying the aid level, where there is a higher penalty, in terms of cost, to set aid too 
low than too high. Since the level of poverty is decreasing with increasing aid, not only 
does setting aid too low have a higher dollar cost, it also reduces the effectiveness of 
reducing poverty. In the empirical setting there may be significant uncertainty in the 
location of M and it may be impossible to determine Sˆ . Due to the asymmetric penalty, 
these results would suggest placing an aid level above the estimated MT would be 
desirable. This has the additional benefit of decreasing poverty to a larger degree while 
still having a lower expected cost of aid.  
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Identifying the minimum aid level and the inefficient aid trap is one step short of 
identifying the optimal aid level for a society, which depends on the social cost of 
poverty g . However, due to the shape of the cost and likelihood of poverty curves, we 
can still make some observations about the likely location of the optimal aid level without 
assuming g . The interaction of the value of g  is unlikely to significantly change the aid 
level and is, at most, a secondary concern.  
 
3.7 Discussion 
The primary contribution of this chapter is to further our theoretical understanding of 
how to best provide aid to individuals stuck in a multiple equilibrium poverty trap. Due to 
the interaction of the multiple equilibrium poverty trap and our basic wealth aid policy, 
we find the cost of providing aid can be used to locate the optimal level of aid, with the 
social cost of poverty being, at most, a secondary consideration. This occurs because of 
the inefficient aid trap, which forms when a safety net is set at a level, which holds 
individuals at a level without significantly increasing a household’s chances of exiting 
poverty. We find the Micawber Threshold is a good approximation of the upper bound 
for the inefficient aid trap, which indicates optimal aid should be set slightly above this 
level. When there is uncertainty in estimating the Micawber Threshold, the asymmetric 
penalty of misspecifying aid level suggests policy makers should err on the side of setting 
aid too high so as to avoid the sharp increase in costs caused by setting aid within the 
inefficient aid trap. 
We distinguish between dependency where aid policy attempts to hold individuals 
up to a level, which they could not maintain without external aid and the inefficient aid 
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trap is when altering level of aid provided can reduce both the cost of providing aid and 
the level of poverty. Dependency is typically thought of as the aid trap, where households 
will be dependent on aid to maintain the high-productivity livelihood without being able 
to accumulate wealth to be able to take advantage of its benefits. In the ASAL example, 
this would describe the case where you hold household wealth just high enough where 
they will engage in mobile pastoralism, as it will be more productive than sedentary 
grazing, but the herd is too small to fully sustain the pastoralists resulting in the herd 
shrinking until the safety net replaces the livestock. 
We find the Micawber Threshold is a sufficient upper bound for the inefficient aid 
trap, which means optimal aid must be set above the Micawber Threshold. This is 
consistent with Barrett (2005) who shows this is the case for the deterministic case and 
suggests it holds for the stochastic case. While Plucinski et al. (2011) are correct in their 
findings that setting aid below the Micawber Threshold can lead to escaping poverty, we 
show this is an inefficient policy solution for the simplest case of multiple equilibrium 
poverty traps. It is important to note, Plucinski et al. (2011) consider a disease-driven 
poverty trap model, where the dynamic feedbacks between wealth and disease cause 
households to be structurally trapped in poverty. This captures how poorer individuals 
have less ability to protect themselves from disease and sick individuals earn less money, 
which can cause a downward spiral into inescapable poverty. This system has an added 
layer of complexity where they consider two sets of assets, wealth and health, and study 
the interaction. It is unclear whether our policy recommendations hold when poverty 
traps are caused by the interaction of multiple assets in this way. In the future, we hope to 
expand this model to answer questions such as these by modeling the resource 
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dependence, in a similar manor to the feedbacks between health and wealth from 
Plucinski et al. (2011), to assess whether these results are robust to more complex 
situations, which may cause multiple equilibrium poverty traps. 
The distinction between dependency and the inefficient aid trap, which we 
introduce, may be a useful when determining optimal policy decisions. The independent 
aid trap focuses on the efficiency of aid policy and should be avoided, as it represents a 
sub-optimal policy. However, this is not the typical definition of the aid trap. In contrast, 
dependency is not always sub-optimal. For the case of single equilibrium poverty traps, 
maintaining a population at a certain wealth level may be desirable even without the 
chance of reducing the dependency on aid in the future. Aid resulting in dependency may 
also be desirable in the short term, while larger overhauls of the economic system or 
other aid is not possible, but may become so in the future. So while both are forms of an 
aid trap, the IAT should always be avoided while UAT may have some value as part of 
aid policy. 
An important implication of this paper is it does not pay to underinvest in aid, 
when poverty traps are present. Governments and aid organizations with limited budgets 
may perceive an incentive to lower the level of aid in an effort to save money. This may 
be especially true in the empirical setting where identifying thresholds such as the 
Micawber Threshold have significant uncertainty; an agency may look to select the lower 
bound of the potential threshold. However, we show this may have drastic implications 
for cost of aid. Due to the shape of the cost as a function of aid level, there is an 
asymmetric penalty for setting aid levels incorrectly. Undershooting the aid level has 
steep costs, resulting in the aid trap and a far less effective aid program, while 
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overshooting aid by the same amount has only a modest increase in cost. This occurs due 
to the long-term benefits of lifting household wealth to a point where they can 
accumulate wealth and only require aid when they experience large or repeated negative 
shocks.  
For our analysis we focus on a social cost of poverty modeled as a linear weight 
on a poverty measure for simplicity. However, results hold for the more general case as 
well where the cost of poverty is any increasing function of the aid measure. The choice 
of the weighting function is not as telling as the choice in measure itself. Each poverty 
measure places different value on aspects of poverty such as inequality or difference from 
a poverty threshold. A society’s preferences for the social cost of poverty will determine 
which is the appropriate measure to use. The weighting function acts to transform this 
poverty measure into some dollar amount to be used in comparing the cost and benefits 
of poverty reduction. Imposing a non-linear weighting function, where costs increase 
faster as the poverty measure rises, would increase the relative cost of poverty at the 
lower tail. This would cause the slope of the cost of poverty to decrease (more negative 
for much of the range), in essence, tilting the social cost of poverty curve to the right. 
This would likely shrink the relative size of the inefficient aid trap, as now the relative 
cost of poverty is lower as we approach the poverty line. However, a weighting function 
of a poverty measure is more of a theoretic construction and has little practical 
application.  
One shortcoming of our model is it does not allow for behavioral adjustments in 
response to safety nets, most notably asset smoothing when assets are near the Micawber 
Threshold. While our model is consistent with asset smoothing in general, we are unable 
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to account for how behavioral responses to shocks and thresholds change in response to 
policy interventions. Ikegami et al. (2016) provide compelling work highlighting the 
importance of how ex-ante responses to negative shocks change when individuals risk 
exposure is reduced due to intervention policies. They show there can be a significant 
crowding-in of investment due to risk reduction policies, making it optimal for agents to 
invest into risky productive assets increasing their likelihood of escaping poverty. 
Additionally, safety nets may crowd-in asset transfers from informal insurance systems as 
there is a higher chance of reciprocity in the future when aid is present, due to less chance 
of being forced to exit pastoralism (Santos and Barrett, 2011). Since we do not account 
for responses to aid programs, results of our model may produce a downward bias on the 
effectiveness of the basic wealth policy in reducing poverty. It is unclear how allowing 
agents to respond to aid would affect the optimal level of aid and is a direction for future 
research. An alternative interpretation of our model is it represents myopic agents who do 
not alter their behavior due to safety nets, which may not be so grand an assumption in 
development contexts. Little (2008) suggests most Northern Ethiopian farmers are not 
‘foolhardy’ enough to rely on external food aid, a form of safety net, as it is uncertain and 
usually poorly timed. If this perception is prevalent, behavioral responses to safety nets 
may take a long period to form or may not come about at all, which adds some validity to 
our results. 
Additionally, we only consider the case where a multiple equilibrium poverty trap 
is known to exist and exists with a known, unique Micawber Threshold. Barrett and 
Carter (2013), among others, highlight how this rarely, if ever, occurs in the real world. 
For one, individual characteristics, such as innate ability, will heavily influence the 
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existence and location of Micawber Thresholds. Ikegami et al. (2016) incorporate 
individual ability in their model and allow for the existence of multiple equilibrium 
poverty traps occurring for only a segment of the population while others have a unique 
equilibrium, either high or low depending on ability level. This adds another component 
of realism not present in our model, which should be included in future research. The 
optimal location of aid, as well as the operational definitions of aid traps, may change 
substantially when considering the case where there is a heterogeneous population with 
varying Micawber Thresholds or even with some individuals all-but-destined to be pulled 
towards a low equilibrium due to innate characteristics and circumstances. 
With these limitations in mind, this chapter is intended to get us another step 
closer to providing policy recommendations about how to help those stuck in a poverty 
trap. Incorporating these additional complexities and analyzing how the 
recommendations for optimal aid changes will hopefully provide important insights, 
which will translate into more informed policy decisions in the future. 
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3.8 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 3.1: Individual Production Technologies 
 
Notes: Figure shows the individual production technologies for low production 
technology, in black, and the high production technology, in blue, capturing the change in 
wealth from period t to period t+1. The red 45-degree line indicates where change in 
wealth equals zero. The high and low equilibria are depicted where the respective 
production technology intersects the 45-degree line, crossing from above. Additionally, 
the figure depicts the technology switching point, , where the two production 
technologies intersect. 
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Figure 3.2: Transition Function 
 
Notes: Figure shows the transition function, in blue, of wealth between periods before 
stochasticity is introduced. The red line represents the 45-degree line. The Micawber 
Threshold, M , occurs where the transition function crosses the 45-degree line from 
below resulting in an unstable equilibrium. 
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Figure 3.3: Transitory Poverty 
 
Notes: Figure shows the transition function, in blue, of wealth between periods and the 
45-degree line in red. The two vertical lines represent the Micawber Threshold, M and the 
asset poverty line z, respectively, which are used to identify three regions: structural and 
chronic poverty, transitory poverty, and non-poor. 
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Figure 3.4: Transitorily Non-Poor 
 
Notes: Figure shows the transition function, in blue, of wealth between periods and the 
45-degree line in red. The two vertical lines represent the Micawber Threshold, M and the 
asset poverty line z, respectively, which are used to identify three regions: structural and 
chronic poverty, transitorily non-poor, and non-poor 
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Figure 3.5: Poverty Measure Comparisons 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the poverty measures: poverty headcount, poverty gap, and the Gini 
coefficient expressed as function of aid level. These measures are calculated by 
simulating wealth time paths with varying levels of aid and calculating each poverty 
measure in every time period and taking the average of these values for the length of the 
simulation. The Micawber Threshold for this parameter combination is at w = 55 , which 
is just after the sharp drop in the poverty measures. 
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Figure 3.6: Poverty Measure Comparisons 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the cost of providing aid in black as well as the separate cost of 
providing a safety net, solid blue line, and the cost of providing a cargo net, dashed blue 
line all as a function of level of aid. We see the cost of the safety net increases rapidly at 
low aid levels then sharply dropping off at the technology switching point,  and slightly 
before the Micawber Threshold M. The cost of the cargo net is increasing with respect to 
aid and does so at nearly constant rate (linear). 
 
  113 
Figure 3.7: Cost of Aid and Likelihood of Poverty by Aid Level 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cost of providing aid, in black, and the likelihood of poverty, in 
blue, over a range of aid levels. The likelihood of poverty is the percentage of people 
below the asset poverty line, z, throughout the simulation. The Micawber Threshold, M, 
is also included.  
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Figure 3.8: Costs with a low Poverty Line 
Panel A: Individual Cost Curves of the Social Planner’s Problem 
 
Panel B: Total Cost from the Social Planner’s Problem 
 
Notes: Panel A depicts the cost of providing aid (solid black) and the social cost of 
poverty (dashed black) while Panel B shows the total cost, which is the sum of the two. 
The vertical lines in both panels are: poverty line (dashed black), the Micawber 
Threshold (solid blue) and the minimum aid level (dashed blue). 
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Figure 3.9: Costs with a Low b   
Panel A: Individual Cost Curves of the Social Planner’s Problem 
 
Panel B: Total Cost from the Social Planner’s Problem 
 
Notes: Panel A depicts the cost of providing aid (solid black) and the social cost of 
poverty (dashed black) while Panel B shows the total cost, which is the sum of the two. 
The vertical lines in both panels are: poverty line (dashed black), the Micawber 
Threshold (solid blue) and the minimum aid level (dashed blue). 
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Figure 3.10: Inefficient Aid Trap 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cost of providing aid, solid black line, and the social cost of 
poverty, dashed black line, as well as the upper and lower bounds of the inefficient aid 
trap, Sˆ  and S
0
 respectively. The horizontal line occurs at c(Sˆ) , which is the cost of 
providing aid at Sˆ  and S
0
. The region in between is inefficient because both cost of 
providing aid and the social cost of poverty can be reduced. 
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Figure 3.11: Costs with a Poverty Line Within Inefficient Aid Trap 
Panel A: Individual Cost Curves of the Social Planner’s Problem 
 
Panel B: Total Cost from the Social Planner’s Problem 
 
Notes: Panel A depicts the cost of providing aid (solid black) and the social cost of 
poverty (dashed black) while Panel B shows the total cost, which is the sum of the two. 
The vertical lines in both panels are: poverty line (dashed black), the Micawber 
Threshold (solid blue) and the minimum aid level (dashed blue). 
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Figure 3.12: Costs with a Poverty Line Above the Inefficient Aid Trap 
Panel A: Individual Cost Curves of the Social Planner’s Problem 
 
Panel B: Total Cost from the Social Planner’s Problem 
 
Notes: Panel A depicts the cost of providing aid (solid black) and the social cost of 
poverty (dashed black) while Panel B shows the total cost, which is the sum of the two. 
The vertical lines in both panels are: poverty line (dashed black), the Micawber 
Threshold (solid blue) and the minimum aid level (dashed blue). 
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Table 3.1 Effect of Micawber Threshold on Minimum Aid Level 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
   
      0.988*** 0.992*** 0.994*** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
  
 
0.0188*** 0.0148*** 
  
(0.0004) (0.0005) 
  
  
0.888*** 
   
(0.0853) 
Constant 1.778*** 0.393*** 0.352*** 
 
(0.1260) (0.1000) (0.0984) 
    Observations 3,108 3,108 3,108 
R-squared 0.978 0.987 0.988 
Adjusted R-squared 0.978 0.987 0.988 
Notes: Regression show effect of Micawber Threshold on Minimum Aid level. Standard 
errors are presented in parentheses and stars indicate significance level *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
M
wH
*
s
  120 
Figure 3.13: Relationship between Micawber Threshold and Minimum Aid Level 
 
Notes: Figure shows the relationship between minimum aid level and the Micawber 
Threshold. The red line is a 45-degree line; observations to the left/above the line indicate 
the minimum aid level lies above the Micawber Threshold. Minimum aid level is an 
integer as we vary aid level by integer values in the simulation. 
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Figure 3.14: Effect of the difference between the high wealth equilibrium and MT 
on the difference between minimum aid level and MT  
 
Notes: Figure depicts the difference between the location of minimum cost of providing 
basic wealth and the Micawber Threshold across different levels of the difference 
between the high wealth equilibrium and the Micawber Threshold. Lower difference 
between the high equilibrium and Micawber Threshold indicates a less stable high wealth 
equilibrium, all else equal. 
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Figure 3.15: Percent Difference Between Minimum Cost of Aid and MT 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the difference between the location of minimum cost of providing 
basic wealth and the Micawber Threshold expressed as a percentage of the Micawber 
Threshold. Each column has the same variance parameter and each row has the same 
shape parameters. The histograms, in blue, show the density at each level of percent 
difference and the red lines are the Gaussians fitted to the data. Data come from 
simulating cost of providing basic wealth at various levels, with minimum cost defined as 
the level of basic wealth resulting in a local minimum of cost. Simulation was performed 
one thousand times for each set of parameters.  
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Table 3.2 Effects of Variables on Percent Difference 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Percent 
Difference 
Percent 
Difference 
Percent 
Difference 
      -0.0810*** -0.0583*** -0.797*** 
 
(0.0056) (0.0046) (0.0379) 
  
  
-0.160*** 
   
(0.0114) 
  
  
0.919*** 
   
(0.0475) 
  
  
-1.054*** 
   
(0.3120) 
  
 
5.440*** 5.453*** 
  
(0.138) (0.134) 
Constant 6.363*** 4.288*** 4.510*** 
 
-0.265 -0.223 -0.289 
    Observations 3,108 3,108 3,108 
R-squared 0.063 0.375 0.453 
Notes: Regression show effect of variables on the percent difference between the 
Micawber Threshold and the Minimum Aid level. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses and stars indicate significance level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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4. Empirical Identification of a Multiple Equilibrium Poverty Trap 
4.1 Introduction and background 
There has been a long-standing difficulty in empirically identifying multiple equilibrium 
poverty traps. This could be because existence of these wealth dynamics is relatively rare 
or non-existent, the tools used to identify poverty traps are insufficient, or a combination 
of the two. As discussed in section 3, multiple equilibrium poverty traps are distinct 
phenomena under the umbrella of poverty traps. This chapter introduces two novel 
methods of testing for multiple equilibrium poverty traps, by testing for necessary 
features of asset transformation at the individual and village levels as well as in the 
pooled data, which the data must exhibit if a multiple equilibrium poverty trap exists. We 
perform these tests on the publicly available replication dataset where a poverty trap has 
previously been found to exist, published under Lybbert et al. (2004). Unfortunately, we 
find little evidence of a poverty trap in these data. Lybbert et al. find a multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap consisting of two stable dynamic wealth equilibria, which we 
refer to as a dual equilibrium poverty trap, by non-parametrically fitting a curve to the 
data using kernel smoothing. Their identification of a dual equilibrium poverty trap is 
simply a graphical observations of a non-convexity in wealth accumulation. However, we 
find these data do not exhibit behavior necessary for a dual equilibria poverty trap, 
namely mean reversion of wealth at the household level and two clusters of wealth 
changes in the pooled data and for each village. The non-convexity in asset dynamics 
found by Lybbert et al. (2004) may occur when fitting a curve to the data, but is not 
indicative of a poverty trap. Instead the fitted curve may be picking up clustering in the 
data more consistent with heterogeneous differences in asset levels and shocks over 
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villages in the sample. This chapter emphasizes the importance of using multiple tests to 
ensure the data are consistent with an empirical model, in this case multiple equilibrium 
poverty traps, rather than relying too heavily on curve fitting techniques which may cause 
spurious overfitting.  
There are many known issues surrounding the identification of poverty traps, 
which Barrett and Carter (2013) discuss in detail, making them difficult to empirically 
identify should they exist. First there will be very few observations around the Micawber 
Threshold, the unstable dynamic equilibrium separating the basins of attraction between 
high and low wealth equilibria. When the equilibria have substantial pull, few households 
exist that switch between wealth equilibria. The nature of the unstable Micawber 
Threshold rapidly pushes wealth away from it resulting in few observations around this 
level. This makes it difficult to identify the location of the Micawber Threshold as well as 
to observe the non-convexity in asset accumulation, which occurs at and below this point. 
A second issue is it is difficult to distinguish between state dependence and 
heterogeneous single equilibria. So even observing two clusters of wealth levels is not 
sufficient to determine a multiple equilibrium poverty trap exists. In our analysis, we 
circumvent these issues by answering the question of can a multiple equilibrium poverty 
trap exist in our data, rather than does it exist. This distinction is important, as we do not 
attempt to distinguish between these alternative hypotheses in this paper. Thus, we seek 
to provide evidence against the existence of a multiple equilibrium poverty trap when it is 
not present. 
Another difficulty with identifying the multiple equilibrium poverty trap is 
heterogeneous factors at the household level may allow for some households to 
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experience a multiple equilibrium poverty trap while others in the same population may 
have only one dynamic equilibrium (e.g. Ikegami et al., 2016) or none at all (i.e. a 
random walk). Given data constraints, most notably length of time and sampling 
frequency, empirical estimation typically requires assuming a common underlying asset 
dynamic for all households (Nashold, 2013, Jalan and Ravallion, 2004) exasperating this 
issue. We surmount this issue by testing for mean reversion at the household level. This 
test does not require an assumption of identical underlying asset dynamics.  
There are also temporal issues that play a role. Micawber Thresholds may shift 
over time due to changing market/environmental conditions making the identification of 
unstable equilibria more difficult. This is problematic because identifying poverty traps 
usually requires a dataset spanning large time intervals increasing the likelihood of a 
changing Micawber Threshold. Using cross-sectional data does not provide enough 
information to identify a multiple equilibrium poverty trap, as it does not capture the 
wealth dynamics. A multiple peaked cross section of wealth levels is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to indicate a poverty trap. Thus, we need to look at assets over time. A long 
sampling period is desirable because many of the tests for multiple equilibrium poverty 
traps rely on asset based measures, which are slow to change over short samples. The 
methods we present do not help alleviate these issues and require assuming any dynamic 
equilibria are stable over time. 
These issues have been used to explain why poverty traps have been so difficult to 
identify in practice even in socio-economic environments where theory suggests they are 
likely (e.g. Jalan and Ravallion, 2004; Lokshin and Ravallion, 2004; Kraay and Raddatz, 
2006;Nashold 2013; McKay and Pergee, 2014). These papers all seek to identify poverty 
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traps in rural areas of Southern Africa with limited access to financial markets, and few 
potential livelihoods (mostly subsistence farming and pastoralism). Barrett and Carter 
(2013) make the case that failing to find multiple equilibrium poverty traps should not be 
interpreted as evidence against the existence of poverty traps. The authors take the stance 
that many of the empirical difficulties involved likely cause researchers to fail to identify 
poverty traps in cases where they exist. A major contribution of this chapter is we design 
falsification test designed to look for necessary conditions of the poverty trap without 
attempting to identify the Micawber Threshold explicitly, as there are many difficulties in 
attempting to locate it, which we discuss below. 
The empirical literature has seen numerous strategies attempting to directly 
identify the elusive multiple equilibrium poverty trap by estimating wealth dynamics, 
especially attempting to identify non-convexities in wealth growth over certain ranges as 
well as locating stable and unstable dynamic equilibria. The direct measures can be 
broken down into three categories based on identification methods. Nashold (2013), 
provides an in depth discussion of these. The first methods were fully parametric methods 
that fit some polynomial function, which allow for some non-convexities (i.e. cubic and 
higher order) and identify whether the estimated function results in multiple dynamic 
equilibria (e.g. Jalan and Ravallion, 2004; Santos and Barrett, 2011). These models are 
overly restrictive, as they require specifying a cubic or quadratic function to the data. 
Alternatively, non-parametric techniques allow for more flexibility by not 
restricting estimation to fit a specific functional form and have been successful in 
identifying poverty traps in some contexts (e.g. Adeto et al., 2006; Barrett et al., 2006); 
this is the technique used by Lybbert et al. (2004). These techniques fit kernel, or other 
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smoothing functions, to the data to look for non-convexities in wealth accumulation, 
providing more flexibility than the parametric techniques. While more flexible, the non-
parametric fitting still requires substantial observations around the non-convexity and the 
Micawber Threshold, which are rarely occurring. In fact, having enough data to fit the 
non-convexity with any degree of confidence either requires a massive data set or is 
indicative of a lack of a poverty trap.  
The Micawber Threshold necessarily represents an unstable dynamic equilibrium, 
which, in essence, is constantly pushing wealth away from it. This must result in the 
distribution of wealth levels will be more disperse around this point making the 
likelihood of observing wealth in this area should be low. Failing to account for this is 
problematic and may lead to spurious identification of multiple equilibrium poverty traps 
when they do not exist. Previous identification strategies have treated the identification of 
a non-convexity as sufficient evidence of a multiple equilibrium poverty trap, however it 
is merely a necessary condition of one. A non-convexity found by fitting a curve through 
a large cluster of data is inconsistent with a multiple equilibrium poverty trap making this 
form of identification insufficient to determine a multiple equilibrium poverty trap to 
exist. The curve fitting approaches, both fully parametric and semi-parametric, have 
typically not accounted for the likelihood of observations and are prone to over 
identifying poverty traps in this maner, which we show is likely the case for the findings 
in Lybbert et al. (2004) using their replication data. 
Nashold (2013) analyzes the effectiveness of the fully parametric and non-
parametric methods of directly observing poverty traps and recommends using semi-
parametric techniques to combine the flexibility of non-parametric techniques with the 
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ability to control for household characteristics and time fixed effects (Nashold, 2013). 
Using household data from Pakistan and Ethiopia, Nashold (2013) assess the 
effectiveness of numerous means of testing for poverty traps and finds one unique 
dynamic equilibrium around the same level using a parametric, non-parametric and semi-
parametric methods. While Nashold holds the semi-parametric approach will perform 
better when there are non-convexities underlying the multiple equilibrium poverty traps, 
the semi-parametric methods still face many of the challenges of the direct measures 
most notably a lack of observations around the non-convexity. 
More recently, Barrett and Carter 2013, among others, have begun using indirect 
methods of testing for poverty traps, which circumvent many issues of the direct 
approaches. These indirect methods seek to identify behaviors, which are consistent with 
multiple equilibrium poverty traps. These methods seek to identify behaviors, which 
would only be rational if individuals were indeed facing a multiple equilibrium poverty 
trap, such as asset smoothing at certain wealth levels (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; 
Carter and Lybbert, 2012), exhibiting risk seeking behavior when assets are just below a 
Micawber Threshold (Lybbert and Barrett 2011), or avoiding providing gifts and loans to 
households near the Micawber Threshold (Santos and Barrett, 2011). These techniques 
bypass many of the empirical challenges presented in Barrett and Carter (2013) and show 
signs of being able to improve our ability to identify MEPT.  
These indirect methods do not rely on identifying the non-convexity in wealth 
accumulation nor require locating the Micawber Threshold. A benefit of indirect 
estimation is it typically does not require assuming an underlying wealth dynamic for all 
households, as is typically required for the direct measures, as many of the implications 
  130 
of poverty traps can be specified in a way to require a smaller sample size and can be 
done at the individual level. Testing for non-convexities at the individual level is near 
impossible, while testing for specific savings and consumption decisions should be done 
at the individual level. Thus these methods should perform better than direct methods 
when heterogeneity across individuals may result in different wealth equilibria within a 
sample by being able to distinguish between these competing hypotheses. 
In this chapter, we introduce two novel indirect tests, which can be used to rule 
out the existence of a multiple equilibrium poverty trap. Rather than identify the 
Micawber Threshold or the non-convexity in wealth dynamics, in-line with previous 
direct test, we focus on identifying trends in the data that are consistent with the existence 
of dynamic equilibria. We test for dynamic equilibria in two ways: (1) testing for mean 
reversion using a variance ratio test at the individual level, and (2) using a mixture model 
to determine if there is clustering in the pooled data and for each village, which would 
indicate multiple dynamic equilibria.  
If a dynamic wealth equilibrium exists, then we should observe wealth trending 
towards it over time with some random error, in other words we should observe mean 
reversion. When there exist multiple dynamic equilibria, we should observer mean 
reversion so long as wealth remains in the basin of attraction of one equilibrium. 
However, once the Micawber Threshold is crossed due to the stochastic nature of wealth 
dynamics, wealth will tend towards a different equilibrium making it more difficult to 
identify mean reversion in the sample. The nature of multiple equilibrium poverty traps 
makes it relatively rare for these thresholds to be crossed, resulting in the few 
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observations around Micawber Thresholds (Barrett and Carter, 2013) ensuring the 
majority of the sample will not have this issue.  
We test for mean reversion of wealth at the household level using a variance ratio 
test. While the existence of mean reversion for an individual is a necessary condition for 
the existence of a multiple equilibrium poverty trap, it is also occurs in the case of one 
dynamic wealth equilibrium. This mean reversion is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition of a multiple equilibrium poverty trap. The variance ratio test is used to test the 
hypothesis that the rate of return of an asset (in our case the change in wealth from one 
period to the next) is independent over time, indicating a random walk. It rests on the 
known statistical property that the summation of two independent random variables will 
have a variance equal to the sum of the two. Thus, an independent time series will exhibit 
additive variance of the rate of return (change in wealth) as the time-step increases, which 
is used to construct the null hypothesis of a random walk. The variance ratio test has been 
widely used in the finance literature to determine whether financial asset prices are mean 
reverting, trend following or if they follow a purely random walk (e.g. Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1988). We test this at the household level and do not find statistically 
significant evidence of mean reversion in our data. In principle, this test can be done with 
the pooled and at thevillage level, but is unlikely to identify mean reversion unless 
household equilibria are clustered together. We find slightly over 5% of individuals 
exhibit mean reversion, which is not significantly different than what we would expect to 
find due to random chance. This is evidence against the existence of dynamic equilibria 
for individuals and, therefore, evidence against the existence of the dual equilibria 
poverty trap found by Lybbert et al. (2004). While this test rules out a multiple 
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equilibrium poverty trap, we also fit a mixture model to the data at the village level and 
with the pooled data and find further evidence against the existence of multiple 
equilibrium poverty traps. We find some evidence concerning potential spurious 
overfitting by Lybbert et al. (2004) by identifying a cluster of data near the Micawber 
Threshold identified in their paper. 
Finite mixture models have been used to empirically classify individuals into 
different groups or ‘clusters’. A finite mixture model is essentially a form of latent class 
modeling intended to identify different classes of individuals within a population 
(Harrison and Rutström, 2009). It can be used to both identify the number of clusters 
within a dataset as well as predict assignment of individuals to each cluster. In 
economics, finite mixture models have been predominantly used to determine behavioral 
decision rules when playing games or making complex decisions (Bruhin et al., 2010; 
Conte et al., 2010; Sproul and Michaud, 2017). In the development field, finite mixture 
models have been used to look at informal employment (Günther and Launov, 2009) and 
even wealth dynamics at the macro-level (Alfo et al., 2008; Owen et al., 2009). Alfo et al. 
(2008) find the Solow growth model performs better when allowing for multiple 
heterogeneous groups fitted from a finite mixture model. Similarly, Owen et al. (2009) 
find multiple single equilibria at the macro-scale, which is best predicted by institutional 
features rather than factors such as region or income. We perform a similar analysis at the 
micro-scale, while focusing on using the fitting of the mixture model to test for multiple 
equilibrium poverty traps. 
We fit a mixture model to the pooled data and for each village in an attempt to 
observe clustering consistent with the dual equilibria poverty trap found in Lybbert et al 
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(2004). The larger scales have the benefit of larger sample size, but at the cost of any 
heterogeneity within the sample potentially obscuring the multiple equilibrium poverty 
trap, should it exist. However, a mixture model fit at the individual level runs the risk of 
over fitting due to small sample size. It also should fail to observe clustering around 
multiple equilibria for those stuck at a single equilibrium and will prefer a single 
component mixture. We find no evidence to support the existence of the dual equilibria 
poverty trap using the mixture model. Depending on the criteria used to select the best fit, 
which we discuss in the methods section, we find either the one cluster or three cluster 
model is fits the data better for the pooled data as well as at the village level. We perform 
a numeric simulation to show AICc and BIC perform well at fitting the two cluster model 
when it exists, indicating we either have more than two equilibria or wealth dynamics 
follow a random walk, both of which are inconsistent with the Lybbert et al. (2004) 
findings.  
While neither test is sufficient to determine the existence of a multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap, both test for necessary features. Using the data from Lybbert et 
al. (2004) we find the data does not exhibit mean reversion at the individual level and do 
not find evidence of clustering consistent with the dual equilibria poverty trap found by 
Lybbert et al. (2004) using pooled data or at the village level. These tests can be used to 
rule out the existence of a multiple equilibrium poverty trap, but do not help us in 
distinguishing between alternative hypotheses such as heterogeneous dynamic equilibria 
for individuals, which we save for future work. These methods circumvent the issues 
surrounding the direct tests for multiple equilibria, as they do not require identifying 
neither non-convexities nor the location of a Micawber Threshold. Thus, these tests are 
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most useful as a first pass at identifying a multiple equilibrium poverty trap or as a 
falsification test for previous empirical studies where poverty traps have been reported. 
 
 
4.2 Context and data 
Our data come from pastoralists in the Borana Plateau of Southern Ethiopia over 17 years 
from 1980-1997, which Lybbert et al. (2004) have used previously to identify a dual 
equilibrium poverty trap. The data contain 55 randomly selected households from four 
villages
10
. From these 55 households, we restrict our sample to households with at least 
10 years of data leaving us with 49 households from four villages. The data contain 
information of household size, herd size, animal births, animal mortality, herd sales, herd 
gifts, and a measure of rainfall. Lybbert et al. (2004) show sales represent an insignificant 
portion of herd loss and gifting/loaning animals is relatively limited so we do not separate 
these factors from herd mortality. For our analysis we focus on herd size per capita, in 
line with previous poverty trap literature for the region (e.g. Lybbert et al., 2004, Barrett, 
2005; Toth, 2014).   
 An important caveat to the data is it only includes information for pastoralists 
active in 1997 (Lybbert et al. 2004). Any households that exited the sample during the 
study period are not included. Through discussion with pastoralists in the area, Lybbert et 
el (2004) state those exiting pastoralism were households with small herds coupled with 
negative shocks from drought, disease or distress sale with no households ‘graduating’ 
                                                 
10
 Village membership refers to a household living near the geographic village center 
over the course of the sample. Village membership is stable with the typical household 
being part of the same village for multiple generations. 
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out of pastoralism due to high wealth levels. Thus, there is an upward attenuation bias 
present in the sample. Failing to observe the households forced out of pastoralism 
potentially obscures a low-level Micawber threshold below which pastoralism altogether 
becomes unsustainable. However, we should still be able to identify a multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap arising from the switching between sedentary pastoralism and 
mobile pastoralism even with the attenuation bias. 
 The data we use may not be identical to the final data used in Lybbert et al. 
(2004). When we received the data from Travis Lybbert, he explained the code for their 
analysis as well as their finalized version of the data were lost due to a computer failure. 
We have had substantial difficulty in recreating some of their results using this data set, 
which is also publically available alongside their publication. The inability to replicate 
results is problematic for conducting a conclusive falsification test of the Lybbert et al. 
(2004) results, but we proceed with our analysis to test for a multiple equilibrium poverty 
trap within the data we were able to obtain. 
 The Borana Plateau is characterized as arid and semi arid lands (ASAL). As 
discussed in sections 1 and 3, the pastoralist system of the ASAL is an ideal context to 
study poverty traps. There are apparently similar groups, mobile pastoralists and 
sedentary households, with very different outcomes. A compelling explanation is there is 
a critical herd size, which is their primary form of wealth and productive assets, above 
which households can engage in the more lucrative mobile pastoralism, but below which 
requires the household to stay near the village resulting in a dwindling herd and possible 
exit from pastoralism altogether. This phenomenon arises due to less grazing area 
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accessible to sedentary pastoralists, which is potentially exacerbated by the ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ in which sedentary herds over graze the pastureland close to the village. 
 
4.3 Wealth Dynamics 
How wealth changes over time is the fundamental question of the poverty trap literature. 
The multiple equilibrium poverty trap describes the case where similar households have 
access to multiple long-term stable equilibria depending on initial asset levels, where at 
least one of these equilibria lies below some poverty line.  See chapter 3 for a more 
detailed discussion of the theoretical mechanisms, which result in multiple equilibrium 
poverty traps. We seek to distinguish this from alternative hypotheses of heterogeneous 
single equilibria and that assets follow a random walk. 
 The random walk hypothesis is typically seen in the financial literature to model 
stock prices. This occurs when changes in assets are independent over time. If this occurs 
and we plotted changes in wealth in  and  space, we would see observations 
spread across the 45-degree line, which is interpreted as where  opposed to 
clustering around points on the 45-degree line. Household wealth would fluctuate in a 
random manner around the 45-degree line. Large deviations from the 45-degree line are 
possible due to large random shocks such as drought. If we took a cross section of wealth 
at any time period, we would expect to observe something similar to a normal 
distribution of wealth with a high variance, as the variance of the distribution should be 
increasing over time. At the individual level, we would not observe clustering of wealth 
levels and would not observe mean reversion, as the fluctuations are independent over 
wt wt+1
wt = wt+1
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time. We use the random walk model to construct the null hypothesis to test for mean 
reversion using the variance ratio test, which we describe in the methods section. 
 Alternatively, each household could have unique dynamic wealth equilibria, 
which the household would tend toward over time, absent stochastic fluctuations. For the 
pooled data, if households in a sample share a similar equilibrium we would observer a 
single cluster of wealth around one point on the 45-degree line, rather than observations 
being more dispersed across it as in the random walk case. However, if there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the location of household equilibria, changes in wealth may 
appear identical to the random walk case in the pooled data and we would observe 
changes in wealth dispersed across the 45-degree line without much evidence of 
clustering around any points. However, at the individual level, we would observe 
significant mean reversion and clustering of wealth levels around a single equilibrium for 
each individual. 
 The last case we consider is when multiple dynamic equilibria exist for 
households. If these equilibria are similar across households in the sample, we would 
observe clustering around each equilibrium. The further spaced the equilibria and the 
stronger the pull each equilibrium has will determine exactly how separate these clusters 
will appear.  Once again, if there is substantial heterogeneity, we may observe wealth 
changes dispersed across the 45-degree line rather than appearing as clusters. At the 
individual level, we would see the majority of households with a single cluster of wealth 
levels identical to the case of a single equilibrium, as most households will remain in the 
basin of attraction of a single equilibrium. However, we will observe some instances of 
clustering followed by a sharp change (large deviation from the 45-degree line) followed 
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by clustering at a new level. This would indicate a Micawber Threshold was crossed and 
wealth levels are tending towards a new equilibrium for the remainder of the sample.  
 The dynamics highlight the importance of looking at the individual level to 
identify multiple equilibrium poverty traps when there is large heterogeneity amongst a 
population, which is potentially unobservable. However, this dramatically reduces the 
sample size reducing the power of statistical tests; in our data, for example, T =17 . 
Many of the direct measures for identifying poverty traps may not be appropriate at such 
a fine scale, which is why most of the poverty trap literature has looked at the pooled data 
or village level and assumed an underlying asset dynamic across the sample (Jalan and 
Ravallion, 2004; Nashold, 2013). However, the two techniques we present do not require 
as large a sample size as we do not attempt to identify the Micawber Threshold nor a 
non-convexity in wealth dynamics, both of which require observing relatively rare wealth 
levels around the unstable Micawber Threshold. 
Figure 4.1 presents a summary of how assets evolve over time in our dataset. The 
left panel shows a histogram of changes in log wealth. We see large left-tail indicating 
large downward shocks, consistent with large drought or disease. The second graph 
depicts the absolute distance from the mean of the sample. We would expect this to 
follow the right half of a normal distribution, as we cannot have negative values, for 
either a random walk or a single equilibria. The flatter the distribution, the more 
consistent data are with a random walk as observations will be more evenly dispersed 
across the 45-degree line rather than grouped around an equilibrium. If we observer 
multiple peaks, it is indicative of a multiple equilibria, either due to a multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap or clustering of heterogeneous single equilibria. The third panel 
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shows the relative distance from the mean where the negative values indicate x-values 
below the mean x-value. Once again, observing multiple peaks would be consistent with 
multiple equilibria, which we do not observe in the pooled data. We see similar results 
for each village as well. 
 
4.4 Methods 
We present two new indirect falsification tests for the existence of a multiple equilibrium 
poverty trap. Rather than attempting to identify poverty traps, in line with much of the 
previous literature, we identify necessary conditions for the multiple equilibrium poverty 
trap at three scales: in the pooled data, at the village level, and at the household level to 
determine if the multiple equilibrium poverty trap may exist. In the pooled data, it seems 
unlikely to find evidence of a poverty trap, as it would require households across 
different villages with varying socio-economic conditions to have similar dynamic 
equilibria. For example, Table 4.1 shows the average wealth by village. We see 
substantial differences in mean wealth and standard deviation, which indicates different 
socio-economic conditions between villages. If there exists substantial heterogeneity in 
dynamic equilibria, should they exist, for households and/or villages, it will be difficult to 
find evidence of the multiple equilibrium poverty trap even if it exists. However, Lybbert 
et al. (2004) do identify a poverty trap using the pooled data, using a similar dataset, by 
directly identifying a non-convexity in wealth accumulation even with these issues. At 
the village level it will be more likely to be able to identify a multiple equilibrium 
poverty trap when it exists. Within a village, many of the socio economic conditions 
faced by individuals will be similar. Thus, the underlying cause of the poverty trap may 
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be shared by households resulting in similar dynamic wealth equilibria. However, 
heterogeneity in ability between households may still play a major role in the existence 
and location of Micawber Thresholds separating dynamic wealth equilibria. Ikegami et 
al. (2016) use a theoretialc model to show how heterogeneous individual ability can result 
in some households experiencing a multiple equilibrium poverty trap while low-skilled 
individuals may only have access to a low equilibrium and high-skilled individuals a high 
wealth equilibrium. This is justification to attempt to identify multiple poverty traps at the 
individual level as well. 
 Lybbert et al., (2004) report herd accumulation to be highly correlated with herd 
size. Using transition matrices based on quartiles of herd size, they find a household in 
the lowest quartile of herd size has a 92% chance of remaining in the lowest quartile in 
10 years. On the other side, less the 3% of households in the upper quartile drop into the 
lower quartiles in the next year and only 9% after 10 years. This indicates a relatively 
stable wealth relationship between households and low occurrence of transitory poverty. 
The poor households stay poor while the wealthier ones stay on top. While consistent 
with the poverty trap hypothesis, these wealth dynamics are also consistent with other 
explanations. It could indicate distinct groups of households, where the more able 
households tend to stay wealthier over time. Or it could simply be each household has its 
own random walk with low enough variability that moving between quartiles is relatively 
rare. While we do not attempt to distinguish between multiple groups and the MEPT, we 
can test for whether we find wealth is better modeled as a random walk, which we 
discuss here. 
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A necessary implication of the MEPT model is each equilibrium, wk
*
, has its own 
‘basin of attraction’, , where observations falling within this range tend towards 
toward wk
*
 over time. In other words, there exists mean reversion for each range of 
wealth levels corresponding to the ‘basin of attraction’ in which each observation resides. 
We use this observation to construct two tests, one explicitly testing for mean reversion a 
second attempting to identify multiple equilibria in our dataset using a mixture model to 
pick up any clustering in the wealth dynamics.  
First we test for mean reversion at the individual level using a variance ratio test 
to determine the existence and direction of autocorrelation of wealth dynamics. The 
variance ratio test has been widely used in the finance literature to test whether financial 
assets follow a random walk (e.g. Lo and MacKinlay, 1988). We apply this technique in a 
novel way to attempt to identify a multiple equilibrium poverty trap by explicitly testing 
for mean reversion.  
The variance ratio test is based on the statistical property that the variance of a 
sum of independent random variables is equal to the sum of the individual variances: 
Var[x + y]=Var[x]+Var[y] when x ^ y .  
Thus, for a time series of wealth (or asset prices as seen in the finance literature), we can 
use this property to test whether error terms are independent overtime or exhibit some 
form of autocorrelation. If we define the error in period t as  we know: if  
 then . In other words, if changes in wealth are 
independent over time then the change in wealth over t  periods: , has a 
variance equal to t  times larger than a one period change in wealth: 
rk
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.  
Using this, we can look at the ratio of variances at different time steps to test whether 
wealth dynamics exhibit autocorrelation. The variance ratio is: 
.  
The null hypothesis of the variance ratio test is that , i.e. assets do not exhibit 
autocorrelation and follow a random walk. When  assets exhibit mean reversion. 
We perform the analysis comparing the variance of a two year lag, , to the one year 
lag. Testing on additional lags can also be done, but requires more intricate multiple 
hypothesis testing to avoid overfitting or too many false rejections of the null (Chow and 
Denning 1993), which we save for future work. We follow Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and 
use overlapping datasets to ensure maximum sample size (n-1 time periods rather than 
n/2 which would occur if you did not allow for overlapping), which they show enhances 
the power of the variance ratio test. A downside to the overlapping approach is it 
becomes more difficult to determine the distribution of the variance ratio test statistic 
making statistical inference more difficult (Charles and Darne, 2009). We circumvent this 
issue by simulating the distribution of the variance ratio test statistic under the null 
hypothesis of independence. 
 We do so by bootstrapping the change in assets for each individual to generate 
new wealth time paths, which are independent. For each individual, we sample from 
observed wealth changes with replacement for the  periods. We then calculate the 
variance ratio for the simulated wealth path, which becomes a variance ratio test statistic 
for data with the same underlying conditions of the individual, but known to be 
V(t ) =1
V(t ) <1
t = 2
T -1
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independent due to the bootstrapping procedure. We perform this procedure 10,000 times 
per individual, which becomes our empirical distribution of the variance ratio for each 
individual.  
As we are testing for the presence of mean-reversion, a one-tailed test is 
appropriate. We determine the 95% confidence interval for the one-tailed variance ratio 
test by ordering the simulated variance ratios and finding the 500
th
 test statistic. When the 
observed variance ratio is below this number, we reject the null hypothesis that assets 
follow a random walk in favor of mean reversion. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of 
simulated variance ratios for a sample village along with the location of the 95% 
confidence level for the one-tailed test, in red, and the observed variance ratio, in black. 
For this household, we observe variance ratio is below the 95% confidence level and 
reject the one-tailed variance ratio test. We perform this test on the 39 households with all 
17 years of data. 
Our next test uses a finite mixture model to determine if we observe clustering in 
the pooled data and village data, consistent with the dual equilibrium poverty trap found 
in Lybbert et al., (2004). Finite mixture models use the expectation maximization (EM) 
algorithm composed of two steps: the expectation step (E) and the maximization step (M) 
(Dempster, et al., 1977). This is an iterative process starting with a starting value of the 
parameters of   Gaussian clusters; the procedure estimates ‘membership probability’ of 
observations in other words it determines which component each observation is expected 
to be drawn from, called the E-step (expectation). With the membership probabilities 
fixed, the log likelihood is then maximized, the M-step (maximization), by varying the 
parameters of the clusters. This is followed by another E-step and repeats until 
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convergence is reached. The number of clusters is fixed, but the procedure can be run for 
different number of clusters.  
We determine the appropriate number of clusters by comparing different criterion 
assessing how well each model fits the data. The typical criterion; Akaike information 
criterion (AIC), corrected Akaike information criterion (AICc), and Baysian information 
criterion (BIC) can all be used, however, Biernacki et al. (2000) find these do not 
sufficiently penalize additional clusters and introduce a modification of the BIC, which 
they name the Integrated classification likelihood (ICL), which they find performs better 
for selecting the appropriate number of clusters in a finite mixture model. A caveat with 
the ICL is in its standard definition the best fit is the one which maximizes ICL, which is 
opposite of the other criterion where the best fit is determined by the minimum value. For 
the remainder of the paper, we will use the term ICL to refer to the negative value of ICL 
for ease of interpretation. 
There is no guarantee the criteria will all agree on the model that provides the best 
fit for the data and we find AICc and BIC reliably prefer a different number of 
components than ICL. As we are using the mixture model to test for a two-component 
mixture model consistent with a dual equilibrium poverty trap, we are interested in 
identifying which criterion correctly identifies two clusters when data are drawn from a 
2-component mixture distribution. After fitting a two-component mixture model to the 
pooled data and each village separately, we simulate new wealth data. We keep the 
number of observations consistent with the original data to ensure direct comparisons and 
determine the number of components proffered by each of the criteria by locating the 
minimum value for up to three clusters. We perform this 1000 times and calculate the 
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percentage of times each criterion prefers a one, two, and three component model 
respectively.   
 We identify which criterion correctly fit the two-component model when it exists 
to determine which criterion to focus on when determining whether a dual equilibrium 
poverty trap exists. We then look at the observed criterion for the empirical data to 
determine if a two-component mixture exists. If the preferred criterion, that is the 
criterion, which fits the simulated data best, also prefers a two-component mixture it is 
evidence in favor of the dual equilibria poverty trap at the pooled level and village scale. 
We use this test using pooled data and for each village to ensure any heterogeneous 
village characteristics do not obscure a poverty trap should it exist.  
 
4.5 Results 
We find little evidence of mean reversion for household wealth. We calculate the 
variance ratio comparing a lag of two, , with the one period lag and construct the 
simulated distribution of variance ratios using bootstrapping to construct confidence 
intervals. Using the one-tailed test on a sample of 39 households where we have data for 
all 17 time periods, we find only two exhibit mean reversion at the 95% confidence level 
while the rest show no autocorrelation, consistent with the random walk hypothesis with 
none exhibiting trend following. The percentage of households exhibiting mean reversion 
equals 5.13%, which is about double what we would expect to find by random chance 
given a = .05 .  
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of the difference between observed variance 
ratios and the one-tailed 95% confidence interval. Observations below zero indicate 
t = 2
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households where we reject the null hypothesis of a random walk in favor of mean 
reversion. Here we would expect to find 5% of households exhibit mean reversion due to 
random chance, which is nearly identical to the 5.13% we find. A lack of mean reversion 
is evidence against the existence of equilibria where household wealth converges. This 
applies both to the multiple equilibrium poverty trap hypothesis and heterogeneous single 
equilibria hypothesis. Put another way, our variance ratio testing results fail to reject the 
independence null (aka a random walk). 
One potential problem with our analysis is the shock caused by the 1983-85 
famine in Ethiopia may impair our ability to identify mean reversion even if it exists. As 
discussed in section 1, this period represents a major downward shock resulting in 
substantial loss of cattle (Lybbert et al., 2004).  The presence of severe downward shocks 
would make identification more difficult. To account for this, we run the variance ratio 
test on the data for years after 1985 to determine if mean reversion exists in this sub-
sample. Figure 4.5 show the distribution of the variance ratio tests and the corresponding 
one-tailed 95% confidence interval for the restricted sample. We see only one 
observation outside this range, consistent with the random walk hypothesis. Thus, we see 
consistent results amongst the whole data set and when the pre-famine years are 
excluded, which enhances our confidence in these results. 
We also fail to find evidence of the dual equilibrium poverty trap using pooled 
data and at the village level using the finite mixture model. Table 4.2 presents the mixture 
fits, using the pooled data and for each village, for information criterion associated with 
the one, two, and three component models. We find AICc and BIC prefer a three 
component model while ICL prefers a one component fit. By itself, this is modest 
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evidence against the existence of the dual equilibrium poverty trap found by Lybbert et 
al. (2004). To enhance this test, we simulate data from a two component mixture model 
for each village and the pooled data to test whether the criteria are able to identify a two-
component mixture when we know it exists in the data. 
We simulate wealth observations by first fitting a two-component mixture model 
to the data, which we perform for the aggregate sample and each village separately. This 
represents the best fitting two-component mixture for the data; in essence we 
parameterize a two-component model using the observed data. We then fit a one, two and 
three component mixture model to the simulated data and determine which model each of 
the criterion prefer. We perform this 1000 times and calculate the percentage of times 
each criterion fits each number of components, which we present in table 3. We see both 
AICc and BIC nearly always identify the two-component mixture while ICL nearly 
always prefers a one-component model. This provides evidence AICc and BIC will 
identify a two component mixture when it is present. Since we do not find AICc nor BIC 
to fit a two-component model in the pooled data nor any village combined when 
simulated results suggest it should if there is a two-component mixture, we reject the 
hypothesis of a dual equilibria poverty trap. These results are consistent with either a 
poverty trap with more than two equilibria, heterogeneous single equilibria, or a random 
walk. However both the multiple equilibrium poverty trap and the heterogeneous 
equilibria are ruled out due to lack of mean reversion.  
 
4.6 Discussion 
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We present two new indirect testing necessary conditions of a multiple equilibrium 
poverty trap to overcome some of the empirical difficulties associated with identifying 
poverty traps. These are intended to be falsification tests used to identify cases where a 
poverty trap is not present, rather than attempting to identify the poverty trap itself.  We 
apply these tests to the Lybbert et al. (2004) data, where a dual equilibria poverty trap 
was previously found, but find contradictory results.  
First we attempted to identify mean reversion for individuals using a variance 
ratio test and find an insignificant portion of the population experience mean reversion 
over our 17-year sample. Failing to identify mean reversion is evidence against the 
existence of any equilibrium for household wealth, much less multiple dynamic equilibria 
consistent across villages and households as found in Lybbert et al. (2004). 
Next we try to explicitly identify the two stable dynamic wealth equilibria 
identified in Lybbert et al. (2004) by fitting a mixture model to the data. We show 
through simulation that AICc and BIC perform well at identifying the 2-component 
mixture consistent with the dual equilibrium poverty trap when it exists in the data. We 
find AICc and BIC prefer a three component fit for the pooled data as well as at the 
village level. A weakness of this test is it only is applicable when dynamic equilibria are 
homogeneous across a population. Thus, it can only be used to rule out the existence of 
multiple equilibrium poverty traps with homogeneous equilibria, rather than as a means 
of identification. In our context, we use it as an additional falsification test to show the 
poverty trap found in Lybbert et al. (2004) is likely a spurious result due to curve fitting 
picking up some minor clustering of the data. Using the pooled data, we find some 
clustering around the Micawber Threshold identified in Lybbert et al. (2004), around a 
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herd size of 15 cattle, which may explain why they identified a non-convexity in asset 
accumulation before this point. However, the large mass of observations around this level 
is actually evidence against the existence of a Micawber Threshold at this location, as the 
Micawber Threshold is an unstable equilibria and theory suggests it would push wealth 
away from this level rather than pulling towards it as clustering suggests. 
One major caveat that weakens this claim is our tests require the assumption any 
wealth equilibria are stable over time for individuals. If socio-economic conditions such 
as infrastructure change, natural resource levels (e.g. health of nearby grazing lands), 
adoption of new technology, etc. change over time, there is no guarantee dynamic wealth 
equilibria will be stable. Thus, the mean where wealth keeps reverting towards may be a 
moving target, which may appear as a random walk. This would be especially true if 
these changes were gradual over time. 
While poverty traps may exist for other populations, failing to find it in a data set 
which had previously identified a dual equilibria poverty trap in an environment where 
theory suggests we would be most apt to find a poverty trap [is disheartening]. This 
highlights the importance of empirically identifying a multiple equilibrium poverty trap 
using a robust set of tests before attempting to combat poverty using the results we 
present in section 3.  While the theory of poverty traps may still be useful, this paper 
presents evidence multiple equilibrium poverty traps may not be as prevalent as 
previously thought. In the future, we intend to apply these tests to other data where 
poverty traps have previously been identified using direct tests to determine if these tests 
are systematically finding poverty traps when they do not exist.  
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4.7 Tables and Figures 
Figure 4.1: Wealth dynamics in the pooled data 
 
Notes: Figure depicts three distributions capturing wealth dynamics at the pooled data. 
The solid red line depicts the empirical distribution using kernel smoothing and the 
dashed line represents the normal distribution fitted to the data. For the second figure, the 
right half of a normal distribution, as absolute values are all positive. All figures use a log 
wealth scale on the x-axis and the density on the y-axis. The first graph depicts the 
change in log wealth. The middle graph captures the absolute distance of an observation 
from the mean, taking into account both x and y distances. The right graph depicts the 
distance from the mean with negative values indicating the x-value is less than the mean 
x-value.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of estimated variance Ratios for an individual 
Notes: Figure depicts the density of the simulated variance ratios for an individual. The 
vertical red line represents the one-tailed 95% confidence interval and the black vertical 
line is the observed variance ratio for the individual. The observed variance ratio lies 
below the 95% percent confidence interval indicating we reject the null hypothesis of a 
random walk in favor of mean reversion for this individual. Variance ratios are calculated 
for comparing a two period lag, , to the one period lag.  
 
t = 2
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Figure 4.3: Difference between observed variance ratio and one-tailed 95% 
confidence interval for all individuals 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the difference between the observed variance ratio and the one-
tailed 95% confidence interval for the 39 individuals with the full 17 periods of wealth 
observations. The red line depicts a normal distribution fitted to the data. Observations 
below zero indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis changes in wealth follow a random 
walk in favor of mean reversion. We reject the null for two individuals out of the 39 total, 
which is nearly identical to the 5% we would expect to observe by random chance. 
Variance ratios are calculated for comparing a two period lag, , to the one period 
lag. 
t = 2
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Figure 4.4: Difference between observed variance ratio and one-tailed 95% 
confidence interval excluding famine years 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the difference between the observed variance ratio and the one-
tailed 95% confidence interval for the 39 individuals with the full 17 periods of wealth 
observations. We exclude timer periods prior to 1986 to remove the famine years. The 
red line depicts a normal distribution fitted to the data. Observations below zero indicate 
a rejection of the null hypothesis changes in wealth follow a random walk in favor of 
mean reversion. We reject the null for two individuals out of the 39 total, which is nearly 
identical to the 5% we would expect to observe by random chance. Variance ratios are 
calculated for comparing a two period lag, , to the one period lag. 
 
t = 2
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Table 4.1: Wealth summary statistics by village 
  Mean Log Wealth Standard Deviation Observations 
Village 1 95.24 130.48 208 
Village 2 82.56 110.22 206 
Village 3 55.66 57.47 197 
Village 4 41.94 35.61 223 
Notes:  Table shows summary statistics for wealth for each village. We see substantial 
differences in mean herd sizes across villages, which indicates different conditions across 
villages. 
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Table 4.2: Observed mixture fits for the pooled data and for each village 
Panel A: Pooled (n=49) 
  AICc BIC ICL 
1 Component  4185.60 4204.00 2426.74 
2 Components 3514.16 3555.65 2585.37 
3 Components 3114.62 3179.29 2711.34 
 
Panel A: Village 1 (n=13) 
 
AICc BIC ICL 
1 Component 1187.52 1200.56 600.28 
2 Components 956.80 986.47 622.57 
3 Components 879.50 926.18 649.87 
 
Panel B: Village 2 (n=12) 
  AICc BIC ICL 
1 Component  1042.25 1055.24 527.62 
2 Components 845.77 875.34 541.72 
3 Components 773.25 819.79 600.35 
 
Panel C: Village 3 (n=11) 
  AICc BIC ICL 
1 Component  938.81 951.24 475.62 
2 Components 737.77 766.14 494.37 
3 Components 650.13 694.89 514.90 
 
Panel D: Village 4 (n=13) 
  AICc BIC ICL 
1 Component  908.43 921.79 460.89 
2 Components 697.95 728.30 507.04 
3 Components 613.86 661.57 543.77 
 
Notes: Table presents the information criterion AICc, BIC and negative ICL for fitting 
mixture models with one, two and three components respectively. We present the 
negative ICL for ease of interpretation, as the proffered model for each criterion is the 
minimum value within the column, which is presented in bold font. We reliably find 
AICc and BIC to prefer a three-component mixture, while ICL prefers one for the pooled 
data and for each village. 
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Table 4.3: Mixture fits for simulated 2-component model 
Panel A: Pooled (n=49) 
  AICc BIC ICL 
1-Component  0 0 1 
2-Components  0.895 1 0 
3-Components  0.105 0 0 
 
Panel A: Village 1 (n=13) 
  AICc BIC ICL 
1-Component  0 0 0.984 
2-Components  0.77 0.997 0.016 
3-Components  0.23 0.003 0 
 
Panel B: Village 2 (n=12) 
  AICc BIC ICL 
1-Component  0 0 0.921 
2-Components  0.774 0.999 0.079 
3-Components  0.226 0.001 0 
 
Panel C: Village 3 (n=11) 
  AICc BIC ICL 
1-Component  0 0 0.959 
2-Components  0.725 0.999 0.041 
3-Components  0.275 0.001 0 
 
Panel D Village 4: (n=13) 
  AICc BIC ICL 
1-Component  0 0 1 
2-Components  0.781 0.997 0 
3-Components  0.219 0.003 0 
 
Notes: Table presents the percentage of times AICc, BIC and negative ICL fit mixture 
models with one, two and three components respectively for simulated data with a two-
component model. Parameters for the simulated data come from the 2-component 
mixture fit for the pooled data and villages respectively. We find AICc and BIC perform 
well at fitting the two component mixture, when it exists, with AICc being more prone to 
over fitting the number of components. We find ICL consistently fits the one-parameter 
model, indicating it does not perform well at identifying the two-component mixture. 
Additionally, we present the number of households in each sample, which we label n. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this dissertation, we investigate poverty alleviation strategies and their outcomes to 
shed light on how to optimally provide aid. Optimal aid needs to take into account not 
only the underlying cause of poverty and associated underlying asset dynamics, but also 
identify potential spillovers aid may have. Understanding the context of poverty in terms 
of the socio-economic and environmental contexts is critical in order to ensure poverty 
alleviation is performing effectively. We focus on rural populations in eastern Africa, 
specifically Tanzania and Ethiopia.  
 Using a CCT conducted in Tanzania designed to increase health and education 
outcomes as well as provide poverty relief, we find there is an increase in both direct 
fishing pressures from additional households earning money from fishing due to program 
participation as well as an increase in demand for seafood. Both put increased pressures 
on local fisheries indicating this poverty reduction policy may have negative spillovers in 
terms of local fisheries. While we do not go as far as to say this policy is sub-optimal 
because of these spillovers, we stress the importance of identifying spillovers and 
planning for them when combating poverty. 
 The results from chapter two are insufficient in themselves to determine if the 
spillover into the fishery sector is a negative impact. The other part needs to be to 
determine if local fisheries are at risk of overfishing. Understanding the complete picture 
of the nexus between the environment and the socio-economic system is essential to 
understanding the extent of how spillovers will impact the long-term wellbeing of the 
people in the system. In a study using data up to the year 2000, Berachi (2003) finds 
many Tanzanian fisheries have already surpassed their maximum sustainable yield. Thus, 
increased fishing pressures both from increased consumption and additional households 
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using fishing as an income source, are likely to exasperate the issue. Especially in inland 
fisheries, even when fish catches are increasing, it is possible to be depleting stocks of 
specific fish resulting in a loss of biodiversity and reduction in the sustainability of the 
fishery (Allens et al., 2005). The spillover into the fishery sector are not necessarily a bad 
thing, especially when fish populations are abundant. 
In cases where local fisheries can support additional fishing pressures, the 
spillover could be a substantial benefit to the populations. We found the moderately poor 
show increased likelihood of entering the fishing industry due to participation in the 
CCT. One explanation is these households were able to afford fishing gear and gained 
access to an additional revenue stream and means of diversifying income. In other words, 
they are able to surmount a Micawber Threshold, which could put them on a higher 
wealth trajectory resulting in long-term reduction in poverty. Regardless of the state of 
fisheries, it is important to consider how poverty reduction policies may impact the 
fisheries in order to manage the fishery in a sustainable manor. A change in aid policy 
may need to be accompanied by changes to how nearby fisheries are managed in order to 
maximize the benefit of the aid program and minimize the negative spillovers to the 
fishery sector. 
 Next we present a poverty trap model based loosely on the pastoralist system of 
the Borana Plateau in southern Ethiopia and use numeric simulation to determine optimal 
level of aid. We identify a range of inefficient aid levels below the Micawber Threshold, 
which we define as the inefficient aid trap. This region is characterized by higher rates of 
poverty and higher costs due to individuals being held at an unsustainable wealth level. 
Thus, the Micawber Threshold is a lower bound for optimal aid level and that aid should 
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be set significantly above the estimated Micawber Threshold when there is uncertainty of 
the location of the Micawber Threshold to avoid the aid trap. Additionally, we find the 
coupled relationship between level of poverty and cost ensures the cost of poverty 
alleviation is the primary driver of optimal aid and the social cost of poverty is a 
secondary concern. These results hold for multiple equilibrium poverty traps where 
households have homogenous dynamic wealth equilibria. We leave it for future research 
to determine if this changes when we allow for heterogeneity amongst individuals. Initial 
steps would be to use a more complex poverty trap model in line with Ikegami et al. 
(2016), which allows for heterogeneous individual ability and apply a basic wealth policy 
to these individuals. Additionally, the model would benefit from explicitly modeling the 
intertemporal choice problem of individuals to include consumption and savings 
decisions to determine if the ability to asset and/or consumption smooth impacts the 
results of our basic model. 
 Lastly, we introduce a novel test to identify multiple equilibrium poverty traps. 
We provide a falsification test by identifying mean reversion at the individual level using 
a variance ratio test. This test surmounts two major issues associated with identifying 
multiple equilibrium poverty traps: few observations near the Micawber Threshold and it 
allows for heterogeneous equilibria across the population. Our second test utilizes a 
mixture model to identify clustering in the aggregate and village level data. This is a 
weaker test, as it still requires assuming homogeneous wealth equilibria. We find no 
evidence using a data set, which was previously used to identify a multiple equilibrium 
poverty trap. This highlights the importance of rigorous tests to ensure we know the 
underlying cause of poverty to ensure we combat it appropriately. 
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The empirical difficulty of identifying multiple equilibrium poverty traps has 
important implications for the theoretic model of combating poverty traps described in 
chapter 3. First, it is extremely unlikely that poverty traps exist where there is a unique 
and stable Micawber threshold for all individuals within a population. Even in the 
relatively simple environment of the Boran pastoralists, it is difficult to identify a unique 
Micawber threshold within a village, much less across the sample as we show in chapter 
4. When more diverse livelihoods are available, which is the case in most contexts, this 
problem is exasperated. Thus, finding a unique Micawber Threshold to use as a target for 
aid policy is unlikely to be appropriate. However, our finding of asymmetric costs of 
incorrectly targeting aid still has important policy implications even when heterogeneous 
Micawber Thresholds exist. 
 Rather than looking at our results in terms of an overarching policy, we can think 
of it in terms of each individual. As there is a much larger cost for underproviding aid to 
any individual, when Micawber Thresholds are heterogeneous providing a basic wealth 
policy should be placed towards the upper end of the distribution of individual Micawber 
Thresholds. For instance, assume two individuals with heterogeneous Micawber 
Thresholds (similarly you could think of two groups of individuals with each group 
having a unique Micawber Threshold). Targeting a basic wealth policy at the average of 
the two Micawber Thresholds would clearly be inefficient as increasing the level would 
reduce the cost of providing aid as the cost of providing aid is much higher when aid is 
set below the Micawber Threshold compared to an equal amount above it. This inference 
is similar to the case of an uncertain Micawber Threshold, where erring on the side of 
overproviding aid is preferable when combating multiple equilibrium poverty traps. 
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 An alternative approach to combating multiple equilibrium poverty traps 
heterogeneous Micawber Thresholds could be using insurance. This would benefit from 
not having to identify individual Micawber Thresholds, as individuals would be able to 
determine when and how much insurance to purchase based on their experience and 
conditions. The issue with insurance is those closest to the Micawber Threshold, i.e. 
those who would benefit most, are least likely to purchase insurance as the cost may 
place them below the Micawber Threshold (Janzen 2012). Insurance would only be 
effective with substantial subsidies designed to allow those near the Micawber Threshold 
to invest in it.  
Future work concerning exactly how to incentivize this while minimizing the 
issues of the moral hazard problem would improve the effectiveness of this approach. 
The goal would be to allow individuals to insure up to their individual Micawber 
Threshold or, potentially, slightly above it at a rate far below the fair insurance price. 
However, if they desire insurance above this level, the price should rise approaching the 
fair price. However, this would either require extensive cost to identify individual 
Micawber Thresholds or accepting some level of providing aid in the form of insuring at 
a higher level than the Micawber Threshold for individuals with relatively lower 
Micawber Thresholds. While potentially costly, this additional insurance would be a form 
of aid, which would effectively provide a safety net and protect individuals from falling 
into the poverty trap region and when set at reasonable levels near the upper end of the 
Micawber Threshold distribution, may represent significant improvement in efficiency 
for society. Determining the appropriate level of insurance and how to discount it should 
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be done as future work through numeric simulation and ideally a randomized control trial 
implementing a subsidized insurance program to test its effectiveness. 
Insurance by itself would only work as the safety net portion of a program. This 
will need to be combined with some form of cargo net to bring individuals up to their 
respective Micawber Thresholds. This is especially important for situations where the 
low production technology draws upon a local public good, such as in the case of the 
Boran pastoralists. Failing to bring herd sizes up to the point where they can engage in 
mobile pastoralism may put additional pressures on the local pasturelands exasperating 
the tragedy of the commons (Lybbert et al., 2004). This potential spillover into the 
natural resources available is similar to what we explored in chapter 2. If aid is set too 
low where households are able to maintain their local warra herd, but not large enough 
for to keep a mobile fora herd may result in additional overgrazing and a reduction of 
productivity. This environment-poverty trap would put additional pressures on the 
already fragile ecosystem and cause additional dependence on external aid resulting in an 
aid trap. 
Utilizing conditional cash transfers may help to ensure this does not happen. If aid 
requires any cattle purchased (similarly the transfer could be in the form of livestock) 
would have to be grazed away from the village, this would reduce the likelihood of 
localized overgrazing. This condition may require households to pool herds, which is 
atypical for these populations. This would run the risk of imposing restrictions that go 
against culture and tradition and should be discussed at lengths with village leaders 
before attempting to implement. This is especially important because how linked status is 
with one’s herd. However, changing conditions may necessitate the shifting of cultural 
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norms in order for the pastoralism of the Borana Plateau to remain viable. Changes still 
need to come from within rather than being forced upon them by outside agencies in 
order to ensure the important aspects of the local culture remain intact and that aid is 
received and utilized by the pastoralists. 
Another form of aid to consider for the pastoralists is providing access to 
microfinance, which could act as both a form of cargo net and safety net. Providing loans 
to allow households to surmount their personal Micawber Thresholds would allow for 
households to put themselves on a path of wealth accumulation, allowing them to pay 
back the loans in future periods. Alternatively, during bad periods households would have 
the option to take out loans rather than draw down the productive assets of the herd 
allowing for more effective consumption smoothing without the risk of falling below the 
Micawber Threshold.  
A major downside to microfinance is the asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders results in the adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Udry, 
1994). A common solution used in rural microfinance has been to use joint-liability 
contracts placing the liability of individual loans on the whole group (Marr, 2012). This 
would utilize social pressures to help ensure loans are repaid when able. However, much 
of the risks associated with the Boran pastoralists tend to be systematic, such as drought 
affecting much of the plateau, which may reduce the effectiveness of these joint loans 
during bad years, which would increase the cost of providing loans and, in turn, 
increasing the price for the pastoralists. It may be desirable to combine this with some 
kind of index-based insurance program, potentially funded through government aid 
programs, to reduce the risk of the majority of loans failing for a village, thus reducing 
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the risk of the lenders. This combined policy would remove much of the moral hazard 
and adverse selection issues, while still providing additional aid during drought years. 
Regardless of the form the aid takes, when multiple equilibrium poverty traps are 
present it is critical to ensure individuals are able to surmount the critical Micawber 
Threshold and to protect assets from falling below this level in future periods. The goal of 
aid is to both enhance current wellbeing and, perhaps more importantly, to enable 
households to maintain a high-level of well being in future periods. Enabling self-
sufficiency rather than building a reliance on aid programs resulting in the aid trap is 
critical to ensuring aid budgets can be used to create the most benefit possible. Short-term 
thinking of trying to reduce current payments may be contrary to this goal of creating 
sustainable growth if aid is provided short of the Micawber Threshold.  
 Together these chapters stress the importance of identifying the cause of poverty, 
understanding the underlying wealth dynamics leading to poverty, and identifying any 
spillovers of aid policies in order to design effective aid strategies. Failing to do any of 
these may potentially lead to undesirable outcomes depending on the context. We hope 
these results can be built upon and used in the future to provide better aid to 
impoverished populations to help make the dream of eliminating extreme poverty a 
reality. 
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